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Moves to decentralise the government‘s administrative system has been 
one of the most important development issues in Thailand over the past two 
decades. These moves are seen most clearly in the establishment of the 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisation (SAO) across Thailand as the fundamental 
governing unit at the local administrative level.  
 
Decentralisation was introduced as a means of increasing the effectiveness 
of local government, promoting the transmission of power to the local people and 
encouraging greater local participation in policy making. The Ninth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006) promoted the development 
of the SAO to strengthen local government. The main purposes of decentralisation 
have been to balance the development of human, social, economic and 
environmental resources so as to achieve sustainable people-centred 
development, and promote the role of officials at the local level to increase the 
power of local government.  
 
The thesis examines implementation of this policy, drawing from theories 
on implementation in terms of ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches, and policy 
implementation failure. Propositions are derived from these theories for testing in 
the research.  The combination of the two approaches offers insights into key 
factors in policy implementation and what is needed to achieve better policy 
implementation. 
 
 This study focuses on 1) the capacity of an SAO to implement the policies 
set out by central government, 2) the capacity of staff to determine and implement 
the policy, 3) the adequacy of revenue available to the SAO for policy 
implementation, 4) the extent of autonomy from central government to the SAO in 
providing public services, and 5) the nature and extent of participation by the 
people in Chiang Rai province in issues of policy formulation and implementation.  
Staff drawn from 45 government agencies at three different levels (central, 




 This thesis found that the concept of decentralisation in Thailand was still 
new for both the Thai people and officials, and that the old bureaucratic systems 
continued to prevail. Local governance continues to be overseen partly by 
appointed personnel and the SAOs still rely heavily on central government for a 
wide range of matters. The lack of support from central government, insufficient 
revenue allocated to SAOs, inadequate autonomy, and various other deficiencies 
have limited the implementation of the policy.   
 
 This study concludes that the government must eliminate problems arising 
from adherence to the old bureaucratic systems at local, provincial and central 
government levels if the policy of decentralisation is to succeed.  Further, central 
government must ensure that staff who implement its decentralisation policy have 
the capabilities and experiences to implement the policy. The government also 
needs to ensure that the support is provided to the SAOs for the policy 
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Thesaphiban System Thailand‘s first form of local government  
 found by Prince Damrong (1862- 1943) 
 in the late 19th century. The function of the 
Sukhaphiban was to oversee the sanitary 
provisions for urban as well as rural 
districts. The Sukhabiban of Bankok was 
the first urban sanitary district, while Tha 






















 Decentralisation is a term used globally as a key theme to promote public 
services, and political and economic development.1 Hague and Harrop define the 
concept as ―central government functions...executed by subnational authorities‖.2 
According to Premdas and Steeves, under decentralisation, the administrative and 
decision-making tasks of the government are distributed to subordinate field 
agencies so that services and functions are dispensed to the local level.3 Starr 
defines decentralisation initiatives as activities that grant officials at provincial level 
more power to initiate ―without turning functions over to public control‖ or what can 
be called a ―self- government‖.4   
 Decentralisation has been introduced to achieve outcomes that include 
enhanced popular participation and improved economic and social interactions. 
Broadly speaking, decentralisation calls for a reallocation of functions and 
responsibilities between different levels of government for greater efficiency.5 
Implicit is the view that bureaucrats at local government can deliver better services 
to the people and that administrative functions and responsibilities can be 
performed more effectively.6  
 Even though decentralisation has been adopted in many countries, the 
development and the status of the process has varied between countries. As the 
United Cities and Local Governments review says:  
                                                          
1
 Andrew Heywood, Politics, 2nd edn. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p.159.    
2
 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 
7th edn. (New York: Palgrave, 2007), p. 294. 
3
 Ralph R. Premdas and Jeffrey S. Steeves, The Solomon Islands: An Experiment in 
Decentralization  (Honolulu: Center for Asia and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at 
Manoa, 1985), p. 4. 
4
 S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830-1870 (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.  x-xi. 
5
 United Cities and Local Governments, The World Bank, ‗Decentralization and Local 
Democracy in the World: First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments 
2008‘. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/waikato/Doc?id=10285629&ppg=58> [accessed 18 
February 2010]. 
6
 Heywood, pp. 158-159.; Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry and Jerry Goldman, The 
Challenge of Democracy Government in America, 2nd edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1989), p. 446. 
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 The scope of powers and functions assumed by local governments in the region 
 varies from country to country, and even among local governments within the 
 same country. These practices had been shaped by the respective country‘s 
 historical traditions, and increasingly by political, economic and fiscal 
 considerations as evidenced by the decentralization programs being 




 The success of decentralisation initiatives is influenced by factors such as 
historical traditions, and political and economic experiences.8 In Europe, the 
promotion of decentralisation is based on historical backgrounds and national 
governments.9 Swianiewicz describes decentralisation in Central and Eastern 
European countries as being a response to ―the historical experience of 
centralisation during the communist period‖.10 In England and Wales, the modern 
system of local government was established as a consequence of the industrial 
revolution,11 in France, local government structures were founded in 1799 by 
Napoleon Bonaparte,12 while in Italy, local authority was in evidence from the 12th 
century.13 Even with historical traditions of local government, these countries have 
experienced further decentralisation over the years.14 
 The success of the decentralisation process in European countries 
contrasts with the experience in Asian states. In many Asian countries, the 
restrictive nature of the cultural, traditional and political background has negatively 
impacted on the successful implementation of the decentralisation process. With 
the citizenry living for prolonged periods under authoritarian dictatorships or 
monarchies, the move to devolve authority from the central to the local level has 
been more problematic.15 In these states, there has been ―a wide range of drivers 
of decentralisation and obstacles to such changes‖.16 For example, 
decentralisation in China and Vietnam has been related to their economic reforms 
                                                          
7
 United Cities and Local Governments, p. 56. 
8
 Ibid., p. 56., Hague and Harrop, pp. 295-296.  
9
 Pawel Swianiewicz, ‗Cities in Transition from Statism to Democracy‘, in Urban 
Governance and Democracy Leadership and Community Involvement, edited by Michael 
Haus, Hubert Heinelt and Murray Stewart (London:Routledge, 2005), p. 103. 
10
 Ibid., p. 103. 
11 John Kingdon, ‗England and Wales‘, in Local Government in Liberal Democracies and 
introductory survey, edited by Chandler, J.A. (London:Routledge, 1993), p. 9. 
12
 M.C Hunt and J.A. Chandler, ‗France‘, in Local Government in Liberal Democracies and 
introductory survey, edited by Chandler, J.A. (London:Routledge,1993), p. 53.  
13
 Hague and Harrop, p. 294. 
14
 Ibid., p. 294. 
15
 Toshio Kamo, Political Economy of Decentralization: Japan, Asia and Europe, [n.d.],  
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN028989.pdf> 
[accessed 19 February 2011].  
16
 United Cities and Local Governments, p. 56. 
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and attempts to move towards a market-based economy. However, 
decentralisation in the Philippines and Indonesia has been based on a radical 
reform agenda, which has led these countries to pay more attention to the ‗bottom-
up‘ approach. In countries like Pakistan and Thailand, the concern was to reinforce 
strong central control to ensure the effectiveness of the national administrative 
system, while by contrast, in Bangladesh and Malaysia, decentralisation was a part 
of a method to strengthen the political role of local government.17  
 The scope of powers and functions assumed by local governments varies 
among countries and is influenced by the perspective of the government 
concerned. However, a common purpose of decentralisation is to promote social, 
political and economic development: 
1. Decentralisation is viewed as a means of achieving more democratic 
political outcomes. For example, Japan promoted a democratic local 
government system through its national agenda during the post-World War 
II period.18  
2. Decentralisation is viewed as a means of fostering economic development. 
For example, China and Vietnam have promoted a policy of 
decentralisation. Decentralisation has primarily been about economic 
reform in order to strengthen the economic potential of regions and 
localities as they have moved toward a market-based economy.19  
3. Decentralisation is viewed as a means for social reform. For example, the 
Solomon Islands adopted decentralisation to reform its social structure after 
its decolonisation.20 Korea promoted a decentralisation policy to strengthen 
its community ethics.21 
4. Decentralisation is viewed as a response to a community‘s wish to have 
greater control over its affairs. For example, decentralisation in North 
European countries was implemented to provide greater welfare states with 
social assistance, unemployment benefits, childcare and education.22  
 
 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
18
 Kamo, p. 109 
19
 United Cities and Local Governments, p. 56. 
20
 Premdas and Steeves, pp. 2-3. 
21
 United Cities and Local Governments, p. 56. 
22
 Hague and Harrop, p. 295. 
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 Even though many countries have pursued policies of decentralisation, 
decentralisation is difficult to implement. A country‘s historical and political 
background in terms of the relationship between central and local government, 
resistance by a strong central bureaucracy and the historical experience of 
colonialism, authoritarian dictatorships, or monarchies all influence the capacity for 
decentralisation.23   
 Decentralisation was first introduced in Thailand in 1897 in response to the 
colonisation of neighbouring countries and as a means of strengthening and 
maintaining control of central government, rather than risking any loss of the 
authority to the peripheral region. Despite this, the Thai national administrative 
system has been characterised by a ‗top-down‘ approach and a strong central 
government.24 More recently, Thailand has reinvigorated its commitment to 
decentralisation to support officials at the provincial and local levels to play a 
greater role within the national administrative system. 
—   The revision of the Thai Constitution in 1997 included decentralisation as a 
means to increase the effectiveness of local government and promote the 
transmission of power to the local people in encouraging greater local participation 
in policy making. The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(2002-2006) promoted the development of the Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisation (SAO) with the purpose of strengthening the local dimension of 
government. The main purpose of the decentralisation policy was to balance the 
development of human, social, economic and environmental resources so as to 
achieve sustainable people-centred development.25 The policy also attempted to 
promote the role of administrators at the local level to increase the power of local 
government.  
—   The implementation of the decentralisation policy, promulgated by the 
government, is at risk of failure. The development of local governance has been 
slow, due to the entrenched hierarchical system, inequality in social conditions, a 
lack of resourcing by central government, and local conditions affecting policy 
implementation. In addition, the overlap between Thailand‘s three layers of 
                                                          
23
 J.A. Chandler, Local Government in Liberal Democracies and Introductory Survey 
(London:Routledge,1993), p. 197.; Swianiewicz, p. 109. 
24
 Kovit Phong-ngam, Thailand‘s Local Governance: Principle and Dimension in the Future 
(Bangkok: Winyuchon Publication House, 2000), p. 78. 
25
 The Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan.1.; Yaowalak 
Rachapaetayakom, ‗A Development of Thailand in the Past Four Decades: Experience and 
the Next Step of Development‘ Suddhiparitad Journal, 16 (2002), 11-15 (pp.11-15). 
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administrative structure, especially between the provincial and the local 
administrations,26 has exacerbated the inefficient inter-relationships between 
government organisations. While the government has attempted to promote 
decentralisation,27 only a small number of officials and the Thai population have 
responded positively to the new challenges. The unique combination of the old and 
new systems has presented many challenges.28 Consequently, the policy 
implementers at the local level faced difficulties in putting the policy into practice 
effectively. 
—   
  This thesis extends the literature on decentralisation through its analysis of 
difficulties in implementing decentralisation effectively. It stems from an interest in 
understanding the role of central and local governments and of factors that hinder 
bureaucrats from performing their obligations in accordance with what the 
government initiates.  
1.2 Significance of the study  
For decentralisation to play an important role in Thailand‘s national 
administrative system, it is necessary to ensure the policy is put into practice 
effectively. This study of the implementation of the decentralisation policy seeks to 
examine the central government‘s promotion of decentralisation in 1997. It is an 
inquiry into the Thai government‘s support for decentralisation and its endeavours 
to implement the policy. The study will focus on the SAO unit of government 
because it is the foundational unit of Thailand‘s local government system.29  
This study is important because there have been many discussions about 
how the Thai government could bring progress to remote areas by encouraging 
decentralisation. The establishment of SAOs is one of the most important 
mechanisms for improving and developing remote areas. The 1997 Constitution 
reinforced the position of the SAOs, which were established in 1995. Despite this, 
                                                          
26
 Nakarin Mektrairat ‗Research in Decentralization‘ [n.d.], 
 <http://203.170.239.216/dlocT/images/upload_article/56_Chapter1_Thai.pdf >  
[accessed 15 July 2006].                                                                                                                                                                                                        
27
 See more detail in chapter 6. 
28
 Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi Democracy The evolution of the Thai political system 
(Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1992), p. 224. 
29
 Orapin Sopchokchai, Good Local Governance and Anti-corruption 
Through People's Participation: A Case of Thailand, World Bank, updated 2001 
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/orapin_paper.pdf>  
[accessed 22 July 2006]. 
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it is apparent that SAOs have limited autonomy to work on their own while they are 
required by central government to function as efficient local organisations 
providing public services.30  
In addition, as the SAOs are local organisations closest to the people, in 
order to implement central government policy, local government needs to be fully 
aware of what central government requires. There is the potential for policy 
implementation gaps due to the lengthy process involved in transmitting 
information.   
Past studies of problems associated with decentralisation,31 both in urban 
and rural cases in Thailand, have revealed weaknesses in the Thai government‘s 
policy, but these have lacked detail. In the case of the SAOs, a number of studies 
have focused on providing knowledge and understanding about the significance of 
the SAO to a locality. They have pointed out the importance of participation, 
particularly in areas of education and health policy.  
 This thesis is designed to explore and analyse Thailand‘s implementation 
of decentralisation policy in order to understand the policy implementation process 
and factors that led to policy implementation failure. This thesis demonstrates the 
difficult reality of implementing this policy and provides a basis for drawing lessons 
for a better approach in the future. 
 
1.3 Scope and Limitation 
 The study of Thailand‘s decentralisation policy is through the case study of 
Chiang Rai‘s SAOs. The aims of promoting decentralisation provided under the 
                                                          
30
 Ibid.; Sopchokchai., UNESCAP, Local Government in Asia and the Pacific: A 
Comparative Study, Thailand, United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, <http:www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/thaialnd/thai.html>. 
[accessed 2 June 2006]. 
31
 Ibid.; UNESCAP., Chaiyan Rajchagool, Tambon Administrative Organization: Are the 
People in the Dramatis Personae or in the Audience?‘, UNESCAP, [n.d.], 
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/Publications/TPTS_pubs/TxBulletin_69/bulletin69_b.pdf> [2 
June 2006].; Chamniern P Vorratnchaiphan and David P Villeneuve, Thailand‘s Capacity 
Building for Strategy Management in Local Government Administration: A New Model for 
Natural Resource and Environmental Management, The Thailand Environment Institute, 
[n.d], <www.tei.or.th/gap/pdf/Capacity%20Building%20for%20SM_alexxandria.pdf> 
[accessed  31 March 2006].; Likhit Dhiravegin, Democracy and Thailand‘s Political 
Revolution (Bangkok: Chaopraya Rabop Kranpim MAC, 2003), p. 97.; Sompong Patpui, 
Decentralisation and Local Governance in Thailand. Grassroots Development Institute, 
LIFE-UNDP Thailand, [n.d.], 
<http://www.thailocal.net/gdi-english/2-decentralisation-local-governce-24aug2002.htm> 
[accessed 9 November 2008].  
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1997 Constitution and the Ninth Plan are of particular interest because in 
promulgating the law, it was anticipated that the outcomes would bring a new and 
improved level of performance to Thailand‘s national administrative system.  
 By redistributing power from central government, sub-national units of 
government would be given the discretion and capacity to enable them to engage 
in effective (as opposed to illusory) decision making authority regarding policies 
affecting their area,32 an idea which had been discussed in Thailand for a long 
time. Yet, decentralisation in Thailand has not been smooth. Problems such as the 
strongly centralised nature of the administrative system and the lack of readiness 
of government officials to respond to this policy are evident. This study 
consequently, focuses on the capacity of SAOs to implement the policies set out 
by central government on the nature of Thailand‘s national administrative system 
and on the conditions inhibiting the government‘s decentralisation policy.   
 
1.4 Objectives of study 
 Thailand has pursued economic development under the National 
Development Plans, as witnessed by the rapid expansion of the national 
economy33 at an average rate of 7.8 percent per annum since 1967. The country's 
financial position has improved and this has been recognised internationally. The 
government is endeavouring to increase investment in infrastructure and public 
services to improve the quality of life of the Thai people.34 Despite these 
improvements, economic development remains concentrated in the capital city 
(Bangkok) and its surrounding provinces. Consequently, there has been a 
widening gap between the rich who live in the city and the poor in the rural areas.35  
 To balance the development of human, social, economic and 
environmental resources, and to achieve sustainable people-centred development, 
the Thai government outlined its plans for decentralisation in the 1997 Constitution 
and the Ninth Plan. The 1997 Constitution set out to promote Thai popular 
participation at both local and national levels, by emphasising the decentralisation 
                                                          
32
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of power to local government, the need to restructure national and local 
governance, and for the reform of electoral and political processes.36  
 The Ninth Plan set out several objectives for the development of Thai 
society such as to establish good governance in all parts of Thai society, to 
enhance efficiency of government service delivery based on people‘s participation 
and to promote a decentralisation process by allowing local administrations to play 
a greater role in local development in accordance with the intent of the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997). The Ninth Plan also focused on the 
decentralisation of functions and responsibilities to local administrative 
organisations so that public services could be in line with the people‘s needs.  
 From this, the primary objective of this study is to outline and analyse 
decentralisation and policy implementation through the case study of the SAOs in 
Chiang Rai province, Thailand. The specific objectives in this study are: 
1) To assess the SAO staff‘s understanding of the policy of 
decentralisation. The focus of this issue is to examine the degree of 
understanding of the SAO staff who are tasked with putting the 
decentralisation policy into practice effectively. Should staff lack in their 
understanding of the decentralisation process, the study then further 
seeks to determine the conditions influencing the lack of staff 
understanding of decentralisation;   
2) To assess and examine the inter-relationships between government 
organisations vertically and horizontally. The focus of this issue is to 
determine the degree of cooperation, support and interaction among 
government organisations, which affect the SAOs‘ policy 
implementation;    
3) To examine the SAO‘s capability in responding to the decentralisation 
policy. The focus of this issue is to identify the clarity of policy 
guidelines, the SAO‘s ability in interpreting the policy of decentralisation 
and what SAO staff seek as solutions. The study also indentifies how 
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much SAO staff draw on their own localised knowledge and expertise in 
their policy implementation;   
4) To identify the nature of problems affecting the SAOs‘ policy 
implementation. The focus of this issue is to examine the autonomy 
granted from central government to the SAOs in providing public 
services, the hierarchical system (constitution, political culture, 
historical background) in Thailand that affects the SAOs‘ 
implementation of the decentralisation policy, the adequacy of revenue 
available to SAOs for policy implementation, the extent of overlap or 
lack of clarity over constitutional responsibilities between provincial and 
local governments, and conflicts between traditional forms of local 
leadership and SAOs that influence positively or negatively the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy and participation by the 
people in Chiang Rai province in issues of policy formulation and 
implementation.  
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
In investigating the practices associated with decentralisation and policy 
implementation, this thesis examines three different elements: 1) policy outcomes 
(whether the implementation process succeeds or fails), 2) limitations in policy 
implementation (conditions or obstacles leading the implementation process to 
fail), and 3) solutions (assistance, support, mentoring provided by the central 
government or responsible organisations assigned by the government). There are 
four parts to this thesis.   
Part One – Issues in policy implementation and decentralisation  
 Chapter 2 outlines policy implementation theories in terms of ‗top-down‘ 
and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches, policy implementation failure, and derives 
propositions for testing through the research undertaken. This chapter explores 
issues of policy implementation, which is the stage in the policy process where the 
government gives effect to its policy decision. Most of the policy implementation 
literature being used in this chapter comes from North American sources, with 
others from Britain and other English-speaking countries. However, some useful 
policy implementation literature is from studies on developing countries.   
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Three main approaches to policy implementation are discussed: the ‗top-
down‘; ‗bottom-up‘; and the synthesis of these two. The ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ 
perspectives are helpful in examining the policy implementation process and the 
role of government agencies in these processes. The combination of the two 
approaches offers insight into key factors in policy implementation and what is 
needed to achieve a better implementation process. The chapter concludes with a 
series of propositions for testing by reference to the case of Thailand. Additionally, 
information in accordance with the case study approach, research design and 
sources of data are presented.  
Part Two - Thailand‘s political background and a new scheme of decentralisaiton 
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of Thai society and its political culture 
examining factors that influence and bring about change to Thailand‘s political 
system. It introduces Thailand‘s political development from the early time when the 
absolute monarchy was applied as a political system that contributed to the 
formation of a social cleavage between the elite and the rest of the citizenry, 
blocking the Thai people from involvement in the political system. The chapter also 
outlines Thailand‘s political system that emerged with the initial transition towards 
democracy in 1932. Problems with Thailand‘s national administration system and 
the search for solutions are also discussed.   
Chapter 4 introduces the history of Thailand‘s decentralisation policy, 
beginning with the bureaucratic reforms of 1892 when Thailand strengthened its 
central government to ensure control of the national administration system to 
protect itself from colonialism. Initiatives towards decentralisation in Thailand are 
outlined according to four different periods: 
1. The attempt to establish self-government at the local level in 1933 in the 
Municipality Act (1993) which set up three types of municipalities: the city 
municipality; the town municipality; and the tambon (districts) municipality; 
2. The period from 1952 to 1956 when the government, realising that the 
municipalities had not developed as initially planned, attempted to resuscitate local 
government in a form of Sukhapibans. During this period, the Provincial 
Administrative Organisation (PAO) was established.  In addition, in 1956, the 
Tambon Act established tambons as local administrative agencies. Consequently, 
tambons had the potential to raise their own revenue and manage their 
expenditure as well as being granted autonomy to exercise their obligations.   
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3. The third period was between 1961 and 1991, during which time the 
government‘s attention was on developing the economic system rather than 
extending local government. As a result, the development of local government was 
not pursued. However, in 1978, the government passed the law that established 
the Pattaya city government. 
4. During 1992 to 1996, there were issues over the election of governors 
and demands were made for local government reform. During this period, in 1995, 
the first 617 SAOs were established. Later in 1996, more SAOs were established 
bringing the total to 2,143. This has since then risen to the total of 6,157 SAOs.37  
Throughout each period, central government has continued to play an 
important role and has controlled the national administrative system at all levels. 
The development of a new form of local body authorities for rural communities, in 
1992, is still limited. Against this background, in 1997 the government promulgated 
the new Constitution, which emphasised more decentralisation and attempted to 
promote a self-governing system at the local level. While the Constitution was 
designed to allow bureaucrats and government agencies at the local level to have 
more opportunities to participate in governing their areas, the local people were 
also encouraged to play an important role in decentralisation by participating in 
local government‘s activities. 
 Chapter 5 outlines the Thai government‘s Ninth and Tenth Economic and 
Social Development Plans, and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 
2540, which includes new strategies to develop the country based on 
decentralisation. While the First Plan was focused on economic development and 
the promotion of economic growth, with social development mentioned as one of 
the primary objectives in raising the standard of living of the Thai people, the latter 
plans were gradually focused on social and people development. This is because 
the government realised that focusing only on economic development was not 
sufficient to develop the country to the next stage.  
 The Eighth Plan had emphasised the concept of people-centred 
development by encouraging Thai people from different backgrounds and regions 
to participate in planning the direction for the development of the country. This was 
a first step for the Thai people to have the opportunity to participate and express 
their views. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540, and the Ninth 
and Tenth Plans, are discussed especially in terms of their aspirations for good 
                                                          
37
 Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior. Data at 15 August 2008.  
12 
 
governance and the attempt to link the national administrative system with local 
government. The Ninth Plan (2002–2006) introduced the concept of good 
governance and the Tenth Plan (2007-2011) sought to improve the quality of 
governance and strengthen the role and capabilities of local government, as well 
increase participation across the localities.  
 Chapter 6 presents details of the SAOs‘ functions, its structures and 
problems it has faced. The SAOs were established under the Tambon Council and 
Tambon Administration Organisation Act of 1994. The SAOs are a sublevel below 
a district and a province. The main purposes of establishing the SAOs were to 
decentralise administrative power to the local people and to revitalise the 
participation of the local people in community development affairs.  
 
As a local organisation, subdistrict organisations are allocated within a 
district (Tambon) area administered at the provincial level. The governors in each 
province are delegated from central government to oversee the accountability of 
the SAOs. Under the Tambon Council and Tambon Administration Organisation 
Act of 1994, the structure of the SAOs has two different parts: 1) the Subdistrict 
Administrative Organisation Council, and 2) the Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisation Commission. Furthermore, the Office of the Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisation acts in response to the SAO obligations. Its responsibility is to work 
on the administrative responsibilities document regarding its district development 
plan.  
 
This chapter also analyses SAOs‘ problems in policy implementation. It is 
noticeable that even though the government has acknowledged the value of 
localisation and has attempted to empower its local government, the national 
administrative system continues to be characterised by a ‗top-down‘ approach to 
policy development and implementation. As a result, the SAOs have less 
opportunity to exercise their own obligations. This chapter also discusses 
problems in terms of the scope and responsibility of SAOs, problems associated 
with the overlap of regulations across different levels of government, and problems 








Part Three - Case study and Research Finding  
Chapter 7 presents information obtained through in-depth interviews, focus 
group interviews, group discussions and private discussions with participants in 
local government in Thailand. The in-depth and focus group interviews were held 
in Chiang Rai and Bangkok provinces. They focussed on four main issues: 1) SAO 
staff understanding of the policy of decentralisation; 2) inter-relationships between 
organisations; 3) interpretations of the decentralisation policy; and 4) problems and 
impediments in implementing the decentralisation policy. 
 
 Chapter 8 is based on interviews with staff at central, provincial and local 
government levels and presents an analysis of decentralisation to the SAOs. It 
also includes insights from key official documents, and scholarly books and 
articles. This chapter reveals that to ensure the policy of decentralisation is being 
implemented effectively, central government needs to be more concerned with 
matters of staffing at local levels, there needs to be training to ensure a good 
understanding of decentralisation, conflicts and overlap among different 
organisations needs to be addressed, the hierarchical system of government 
bureaucracy needs to be modified for work with local government, and the limited 
autonomy and unstable flow of revenue to the local level, along with the rigid 
administrative rules and regulations issued by central government need to be 
reviewed and addressed. 
 
         Chapter 9 evaluates the decentralisation policy in Chiang Rai‘s SAOs 
based on the information provided from the in-depth interviews, focus group 
interviews, questionnaires, private interviews and secondary data. The problems 
regarding the decentralisation policy and the difficulties in policy achievement are 
also discussed in this chapter. In the case of Chiang Rai SAOs, it can be seen that 
on the one hand, the SAO staff face several problems caused by the government 
at the central level, such as problems regarding administrative structures, 
ambiguous regulations issued by central government, and limited revenue, 
resources and autonomy. On the other hand, the problems at the SAO level 
include limited staff capability and experience. In addition, SAO staff face problems 
stemming from traditional forms of leadership and adherence with the old style of 
administration. For as long as these issues remain unaddressed, it is difficult to 
anticipate that the SAOs can achieve the government‘s goals that underpin the 
decentralisation policy.   
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Part  Four,  Conclusion  
Chapter 10 concludes this study, summarising its contribution to 
knowledge, noting the limitations of the research and indicating further work 
needed. Several suggestions and recommendations are made regarding the 
decentralisation policy and the steps needed for the successful implementation of 
the policy. Given the absence of a strong foundation for decentralisation, the 
government must consider seriously the issues which currently limit the success of 
the decentralisation process. The government must also address inefficiencies in 
the interactions between the three levels of government that stem from the 
perpetuation of a ‗top-down‘ approach, so staff at the local level have more 
opportunity to participate in government and to exercise their own authority. As 
well as to genuinely transfer power and allow local government to perform its new 
responsibilities, central government must ensure staff at the local level gain 
sufficient knowledge, capabilities, and experiences in order to respond well to the 
decentralisation policy.   
Studying developments after 2011 will benefit the government as it seeks 
to enhance its policy as well as to solve the problems occurring during the 
implementation of the plan. Furthermore, the moderate level of success in 
achieving the goals of the Ninth Plan demonstrates there were deficiencies 
regarding the new national administrative system. Studying bureaucrat 
administration and behaviour under the new scheme, especially those bureaucrats 
who work at the local government level, will assist the government solve the 
problems and enhance the decentralisation policy for a better outcome.   
What follows in the next chapter is a review and analysis of the literature on 
policy implementation, together with the factors that cause policy implementation 
failure, and propositions derived from the literature for testing against research and 










Issues in Policy Implementation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and outlines the theoretical and conceptual 
framework for this study of the Thai government‘s efforts to extend greater power 
to Subdistrict Administrative Organisations. The focus is on issues of policy. The 
chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section outlines the policy-
making process under five headings: 1) issue emergence, 2) policy formulation, 3) 
policy implementation, 4) policy evaluation, and 5) feedback. The second section 
describes the evolution of policy implementation theory since the early 1970s and 
focuses on the ‗top-down‘ approach, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach, and a synthesis of 
the two. The third section outlines the insights from these perspectives in terms of 
the risk of policy implementation failure and derives a number of propositions from 
the policy implementation literature. The fourth section presents propositions for 
testing by reference to a case study. The final section introduces the case study 
method that will be employed as well as issues of sampling and data collection.    
 
2.2 The Policy Process 
One of the key reasons for studying public policy is to understand better the 
public policy process.38 Many scholars present this as a series of stages, which are 
related to the activities through which a policy is made.39 Birkland outlines the 
stages of the policy process, drawing on Easton‘s system model, and suggests 
that the main activities of the process consist of 1) issue emergence, 2) agenda 
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1. Issue Emergence 
Anderson calls the first stage problem identification and agenda setting. 
The focus here is on the identification and specification of problems, and the way 
that they are drawn to the attention of the policy makers.41   
2. Policy Formulation 
Policy formulation refers to the process of decision-making used in 
addressing the specific problem that has been identified.42 Two contrasting models 
of the formulation process, the rational and incremental, offer different accounts of 
policy formulation.43  As Hague and Harrop describe: 
 the rational model views policy formulation as emerging from a systematic search 
 for the  most efficient means of achieving defined goals. By contrast, the 
 incremental model sees policy formulation as emerging from a compromise 




Birkland suggests the rational model reflects how most people believe 
decisions should be made45 and this model is often presented as the universally 
ideal pattern for decision-making, one that should be approximated as closely as 
possible.46 The rational model assumes decision-makers have at their disposal all 
the information in relation to a problem and its causes as well as information about 
possible solutions, with the most preferable option selected.47 The incremental 
model developed by Lindblom notes that ―people make a decision in relatively 
small increments rather than in big leaps‖.48 It views public policy formulation as a 
continuation of past government activities with only relatively minor modifications 
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3. Policy Implementation 
Once the decision makers have completed formulating a policy, the policy 
is prepared for delivery and implementation. In the conventional stages model, 
implementation is assumed to be the role of bureaucrats and government 
agencies. The primary focus of this thesis is on the policy implementation stage. 
4. Policy Evaluation 
Evaluation follows policy implementation, and consists of clarifying the 
extent to which a policy has achieved the goals set by the decision-makers.50   
5. Feedback 
Once the policy has been implemented and evaluated, feedback of the 
outcome of the policy is taken into account as it informs another round in the policy 
making process.51 
This conception of public policy making provides a basic framework and 
context for examining implementation issues.  
 
2.3 Evolution of Policy Implementation Theory 
Policy implementation consists of a series of decisions and activities 
directed towards putting policy into action.52 As Heywood notes, implementation is 
generally seen as ―an aspect of administration, not as a feature of politics‖.53 As 
Pressman and Wildavsky state, ―a verb like ‗implement‘ must have an object like 
‗policy‘‖.54 Once a policy has been determined, the next process is the response of 
the various actors.55 Policy implementation involves all the parties and the 
activities involved in carrying out the decision. Typically, government officials and 
administrators translate government decisions into operational rules and 
regulations.56 Increasingly there is recognition, then, that administrators also make 
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policies as they engage in the tasks of implementation including the making of 
regulations, adjudicating cases, and exercising their discretion.  
Policy implementation is generally carried out by the bureaucracy but 
progressively, administrative agencies are expected to implement policy in a 
network of governance, which includes other groups.57 Policy implementation 
therefore involves various actors, organisations, procedures, and techniques, 
coming together to put policy into effect to achieve the policy goals.58   
Recognising the importance of the policy implementation process has been 
one of the major advances in the study of policy. A key concern in the study of 
policy implementation is with the extent to which those who formulate policy pay 
attention to the content and shape of a policy to ensure its successful 
implementation.59 This refers to the administrative agencies that have the 
discretion and powers to issue rules and directives regarding policy.60 There have 
been three main stages in research into the evolution of the policy implementation 
process. 
 
2.3.1 The Top-Down Approach  
The first stage of research of the policy implementation process began in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s with the seminal case studies by Jeffrey Pressman, 
Aaron Wildavsky, and Erwin Hargrove, who wrote about a missing link in the study 
of policy process,61 and Martha Derthick, who studied implementation issues.62 
These cases, later known as ―misery research,‖63 examined failures in the policy 
implementation process.  According to these pioneer studies, ―the problem of 
implementation was rarely analysed‖64 and the work spawned a number of 
subsequent studies.    
With little available knowledge about the policy implementation process, 
people were eager ―to understand why implementation failed or succeeded‖.65 
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From the individual case studies that were carried out, it was concluded that 
―government sponsored programmes seldom achieved their objectives‖66 because 
of the lack of attention given to the policy implementation process and the 
implementers.  
In addition, the Pressman, Wildavsky and Derthick67 study of policy 
implementation was highly informative, but their contributions were limited by the 
absence of a theoretical perspective.68 Their individual case studies did not offer 
any guidance about how to develop a model of the policy implementation process69 
that could be tested with other cases.70 In addition, according to Lester and 
Stewart:  
 little or no attempt was made to develop any dynamic model of the policy 
 implementation  process that could explain such failures, or to provide any real 
 guidance about how to  relieve the problems. Moreover, the case study 
 approach, used almost exclusively by the early researchers, made it 
 exceedingly difficult for investigators to generalize from their findings.
71
   
 
 This body of work contributed to the ‗top–down‘ approach to understanding 
implementation issues. From this perspective, policy implementation was analysed 
from the view of higher–level bureaucrats and executives who made policy 
decisions. The focus was on the decision-making of top level officials and their 
behaviour in working to ensure that a policy‘s goals were attained or 
reformulated.72   
The policy process was viewed as a series of chains of command where 
political leaders articulate a clear policy preference, later carried out through the 
administrative machinery.73 The nature of the relationship between the policy 
makers and policy implementers was seen as determining whether a policy was 
successful or unsuccessful. The ‗top-down‘ approach was based on several 
assumptions. 
1. Policies contain clearly defined goals against which performance can be 
 measured.  
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2. Policies contain clearly defined policy tools for the accomplishment of goals. 
3. The policy is characterized by the existence of a single statute or other  
    authoritative statement. 
4. There is an ―implementation chain‖ that ―start[s] with [the] policy message at 
 the top and sees implementation as occurring in a chain‖.
74
 
5. Policy designers have a good knowledge of the capability and commitment of 
 the implementers. With the availability of resources for an implementing 
 organization to carry out its tasks, including monetary and human resources, 
 legal authority and autonomy, and the knowledge, policy designers share with 
 the lower-level implementers, the need to implement policy effectively. 
 Commitment includes the desire of the implementers to carry out the goals of 
 the top-level policy designers; a high level of commitment means that the 
 values and goals of the policy designer are shared by the lower-level 
 implementers, particularly those at the ‗street-level‘ such as teachers, police 




As Mazmanian and Sabatier asserted, the ‗top-down‘ approach drew 
attention to the question of the extent of political control of a public organisation.76 
Consequently, it has led to a number of questions. 
1. To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups 
 consistent with the objectives and procedures outlined in the policy decision?  
2. To what extent were the objectives attained over time and were the impacts 
 consistent with the objectives? 
3. What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, and were 
 they relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones? 
4. How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?
77
   
 
Implementation theory suggests that it is difficult to minimize 
‗implementation gaps‘ where ‗top-down‘ control cannot be exerted over actors 
whose commitment to policy intentions is voluntary.78 The theory also considers 
that while government may pay more attention to decision-making and planning, 
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2.3.2 The Bottom-Up Approach 
The next phase in the development of implementation theory began in the 
mid-1970s when an alternative to the ‗top-down‘ approach was developed and 
several scholarly discussions regarding this approach and the emergent ‗bottom–
up‘ approach followed. In this era, systematic theories were developed for general 
cases rather than focusing on specific case studies80 as in the first era.  According 
to Birkland:  
 A second era of implementation studies… sought to create systematic theories of 
 the policy process that were generalizable to many cases, rather than focus 
 on one or a few  cases…. The first of these approaches emphasizes a ‗top-down‘ 
 perspective of policy implementation. Its proponents claim that one can 
 understand policy implementation by looking at the goals and strategies  adopted 
 in the statute …. These studies focus on the gaps between the goals set by a 
 policy‘s  drafters and the actual implementation and outcomes of the policy. 
 The second approach emphasizes a ‗bottom-up‘ perspective, which suggests 
 that implementation is best studied by starting at the lowest levels of the 
 implementation system  or ‘chain‘ and moving upward to see where 
 implementation is more successful or less so.
81 
 
The ‗bottom–up‘ approach emphasises the role of administrators at the local 
level who dealt directly with the policy in accordance with their responsibility to 
accomplish the policy‘s aims and objectives. The ‗bottom-up‘ approach focused on 
the involvement of lower-level bureaucrats carrying out public policy decisions. 
The actions of lower level, or street level, administrators were seen as critical to 
policy implementation because of the way they carried out the policy determined at 
a higher level by policy initiators.82   
The ‗bottom-up‘ approach first emerged when Lipsky argued that it was not 
easy to control the behaviour and activities of the front-line staff who develop their 
own ideas about how best to carry out their responsibilities and what was more 
effective in policy implementation, even though it is not necessarily what is 
required by the government.83 Front-line staff were seen as playing a very 
important role not only because they delivered government policy but because 
they were often the only ‗government‘ staff most citizens encountered. Teachers, 
police, and financial staff, in their positions as public policy providers, attract 
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political controversy and are constantly barraged by the demands of the recipients 
of the service to improve effectiveness and responsiveness, and by the demands 
of citizen groups to improve the efficacy and efficiency of government services.84  
Street level administrators were seen to approach policy implementation on 
the basis of their own judgements, values, opinions, experiences, history and 
background.85 In addition, scarce resources or having limited power86 were also 
found to be factors which made it difficult for staff at lower levels to work effectively 
in the policy implementation process. In his study, Lipsky saw ―front line staff in 
social policy implementation agencies as isolated people trying to provide service 
in the face of conflicting hierarchical requirements, great pressure from the public 
and inadequate resources‖.87 In these conditions, the front-line staff may modify or 
change the intention of a policy to suit how they have to carry out the 
implementation process. From this, it follows that the outcome of policies 
determined by central government may frequently be different to those expected. 
The ‗bottom-up‘ approach implied, therefore, that the ‗top-down‘ approach 
paid too much attention to top level officials and either ignored or underestimated 
the role of lower level bureaucrats. John points out that the ideas and influences 
arising from the involvement of implementers provide feedback to the top level 
decision-makers and so further influence policy choices.88 As John says, ―policy 
decisions can move ‗backwards‘ from implementing organisations, such as local 
authorities and government agencies, to the policy formulators‖.89 Instead of 
focusing on the policy as in the ‗top-down‘ approach, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach 
recognised the role of bureaucrats at lower levels because they have a significant 
input into decision-making.90  Bogason adds that the ‗top-down‘ people invariably 
find problems with the organisational setting. Later, those ‗top-down‘ people can 
give advice to the decision–makers on making policy without challenging the 
perspective of that particular organisation. In contrast, the perspective of the 
‗bottom-up‘ people is to deal with the policy implementation process, which allows 
them to be able to address any interaction that is linked to the policy 
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implementation problem instead of being tied to a particular definition by one 
organisation, which may only be part of the solution.91 
 
2.3.3 Debate between the ‗Top-Down‘ and ‗Bottom-Up‘ Approaches 
The ‗top-down‘ and the ‗bottom-up‘ debates centre on the separation of 
implementation from policy formation.92 This is only part of a wider issue of how to 
identify the features of a very complex process that writers respond to in a variety 
of ways.93 The two concepts have some very different characteristics and foci.  
Because the ‗top-down‘ approach emphasises clear objectives and the 
creation of proper structures and controls to encourage compliance with the goals 
set at the top level, if there is no consensus as to what the programme goals are, 
then it will be very difficult to set a standard for programme success or failure.94 
Furthermore, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach recognises that policy goals are often 
ambiguous and may conflict not only with other goals in the same policy area, but 
also with the norms and motivations of the street-level bureaucrats.95 ‗Top-down‘ 
models are most concerned with compliance, while ‗bottom-up‘ approaches value 
an understanding of how conflict can be alleviated by bargaining and sometimes 
compromise. According to Birkland, the:  
 ‗top-down‘ approach is much more useful when there is a single, dominant 
 program that is  being studied. The ‗bottom-up‘ approach, however, is best for 
 there is no one dominant program and one is more interested in the local  dynamic 




The arguments about the merits of ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom–up‘ approaches have 
been protracted and ultimately unfruitful since both offer insights into the making 
and implementation of policy.  
 
2.3.4 Synthesis  
The ‗bottom-up‘ approach depicts the policy implementation process as not 
only involving a relationship between policy makers and implementers, but also a 
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range of factors that affect the process of policy implementation. Both the ‗top-
down‘ and the ‗bottom–up‘ approaches offer insight into the key factors in policy 
implementation and, in practice, both approaches are needed to achieve better 
and effective policy implementation.  
Under the third stage, the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom–up‘ approaches are 
integral to the policy implementation process. Following criticism of both 
approaches, proposals for a synthesis resulted in the incorporation of three 
different features of those approaches. First, Richard Elmore developed a 
combination of ‗backward mapping‘ and ‗forward mapping‘,97 taking into account 
the significance of both the top level policy maker and the street level implementer 
in contributing to, and facilitating the policy implementation process.98 He also 
noted that instead of paying attention to the policy instrument, the policymakers 
must consider other resources at their disposal – ‗forward mapping‘.  
Elmore‘s ‗backward mapping‘ was derived from the recognition that those 
implementing policy are forced to make choices between the programmes that 
conflict and interact with one another.99 From this, Elmore sees ‗forward mapping‘ 
as the ‗top-down‘ approach that was difficult to maintain in the face of 
accumulating evidence on the nature of the implementation process.100 From this, 
he pays more attention to the ‗bottom-up‘ people in terms of the relationship of 
policy-makers to policy deliverers. The idea of ‗backward mapping‘ offers a way of 
both analysing and organising policy from its end-point.101 Elmore focuses on the 
issues of policy implementation, rather than offering rules about how to control 
implementation.102 From this, he defines ‗backward mapping‘ as: 
backward reasoning from the individual and organizational choices that are the 
 hub of the problem to which policy is addressed, to the rules, procedures  and 
 structures that have the closest proximity to those choices, to the policy 
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Sabatier‘s Advocacy Coalition Framework focuses on adopting the best of 
the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches as they both offer insight into the policy 
implementation process at different stages.104 According to Sabatier:  
adopting the bottom-uppers‘ unit of analysis [involves] a whole variety of public 
 and private actors involved with a policy problem – as well as their concerns with 
 understanding the perspectives and strategies of all major categories of actors 
 (not simply program proponents). It then combined this starting point with the top-
 downers‘ concerns with the manner in which socio-economic conditions and legal 
 instruments constrain behavior. It applies this synthesized perspective to the 




Sabatier therefore sought to combine the best of both the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-
up‘ approaches in developing the conceptual framework.106 As Sabatier notes:  
 The top-down approach appears to have a comparative advantage in situations 
 in which (1) there is a dominant piece of legislation structuring the situation 
 or in which, (2)  research funds are very limited, or is primarily interested in mean 
 responses, and  the situation is structured at least moderately well. In contrast, 
 the bottom-up approach is more appropriate in situations where (1) there is 
 no dominant piece of legislation but a rather large number of actors  without 
 power dependency, or where (2) one is primarily interested in the dynamics 




 That is to say, the ‗top-down‘ approach is better where there is a dominant 
programme, in instances where the law is well structured, where there are limited 
funds, and when there is a situation that someone requires a programme structure 
quickly.108 However, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach is better when there is no single 
dominant programme, or where interest is expressed in the dynamics of the policy 
implementation process at the local level.109 
 
According to Sabatier, the Advocacy Coalition Framework reflects the 
growing sense that implementation does not take place in a one-to-one 
relationship between the policy makers, implementers, and targets, but that policy 
subsystems110 are composed of actors who play a part in the generation, 
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dissemination and evaluation of policy.111 Sabatier‘s framework synthesises ‗top-
down‘ and bottom-up‘ approaches when a policy problem or subsystem are 
studied, rather than focusing on law or the policy decision framework. It requires 
that attention be given to the strategies employed by relevant actors at different 
levels of government as they interact to clarify the policy‘s objectives. It also 
requires attention be given to the legal and socio-economic factors which structure 
behavioural options in the implementation process.112  
 
The communication model developed by Malcolm Goggin et al also focuses 
on intergovernmental relationships between the top level and the administrators. 
Birkland refers to it as ―the sending of messages between policy implementation 
and implementers‖.113 This model emphasises conditions that affect decisions of 
whether to accept or reject messages communicated between layers of 
organisations.114 Two propositions from Goggin et al are: 
 1. Clear messages sent by credible officials and received by receptive 
 implementers who have or are given sufficient resources and who implement 
 policies supported by affected groups lead to implementation success. 
 2. Strategic delay on the part of states, while delaying the implementation of 
 policies, can actually lead to improved implementation of policies through 




Goggin et al explain the first proposition by pointing out that the messages 
are frequently ambiguous. The policy implementers are either very receptive, 
receive insufficient resources, or are opposed by the affected groups. In the 
second proposition Goggin et al argue the necessity of being concerned about the 
―strategically delayed implementation‖.116 This refers to the clarification of policy, 
more funds, and ensuring that there is the necessary support before a policy is 
implemented. By delaying the implementation of a policy, there is more time for the 
implementers to study, as well as prepare for and improve the service they offer.117  
 
The third phase in the theorisation of policy implementation, therefore, 
draws attention to the way in which both ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom up‘ perspectives 
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are significant in the understanding of policy implementation. Allen argues that the 
resulting model of policy implementation enables policy makers to achieve their 
goals by offering advice as to how they can exert greater control over the 
implementation process.118 
 
2.4 Policy Implementation Failure 
Ensuring the success of policy implementation is ―one of the most difficult 
aspects of the policy process‖.119 The often-noted reality is that it is difficult for a 
government to ensure policies will achieve the goals it is seeking. John and Kress 
et al refer to this as policy drift120 - the way events gradually shift the policy aims 
and later make the objective of the policy go awry. Because this can occur at any 
time, and even though policy makers endeavour to ensure the policy they 
determine is appropriate, there is no guarantee that the policy implementation 
process will be successful. A government needs to understand that policy drift can 
occur as the result of many unforeseen variables beyond their control.121  
Several scholars consider that policy implementation failure is relevant to 
the ‗top-down and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches. Barrett and Fudge see policy 
implementation failure as the outcome of a process when the top level actor 
demands the lower level actor conform to what they, the top level actor, expects 
from the policy they have determined.122 Rather it is the negotiating process in 
which control over policy execution or objectives is a key factor that ensures the 
success or failure of policy implementation.123  Barrett and Fudge note: 
If implementation is defined as putting policy into effect, that is, action in 
conformance with policy, then compromise will be seen as a policy failure. But if 
implementation is regarded as ‗getting something done‘, then performance rather 
than conformance is the central objective, and compromise a means of achieving 




In addition, Goodrice suggests that rather than increasing control over 
programme resources, the government must pay attention to the policy process in 
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order to improve local staff performance.125 John considers it important for a 
government to pay attention to both the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches.126 
Providing assistance and suggestions to people who work at the lower level will 
enhance the policy implementation process. This is because it is important to see 
the process holistically, from the beginning through to the end.  
While several scholars mentioned that ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ 
approaches can explain causes of policy implementation failure, Edwards sees 
that the synthesis perspective can also explain the cause of policy implementation 
failure. He notes:  
Policy implementers may know what to do and have sufficient desire and 
resources to do it, but they may still be hampered in implementation by the 




As he explains, differences in the origin of organisational characteristics 
can inhibit policy implementation128 causing the frontline workers to implement the 
policy in different ways.129 Because policy failure may occur at any stage of the 
process, it is necessary to pay attention to the relationship between the 
implementers implementing the policy rather than examining the behaviour of the 
top level actor in determining national policies, and the behaviour of the street level 
agencies in policy implementation. 
The following three sections look at policy implementation failure from ‗top-
down‘, ‗bottom-up‘ and synthesis perspectives.  
 
2.4.1 Policy failure from a ‗top-down‘ perspective 
According to Bachrach and Baratz, the shaping of policy may continue to 
change during the process of implementation.130 This may result in goal 
displacement, which normally occurs when the objectives actually implemented 
differ significantly from their initial intention. In relation to the ‗top-down‘ approach, 
policy implementation failure can be the consequence of a variety of factors as 
described below. 
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2.4.1.1 Policy formulation 
Because policy formulation is primarily focused at the top level,131 decision-
makers can provoke policy implementation failure if they initiate ambiguous 
policies132 which have unclear goals and vague priorities,133 all of which make it 
difficult for frontline workers to put the policies into practice.   
According to Sabatier, difficulties in the designing of policy reflects the 
reality that successful policy implementation can take more than ten to twenty 
years.134 From this, John notes that policy decision-making is characterised 
through the linear sequence of learning, adaptation and reformulation.135 Policy-
makers learn from mistakes and produce policies that are more appropriate or 
effective, and administrators, too, learn from mistakes in implementation.   
 
2.4.1.2 Lack of resources provided from central government  
Another factor that may lead to policy implementation failure is a lack of 
essential resourcing from the central government. This occurs in three ways. First, 
there is inadequate information.  Edwards notes that one of the critical resources in 
policy implementation is clear and concise information.136 If policies are innovative 
and highly technical, the implementers need to have sufficient information, a clear 
context, direction, and structure,137 to enable them to carry out the policies 
successfully.  
Second, policy implementation must be supported by sufficient funding 
otherwise the task cannot be accomplished.138 One classical example of a lack of 
funding which caused policy implementation failure is Pressman and Wildavsky‘s 
study of policy implementation using Oakland City, California, as a case study.  
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According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the project was delayed due to the  
―difficulties concerning interim financing‖139 when the Economic Development 
Administration, which had the funds, had no policy to ―advance grant funds for 
interim development and construction financing‖.140 Edwards also notes that the 
problem of insufficient funds can cause embarrassment to those involved in the 
implementation process and antagonize those whose active support is necessary 
for effective implementation.141  
 
Third, high level bureaucrats are often not aware of the lower level‘s 
capacity to follow and complete a mission. This lack of awareness can lead to 
inadequate preparations and resource allocations to those expected to implement 
a policy.142  Resources can be taken to refer to a ―staff of sufficient size with the 
proper skills to carry out their assignments‖,143 along with the authority and 
facilities.144 Parsons notes that the implementation process requires a top level to 
provide the resources to a lower level to do a job.145 In addition, Edwards explains 
that even though the implementation process may be accurately transmitted and 
consistently, if the frontline workers lack the resources necessary to carry out the 
policies, implementation is unlikely to be effective.  
 
2.4.1.3 Policy inconsistencies  
Problems regarding policy implementation may occur when those actors 
who implement policies are confused by inconsistency at a higher level and thus 
are unable to interpret as well as to carry out a policy‘s goal.146 According to 
Edwards: 
Implementation orders must be consistent as well as clear if policy implementation 
is to be effective. Transmitting clear but contradictory instructions will hardly make 
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it easier for operational personnel to expedite implementation. Nevertheless, 





Edwards notes several factors that produce policy inconsistency. These 
include the complexity of public policies, the difficulties in starting up new 
programmes, and the multiple objectives of many policies.148 According to 
Edwards: 
Inconsistency, like ambiguity, also result from a desire not to alienate interests, and 
the greater the number of competing interests that seek to influence a policy‘s 
implementation, the greater the chance of inconsistent implementation instructions. 
Finally, the more concerned decisionmakers are with overturning precedent, the 
higher the probability of their decision appearing to be inconsistent as they attempt 




From this, central government must be aware and make certain there are 
no problems regarding policy inconsistencies, otherwise, frontline workers may be 
confused and unable to fulfil the policy implementation process.150  
 
2.4.2 Insights into reasons for policy failure from a ‗bottom up‘ perspective 
Because the top level people and the agencies have different 
responsibilities in the policy implementation process, it is necessary to make 
certain that those frontline people who put the policy into practice respond to the 
policy correctly. Problems regarding policy failure from the ‗bottom-up‘ can be 
explained in terms of the limited capabilities of bureaucrats. One set of problems 
can be due to difficulties in policy interpretation. Rawson agrees with Hill and Hupe 
that a prime cause of implementation failure151 arises because the policy contents 
or policy characteristics152 are ambiguous for government agencies to implement. 
While those who are policy-makers require implementers to be competent153 and to 
respond the policies correctly, ambiguous policies may lead the frontline workers 
to interpret the policies in different ways.   
Another set of problems can be due to the background and experience of 
bureaucrats. In addition to the decision-makers at the top level, the frontline 
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workers also play an important role in policy implementation. Anderson observes 
that because the administrative agencies are the primary implementers of public 
policy, their performance affects citizens more regularly than other government 
organisations.154 Hill and Hupe identify those agency responses in policy 
implementation155 which may later cause policy failure. First, there are overall 
conditions regarding organisational control, inter-organisation relationships, and 
formal and informal linkages in policy-making.156 The disposition of agencies which 
implement the policy157 concentrates on three different elements: a) the agencies‘ 
cognition of the policy (comprehension or understanding); b) the direction of the 
agencies‘ responsibilities to policy (acceptance, neutrality, or rejection); and c) the 
intensity of the response. Second, there are the issues about the behaviour of 
street level staff158 as they bring their individual background and experiences to the 
implementation process: their individual judgement; values; opinions; experience; 
history and background.159  
 
2.4.2.1 Nature of problems affecting policy implementation 
Several factors can determine policy implementation success or failure, 
which can vary according to region, the local context, cultural practice, mixing of 
ethnicities, assumptions around gender,160 and economic forces.161 The nature of 
the problem being addressed is also influenced by changes in social and economic 
conditions,162 the availability of new technology,163 and variation in political 
circumstances of the target group.164 As a consequence, the ultimate outcomes 
may differ from those expected by central government.165  
Anderson draws attention to the different structures, operating styles, 
political support, expertise, and policy orientation of administrative organisations. 
John points out that organisations differ from one another in the way they operate 
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and in the way they respond to the policy implementation. Anderson166 observes 
that ―conflict over questions of administrative organisation can be every bit as 
sharp as conflict over substantive policies. Forming an administrative organisation 
is a political as well as a technical task‖.167 According to Seidman:  
Organizational arrangements are not neutral. We do not organize in a vacuum. 
Organization is one way of expressing national commitments, influencing program 
direction, and ordering priorities. Organizational arrangements tend to give some 
interests and perspectives more effective access to those with decision-making 




From this, as Anderson and Nagel note, ―the content and impact of policy is 
affected by how it is implemented‖.169 Since there are different administrative 
organisations involved in policy implementation, it is difficult to control the policy 
implementation process. As Edwards notes, ―the more actors and agencies 
involved with a particular policy and the more interdependent their decision, the 
less the probability of successful implementation‖.170  
 
2.4.3 Policy failure - synthesising ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ perspectives 
A synthesis of the two perspectives suggests policy implementation failure 
can occur in different ways. It is quite clear that top level officials alone cannot 
make the implementation of policy successful. That means, ―different bureaucratic 
agencies at different levels of government (national, state or provincial, and local) 
are involved in implementing policy‖,171 especially administrators at the lower level 
who are essential parts of policy implementation; indeed, policy implementation 
relies on their efficiency.172 Therefore, poor relationships within government 
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organisations and problematic inter-organisational relationships are important 
reasons for policy implementation failure.173  
Colebatch observes that a shared understanding of the policy is significant 
for successful policy implementation. It is often the case, however, that those who 
participate in the implementing process come from different perspectives and what 
they know is often in conflict with what others in the implementation process 
know.174  
Focussing on the inter-relationships between organisations draws attention 
to links between different levels and layers of government. As Hill and Hupe note, 
paying attention to the specific level and organisation will normally enhance policy 
implementation.175 Inadequate coordination or collaboration between organisations 
at the vertical level is likely to impede the policy implementation.176 Problems of 
coordination and collaboration between organisations at the horizontal level, where 
there is no hierarchical accountability, are also likely to cause problems, for 
example through overlaps between organisations.177  Hierarchy also means that 
those at upper levels have a larger voice in agency decisions because of their 
higher status, even though lower level officials may have more substantive 
qualifications and information.178   
Hill and Hupe note that the quality of collaborative relationships in policy 
implementation is shaped by the type of network between organisations.179 If there 
is a well functioning network and effective relationships between policy-makers 
and implementers, and among government agencies, then implementation will be 
more successful. It is less likely that there will be miscommunication between 
different levels and layers of the organisations involved.  
A vertical perspective of policy implementation draws attention to the 
possibility of difficulties in communication between agencies at different levels - 
upper and lower - where the administrators at the lower level may have problems 
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regarding ―how to get the message right‖,180 or as Dunsire calls this ―a failure of 
communication‖.181 The horizontal approach draws attention to possible problems 
in terms of the quality of coordination and collaboration between organisations. 
The nature of the networks between organisations, then, and the quality of the 
relationships between officials within the organisations, their attitudes, trust and 
individual behaviour, are important factors.182   
 
2.5 Summary  
The discussion of policy implementation draws attention to the significance 
of the way national policies emerge not only from the intentions of top level 
bureaucrats, but also from lower level agencies with input into policy decision-
making. Important concerns for central government are, first, how central 
government itself determines appropriate policies, and, second, how government 
policies are carried out at the street level. The previous discussion shows that 
once a policy is determined there is no guarantee that what is produced – the policy 
outputs - will meet the desired goals or requirements. The discussion also leads to 
the conclusion that success in policy implementation depends on sound policy 
ideas and appropriate processes to carry out the policy.  
 
2.6 Propositions  
 Drawing from the previous review, a number of propositions for testing by 
reference to a case study have been derived.  
1. Policy implementation is best understood by ―looking at the goals and 
strategies adopted in the statue‖ (derived from Birkland);183 
2. Policy implementation is best understood from the lowest level of the 
implementation system (derived from Birkland);184 
3. The policy implementation process is best understood by analysing 
and organising policy from its end points (derived from Elmore‘s proposition 
regarding ‗backward mapping‘ and the need to take account of all policy 
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actors who influence the policy implementation process.185 Rather than 
paying attention only to the policy makers at the top level, Elmore focuses 
on the relationship between the policy makers and policy deliverers at the 
end points in the process);186 
4. The ‗top-down‘ approach is better where there is a dominant 
programme such as where the law is well structured, where there are 
limited funds, and when there is a situation that someone requires a 
programme structure quickly. Nevertheless, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach is 
better when there is no single dominant programme, or where interest is 
expressed in the dynamics of the policy implementation process at the local 
level (derived from Sabatier‘s proposition that sought to combine the best 
of both ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches. As Sabatier sees it, both 
‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches actually offer insight into the policy 
implementation process.187 Policy implementation does not take place in a 
one-to-one relationship between the policy makers, implementers, and 
targets (of policy), but among all policy implementers who are involved with 
the policy process);188 
5. Clear messages sent by credible officials and received by receptive 
implementers who have or are given sufficient resources and who 
implement policies supported by affected groups lead to implementation 
success (derived from Goggin‘s proposition that policy implementers 
frequently receive ambiguous messages and inadequate resources from 
those at the top);189 
6. Even though policy makers aspire to develop appropriate policies, 
there is no guarantee the implementation process will be successful 
because policy drift can shift policy aims and later make the objective of the 
policy go awry (derived from John‘s proposition that once a policy is 
launched, there is a possibility that the outcome will be different from what 
was expected given unforeseen conditions beyond the government‘s 
control);190 
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7. If implementation is defined as putting policy into effect, that is, action 
in conformance with policy, then compromise will be seen as a policy 
failure. But if implementation is regarded as ‗getting something done‘, then 
performance rather than conformance is the central objective, and 
compromise a means of achieving performance albeit at the expense of 
some of the original intentions (derived from Barrett and Fudge‘s 
proposition that implementation failure can occur when the top level 
demands the lower level to conform to clearly defined prescribed steps, 
without regard to the outcome of following those);191  
 
8. Policy implementers may know what to do and have sufficient desire 
and resources to do it, but they may still be hampered in implementation by 
the structures of the organisations in which they serve (derived from 
Edwards‘s proposition that organisational characteristics at different levels 
can influence and inhibit the policy implementation process);192 
9. One of the critical resources in policy implementation is clear and 
concise information. If policies are innovative and highly technical, the 
implementers need to have sufficient information, a clear context, direction, 
and structure (derived from the Edwards‘, and Sabatier and Mazmanian‘s 
propositions that if the policy makers initiate ambiguous policies, the 
implementers who deliver the policy will have difficulty in putting the policy 
into practice effectively);193 
10. Policy implementation must be supported by sufficient funding 
otherwise the task cannot be accomplished (derived from Kelman);194   
 
11. Implementation orders must be consistent as well as clear if policy 
implementation is to be effective. Transmitting clear but contradictory 
instructions will hardly make it easier for operational personnel to expedite 
implementation. Nevertheless, implementers are at times burdened with 
inconsistent directives (derived from Edwards‘s proposition that problems 
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occur when frontline workers are confused by inconsistent instructions by 
the higher level);195  
12. A prime cause of implementation failure arises because the policy 
contents or policy characteristics are ambiguous for government agencies 
to implement. While those who are policy-makers require implementers to 
be competent and to respond to the policies correctly, ambiguous policies 
may lead the frontline workers to interpret the policies in different ways 
(derived from Rawson and Hill and Hupe‘s proposition that frontline 
workers have limited capabilities in interpreting policy. If the policy contents 
or policy characteristics are ambiguous, frontline workers will face difficulty 
interpreting the policy leading to implementation failure);196  
 
13. Street-level staff bring their individual background and experiences to 
the implementation process, that is their individual judgements, values, 
opinions, experience, history and background, and these influence how 
they interpret and apply policy directions (derived from John‘s and Hill and 
Hupe‘s proposition that that the frontline workers bring their background 
and experiences to the implementation process);197 
14. Factors according to region, the local context, cultural practice, mixing 
of ethnicities, assumptions around gender, and economic forces, which are 
influenced by changes in social and economic conditions, the availability of 
new technology, variation in political circumstances of the target group can 
determine policy implementation success or failure (derived from Jackson, 
Hill and Hupe, and Howlett and Ramesh);198 
15. Coordination and collaboration problems between organisations at the 
vertical level may impede the policy implementation process because of 
gaps or breakdowns between the multi-layers of governments (derived 
from Hill and Hupe‘s proposition that complex layers in the administrative 
system can undermine the policy implementation process).199 
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2.7 A case study of policy implementation in Thailand 
These propositions about policy implementation will be examined through a 
case study of the policy to decentralise key aspects of government in Thailand. 
Since the 1990s, through its national planning process, the Thai government has 
initiated greater decentralisation and the devolution200 of more power to local 
government. The Plan for Decentralisation of Power to the Locality launched in 
1997; later passed by the Cabinet on 3 October 2000, contained three substantial  
principles: 1) autonomy, 2) clear delineation, and 3) efficiency.201 As well as the 
Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan‘s perspective, the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) proposed a greater 
opportunity in national participation to the people at both local and national levels. 
An amendment to this 1997 Constitution specifically required the transmission of 
power to communities to enable greater participation in policy making at a regional 
and local level,202 allowing governments to improve the delivery of services to 
people in the local area. The changes involved a restructuring of the balance of 
power between national and local government.203   
These changes are significant, but there is the potential for the policy not to 
be implemented as intended. Implementation gaps are likely to be caused by 
deficiencies in the capacity of SAOs, in their degree of resourcing, in the 
capabilities and expectations of key personnel, and in the ongoing relationship 
between local and central government. There are real challenges in achieving the 
goal of decentralisation because now the SAO is an organisation that has seen 
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power transferred from central government to the SAO in order that foundation unit 
has the autonomy to work out and implement its own policies.  
There are two aspects of these reforms to be examined in this thesis. The 
first is to examine the practices following Thailand‘s promotion of the 
decentralisation policy stated in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 
2540 (1997) and in Thailand‘s National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(Ninth Plan 2002-2006).  
The second area to be examined is the role of the SAOs in Chiang Rai 
province as part of the decentralisation policy, and the capacity of the SAOs‘ role 
in implementing decentralisation and carrying out the intentions of central 
government.  Four areas provide the main focus of this study:  
1) SAO staff understanding of decentralisation policy; 
2) Inter-relationships between organisations, in both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions; 
3) The impact the different interpretations of the policy makers and the 
government officials have on decentralisation policy; 
4) The effects of other conditions on the efforts to implement the 
decentralisation, including the capacity of SAOs to implement the policy of 
decentralisation, the extent of SAO autonomy from central government in providing 
public services, and the adequacy of revenue available to the SAOs for policy 
implementation.  
The case study will thus involve an examination of Subdistrict 
Administrative Organisations within Chiang Rai. Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisations are the lowest level of local government and the foundation units of 
local administrative organisation and they have been one of the key organisational 
means in the attempt to promote government decentralisation. Since 1995, they 
have been given greater autonomy to make and implement decisions, and they are 
expected by those who initiated this change to reflect, in policy and services, the 
distinctiveness of their own communities.204 The expectation is that by working with 
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people in a local area to determine and establish policy, communities will become 
more independent and vigorous.205 
 
2.7.1 Justification of the case study approach 
Case studies allow for the close examination of the complexities of 
phenomena within specific real-life contexts.206 They allow for questions of ‗how‘ 
and ‗why‘ to be considered.207 Typically, they draw on multiple sources of evidence 
such as surveys, histories, and interviews. They provide context-dependent 
knowledge that is useful for solving particular problems. Moreover, the knowledge 
obtained through case studies allows for generalisations of theoretical insight. 
 Several scholars such as Hakim, Bouma and Atkinson state that case 
studies offer ―the strength of experimental research within a natural setting‖.208 This 
is because the study can focus only on ―a particular group‖209 or one specific group 
which there is ―no comparison with another group...made‖.210 In this instance, the 
case study will examine the small-scale research211 and provide intensive 
information.212  
 Blaxter et al describes advantages and disadvantages of the case study 
method:  
 Advantages  
1. Case study data are drawn from people‘s experiences and practices and so 
 are seen to be strong in reality. 
2. Case studies allow for generalizations from a specific instance to a more 
 general issue. 
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3. Case studies allow the researcher to show the complexity of social life. Good 
 case studies build on this to explore alternative meanings and 
 interpretations. 
4. Case studies can provide a data source from which further analysis can be 
 made. They can, therefore, be archived for further research work. 
5. Because case studies build on actual practices and experiences, they can 
 be linked to action and their insights contribute to changing practice. Indeed, 
 case study maybe a subset of a broader action research project.  
6. Because the data contained in case studies are close to people‘s 
 experiences, they can be more persuasive and more accessible.  
 Disadvantages 
1. The very complexity of case studies can make analysis difficult. This is 
 particularly so because the holistic nature of case study means that the 
 researcher is often very aware of the connections between various events, 
 variables and outcomes... 
2. While the contextualization of aspects of the case strengthen this form of 




Case studies provide in-depth knowledge about experiences and 
practices.214 The data gained from a case study investigation allows for the 
comprehension of complex phenomena, and for interpretation and analysis. The 
data can be taken to represent the specific group being chosen but not represent 
an entire population.215 The case study method is appropriate for this investigation 
of the implementation of Thailand‘s policy to decentralise government. It will allow 
for the in-depth analysis of the practice of government agencies at the local level 
and provide an understanding of the real-life of the organisational and managerial 
processes.216  
The researcher has worked in the Chiang Rai province for six years and 
has carried out previous research with local government staff on the question of 
participation by local people in the political process. The researcher is therefore 
familiar with Chiang Rai local government and its organisation, and has developed 
good relationships with those working in local government. Furthermore, Chiang 
Rai is particularly appropriate as a case study:  
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1.  Chiang Rai is located in the far north of Thailand, and deemed as the 
upper northern gateway and region‘s economic centre217 for conducting cross-
border trading with Myanmar, Lao PDR, and southern China.218  
2.  Various ethnic groups live in Chiang Rai province. Their different beliefs, 
cultures, traditions, and ways of life create challenges for SAOs in implementing 
government policy.   
3.  As it is located in the most northern part of Thailand, Chiang Rai 
experiences some difficulties in accessing central government. Its isolation also 
makes for a lack of infrastructure in the province.   
 
2.8 Choosing the SAOs   
Six SAOs were selected from the 116 SAOs in Chiang Rai province. 
Purposive sampling and simple random sampling techniques were used. In order 
to allow for a comparison of older and newer SAOs, three SAOs established in 
1994-1995 were selected and three SAOs established between 2002-2006 were 
selected. Three older and three newer SAOs were subsequently selected. Further, 
in order to allow for the consideration of the impact of the size and scale of the 
organisation on the implementation of the plan to decentralise government 
functions, a selection of small and medium SAOs were selected.   
Five small, and one medium SAO, Tambon Rimkok, were established in 
the 1994-1995 period. A simple random sampling was still considered for use in 
selecting two of the five small SAOs, but with only one medium SAO no sampling 
was required. 
The two small SAOs were identified, first, according to their revenue, then 
ranked and numbered from 1 to 5 respectively.   
1.1 Tambon Sansai  (29.69 millions baht) 
1.2 Tambon  Wiang, Chiang Saen (25.14 millions baht) 
1.3 Tambon Mae Kowtom (39.60 millions baht) 
1.4 Tambon Huaysor (27.98 millions baht) 
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1.5 Tambon Yonok  (13.78 millions baht)219 
 
 Using a simple ballot, the two SAOs were selected: number (2) Tambon 
Wiang and (5) Tambon Yonok. There were only three SAOs established after 
2002, so all were selected. The two small SAOs were Tambon Mae Chan and 
Tambon Nong Rad, while the one medium SAO was Tambon Pa Or Donchai. 
Including two small SAOs in each group provided additional information about the 
range of responsibilities of SAOs, providing the researcher with a broader 
perspective.   
 
2.9 Data collection 
 The principal source of primary data was interviews with key informants 
within SAOs with responsibility for and experience in the implementation of the 
programme of decentralisation. Specifically, these participants were drawn from 
those in the following roles: elected community leaders (the equivalent of local 
government councillors in New Zealand), administrative heads, and planning 
officials. In-depth interviews explored their accounts of having to assume greater 
responsibility for decision-making and service delivery at a local level, where there 
had been success, where there had been failures, and their explanations for these. 
These responses were analysed with a view to obtaining insights about the 
theoretical propositions derived from the review of literature on policy 
implementation. 
 The process of obtaining data from these participants began with three 
focus group interviews with up to five individuals drawn from each group. 
Participants in these focus groups were identified through the office of provincial 
statistics and the office of local administration, Chiang Rai, which has the official 
information about each SAO. Participants were sent an information sheet and 
invited to take part. The focus group meetings were held in the SAO premises. The 
focus group meetings themselves were free ranging discussions about the issues 
associated with the effective implementation of the programme of governmental 
decentralisation. There were six different focus groups from the six SAOs. Focus 
group participants consisted of those who held positions as 1) community leaders, 
2) administrative leaders, and 3) staff in policy and planning roles in SAOs. The 
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discussions were recorded and used to highlight themes that were explored further 
in individual in-depth interviews.   
 A schedule of questions was developed on the basis of the focus group 
discussions and these were used for in-depth interviews with informants from the 
three groups mentioned above. These interviews were conducted at their SAO 
offices and were recorded. The questions were adjusted to correspond to job 
descriptions, levels, and positions of the interviewees. Transcripts of the interviews 
were returned to the participants for checking and clarification.  
 
2.9.1 Selection and Range of participations 
Participants at provincial and local levels were invited to attend at least one 
interview session, either a focus group or in-depth interview.220 Some participants 
were invited to attend both a focus group and an in-depth interview, according to 
their experiences of working with the decentralisation policy. In addition, a private 
interview session was also arranged for those who requested it, at their preference 
and convenience.   
Participants who worked at the central level responded by completing the 
questionnaires. The questionnaires followed the same pattern of questions used in 
the interviews (see appendices D and E). Using questionnaires for participants at 
the central level allowed respondents to freely express their understanding of 
decentralisation as well as their opinions and problems regarding working in the 
policy-making, policy implementation process, and their thoughts about 
accomplishing the decentralisation policy.  
 
2.9.2 Recruiting participants  
Interviews were conducted with two different groups - focus group 
participants and in-depth participants. There were six different focus groups from 
the six SAOs. Focus group participants consisted of those who held positions as 1) 
community leaders, 2) administrative leaders, and 3) staff in policy and planning 
roles in SAOs. Participants for in-depth interviews were identified and drawn from 
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those who held positions of 1) higher authorities and government agencies,221 2) 
community leaders, 3) administrative leaders, and 4) staff in policy and planning 
roles in SAOs for in-depth interviews.  
Because the SAOs‘ function was to coordinate and to carry out plans and 
projects supervised by higher authorities and government agencies in five 
obligatory functions, the following were groups identified for collecting research 
data:  
1. Chiang Rai‘s Governor or Executive  
2. The former Governor or Executive of Chiang Rai 
3. Nai Amphor ( District head) or assigned government officer 
4. Representatives of the Tambon Council  
5. Members of the Tambon Executive Committee 
The discussions undertaken in SAO offices of the focus groups were audio 
recorded, and took about an hour. The in-depth interviews were carried out with 
individuals and were also recorded. They took approximately 1-1.5 hours. The 
primary risk for participants related to the possible consequences for participants if 
they were critical of aspects of their particular SAO. They were protected from any 
negative consequences by having their privacy and confidentiality protected. 
Procedures for conducting and completing the community survey ensured that the 
names of participants, their position and department remain confidential. 
 
2.9.3 Primary data  
The key source of primary data was the interviews, specifically with SAO 
staff with responsibility for and experience in the implementation of 
decentralisation. The 45 participants were interviewed in two different groups: 18 
in-depth interviews, and 27 focus group interviews. Participants were drawn from 
three different government levels, six respondents at central government level, four 
respondents at provincial levels and 35 at local level. 
There were six focus group interviews with up to five participants in each 
group and the meetings were held in the SAO premises. The focus group meetings 
themselves were free-ranging discussions about the issues associated with the 
effective implementation of the programme of governmental decentralisation. The 
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in-depth interviews explored the views of the senior staff who had the greater 
responsibility for decision-making and service delivery at the local level, where 
there had been successes, where there had been failures, and their explanations 
for these. The in-depth interviews were conducted at a venue that was convenient 
for the participants. The recordings and transcripts of the interviews were returned 
to the participants for checking and clarification.  
The questions being used to obtain the primary data with key staff were 
focused on the following topics (see more in appendices B and C): 
- The goals of policy implementation 
- The effectiveness of this policy in solving problems  
- The consequences of implementing the policy  
- Potential difficulties with policy implementation at the grass roots 
 level  
- Assessment of policy implementation by SAOs  
 
2.9.4 Secondary data  
Secondary data was obtained from both English and Thai published 
material, including books, articles and government documents. Additional data was 
also drawn from published articles of previous research.  
English published materials, including books and articles, were used 
heavily in a review of literature in outlining and discussing the basic concepts of 
policy implementation, the significance of policy implementation and the reasons 
for policy implementation failure. Several English language materials were used in 
examining Thailand‘s administrative and political system.  
Thai published materials, especially books and articles, were good sources 
for a better understanding of Thailand‘s national administrative system, political 
culture, and hierarchical system, which affect the national administration. Several 
sources were useful in providing information regarding decentralisation and the 
SAO: the government reports and handbooks, especially from the Department of 
Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, and the Office for Local Administrative 
(Chiang Rai Province), were used in examining the government‘s decentralisation 





Thailand‘s Political Development  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents Thailand‘s political development from the early time 
when the absolute monarchy was applied as a political system since the Sukhothai 
Kingdom (1257-1378) until the political system was transformed to democracy in 
2477 BC (1934).  
Located in Southeast Asia, a unified Thai Kingdom was established in the 
mid-14th century.222 This country was known as Siam until 1939223 when the name 
changed to Thailand. As well as its long history, Thailand‘s political system was 
ruled by both a paternalistic and absolute monarchy for centuries,224 until the 
introduction of a constitutional monarchy following the change to democracy in 
1932. The country‘s democratic regime has had kings as heads of state225 and they 
have been able to exercise some powers through the National Assembly, the 
Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution.226  
Thailand‘s long experience of monarchy has left its legacy in its social and 
political systems. Thai society has had three main influences: a) the Sakdina and 
Prai system; b) order in precedence; and c) hierarchy. Thai society was divided 
into different classes with political powers in the hands of the elites, while the 
commoners had few opportunities to participate in politics, and less chance to 
study at a higher level, like those in higher positions. Consequently, a social gap 
between two groups, the elite and the great majority, opened.  
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Under the political reforms following the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, 
the structure of Thailand‘s political administration was divided into three levels: 
central government, provincial government, and local government. However, the 
government continued to be driven from the centre. Despite the new political 
system introduced in 1932, Thailand has yet to introduce a fully democratic 
system. There are, therefore, only a few people who are interested and involved in 
the political system: the elite, bureaucrats, and students of political science.227 
Most people pay little attention to politics and do not participate in politics as they 
perceive that such matters are only for bureaucrats and that they should not be 
involved.228  
Dhiravegin notes that during 1892, the Thai government realised it was 
necessary to pay attention to and strengthen central government to control the 
country and withstand pressures of colonialism.229 The Thai nation state 
developed230 in a way that was dominated by central government. Local 
government in this context was not encouraged. Today, however, the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 aims to promote the participation of all 
citizens at both local and national levels, and a new emphasis on the 
decentralisation of power to the local government231 is emerging to promote better 
political processes. Thailand‘s democratic system is still in a state of development, 
this being reflected in the lack of political participation by the people, and is partly 
due to the political culture of Thailand‘s political system.  Dhiravegin notes:  
The modern era of Thai politics is no less painful and its experiences no less 
turbulent than those of the previous periods. The implantation of the democratic 
system on the Thai soil after the revolution of June 24, 1932 only led to the 
resurgence of the traditional forces who were repulsed by the introduction of things 
alien to the Thai culture. Yet change was introduced; this led to a struggle between 
bureaucracy and democracy, and to political turbulence for two and a half decades 
between 1932 and 2957. However, in 1958, the traditional element in the form of 
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3.2 From Absolute Monarchy to Parliamentary Democracy 
A unified Thai Kingdom was established in the mid-14th century,233 located 
in a heart of mainland Southeast Asia.234 The modern Thai Kingdom began with 
the Sukhothai Kingdom,235 the Ayutthaya Kingdom, and the Rattanakosin period 
respectively.  
 
3.2.1 The Emergence and Derivation of Rigid Hierarchy  
 While paternalism was successfully applied throughout the Sukhothai 
Kingdom (1257-1378),236 and later in the Ayutthaya Kingdom (1350–1767), the idea 
of the absolute monarchy developed and was continually applied as the political 
system until 2477 BC (1934) when Thailand‘s political system became a 
democracy.  
The Sukhothai Kingdom, the main kingdom of the modern Thai nation,237 
applied a ‗Father-Son‘, or ‗paternalistic‘, system to its administration, in which the 
status of the King was respected as the father to all the people. Under this Father-
Son administration, kings possessed absolute power. In addition, because the 
relationship between a king and his people was very close, the kings were able to 
exercise their absolute power. As the Department of Provincial Administration, 
Ministry of the Interior notes: 
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During the Sukhothai Era, the paternal relationship between the King and his 
people was set up. Anytime a person had a complaint, he or she could ring a bell 




A paternalistic form of government was adopted, but Sukhothai‘s political 
system was deficient to the extent that it was a fragmented city-state with no 
centralised government.239 As a result of problems caused by this, the Ayutthaya 
Kingdom (1350–1767) introduced an absolute monarchy. While under the influence 
of the Khmer Empire,240 the Thais borrowed ‗The Divine Rights System‘,241 which 
meant that during the time of King Ayutthaya,242 the rulers and the people were 
separated. The changed status of the Kings left the people completely under the 
control of rulers and the relationship became one of master-servant within the 
context of an absolute monarchy.243 Thailand‘s administrative regime remained an 
absolute monarchy until the Rattanakosin era. 
During the Ayutthaya Kingdom, the first provincial administration in 
Thailand was introduced.244 The Jatusadom system,245 the Sakdina system,246 and 
the Prai system247 were initiated and continued for 400 years, through the 
Ayutthaya Kingdom until the beginning period of Rattanakosin era. These enabled 
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a hierarchical system to exist and play an important role.  According to the 
UNESCAP: 
The traditional government system and social structure in Siam during this period 
was known as the Sakdina system, one that is similar to that of a feudal society. 
All land was owned by the ruler who granted land to members of the royal family 
and the nobility according to their ranks in the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Bureaucrats ran the affairs of the state. Peasants aged between 18 and 60 were 
subjected to register as corvee labour for the crown or individual noblemen. The 
former was known as Prai, the latter as Nai. A poor peasant who sold himself to a 
rich Nai became a slave. These relations constituted the Sakdina society that 
survived well into the nineteenth century.
248
    
 
Dhiravegin states that one of the major national administration reforms 
during the Ayutthaya Kingdom249 was launched for several decisive reasons, 
including the social class reform called the Sakdina and Prai system.250 He further 
states the political and administrative reforms during the Ayutthaya Kingdom can 
be divided into two levels. First, there was the national administration and the 
central administration level which was a transformation of the existing Jutusadom 
system,251 a more complex system which separated, both in theory and in 
structure, the military (Kalahom) from civil affairs (Mahattai).252 Second, there was 
the provincial administrative level which was a transformation designed to 
strengthen the Ayutthaya Kingdom and its capital.253 The paternalism of the 
absolute monarchy served to strengthen the power of the elites, which still features 
in Thailand‘s national administrative system.    
 
3.2.2 Modernisation under the reign of King Chulalongkorn  
Although the Ayutthaya Kingdom disintegrated, its approach to national 
administration did not end. The main idea of the Jutusadom system and other 
Ayutthaya administrative systems remained during the first four reigns of the 
Bangkok Empire or Rattanakosin, with some modifications developed to make it 
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more appropriate to the time.254 It was not until 1868 that the national 
administrative reform began during the rule of the great monarch of King 
Chulalongkorn (Rama V 1853-1910). 
The move to reform the national administration was originally influenced by 
modernisation during King Mongkut‘s reign (Rama IV 1851-1868). Many countries 
in Southeast Asia were colonised, but Thailand resisted this and moved to make 
its own modernisation reforms.255 The reforms were not completely successful 
because there was a lack of resistance to the growth of European power, and 
several Western countries extended their empires over mainland Southeast Asia in 
the 19th century.256 King Mongkut had to sign treaties257 with Britain giving it an 
extra–territorial legal right over the Thai Kingdom.258 Even though modernisation 
affected Thailand‘s political administration, it was not until the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (Rama V 1853-1910) that democracy and decentralisation were 
first mentioned and considered, and the political system and national 
administration reformed. Church notes that while King Mongkut avoided 
fundamental reforms, his son who succeeded him, King Chulalongkorn, brought 
new ideas of modernisation during his reign.259 The modernisation brought by the 
Europeans was one of a number of significant factors260 that influenced Thailand 




                                                          
254
 Ibid., pp.28-30. 
255
 This reform is known as ‗Chakkri Reformation‘ or ‗Revolution on the Throne‘ of King 
Chulalongkorn. The reformation programme was between 1868–1910. See more in 
Dhiravegin, Demi Democracy :The Evolution of the Thai Political System, p. 90, Damien 
Kingsbury, South East Asia: A Political Profile (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 148. 
256
 Church, p. 130.  
257
 Ibid., p. 130. 
258
 Ibid., p. 130. 
259
 Ibid., p. 131.  
260
 See Department of Provincial Administration The Motives for Administrative Reform, 
(Ministry of the Interior), <http://www.dopa.go.th/English/history/polit1.htm> [accessed 28 
March 2007]. 
261
 Kingsbury, p. 148. 
54 
 
The administrative reforms were significant and necessary for Thailand in 
preventing colonial rule,262 and the power of indigenous elites and institutions 
needed to be maintained and transformed into modern institutions.263 Known as 
the Chakkri Reformation or ‗Revolution on the Throne‘ of King Chulalongkorn, the 
reform programme began in 1868 and ended in 1910 during the rule of his great 
monarchy. As Dhiravegin notes, throughout his reign, King Chulalongkorn 
attempted the difficult task of bringing the Thai kingdom, based on the Hindu 
mythological concept of godly kingdom, into that of a modern nation-state in line 
with the civilised nations of the West. Before King Chulalongkorn‘s reforms, 
Thailand had a traditional political system based on the Indian and Chinese 
civilisations, capable of dealing with political, economic, social, and philosophical 
problems.264  
As part of his reforms, King Chulalongkorn sent high-level government 
officials abroad on a tour of inspection to learn and observe the administrative 
systems of Thailand‘s neighbours. The Thai government and its functions were 
carefully reconsidered and afterwards bureaucratic reform was introduced and 
promoted. Bureaucrats attempted to reorganise Thailand‘s political system and the 
national administrative system was strengthened.  King Chulalongkorn stated:  
The administration regime we have been using is not sufficiently flexible. 
Especially now that our country has become much more developed than in the 
past. The existing administration cannot serve the greater demands of the country. 
As a result, we have the massive undertaking of adjusting the administration to 
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In the transformation from a traditional kingdom into a modern nation-state, 
King Chulalongkorn began by setting up the State Council and the Privy Council, a 
development viewed with distaste by the old elements as, symbolically, their 
political power was threatened.266 Under the national administration reforms, 
central and provincial administrations were introduced, with the central 
administrative system divided into 12 different ministries;267 this can be compared 
with six different sections268 during the previous Ayutthaya Kingdom.269 Provincial 
administration was also organised in a number of precincts.270 The first form of 
local government, which will be discussed later in chapter 4, called ―sukhaphiban‖ 
or "sanitary committee", was experimented with in 1898.271 
The administrative reforms were not completely successful, and this is seen 
as having been due to several factors. These included the ineffectiveness and 
backwardness of the country's administration system, the overlapping of 
administration functions, confusion about which level had control, and the fact that 
Thailand had paid too much attention to achieving a strong central government, 
which put the national security at risk and which had opened the opportunity for the  
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3.2.3 Thailand‘s Democracy: between Autocracy and Democracy  
Even though Thailand became a democracy in 1932, the democratic 
reforms were completely unsuccessful. After this date, the political system was 
unstable273 and subject to military intervention and coup d'états. As a result, 
Thailand was described as a ‗Demi–Democracy‘.274 There are four views on this. 
First, the revolution in 1932 was carried out in a short period of time and did 
not lead to deeper systemic change.275 As stated by Dhiravegin, the accepted 
purpose of the revolution in 1932 was to transform the political system from a 
monarchy to a democracy.  However, a hidden aim was a snatching of power from 
the King by a group of bureaucrats.  Busch concludes that Thailand‘s national 
revolution did not occur against foreigners, as in many other countries, because 
the revolution in 1932276 was against the king.277 However, even though Thailand 
adopted democracy as its political system and the king was retained as the head of 
state, the monarch‘s authority and kingship had been changed. The king no longer 
held absolute power but his status was ensured by the constitution.278 The 
monarchy was reduced to a symbolic role, but it continued to serve in a legitimising 
function.279 
Following the political transition in 1932, it was notable that even though 
the political system became a democracy, with the ‗Khana Ratsadon‘ or the 
People‘s Party holding the power, the ordinary people did not actually participate. 
The introduction of the new scheme of democracy for the Thai people at that time 
was therefore very weak because of the divide between the political and 
bureaucratic elites and the common people.280 While the elite understood the 
significance of the political system changes, most Thai people did not and were not 
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ready for the new political system.281 King and LoGerfo write that even though the 
group of junior army and navy officers and the civil servants who overthrew the 
absolute monarchy in June 1932 proclaimed the establishment of the first 
democratic regime in Thai political history, what they created was democratic more 
in form rather than in content. As a result, the political system soon gave way to 
military-based rule.282  
Thailand‘s national administrative system had evolved to become highly 
centralised.283 It was characterised by autocracy from the beginning of the modern 
state when the King, as a head of state, had the highest authority and was 
dominant. Nobles and ordinary people complied with these arrangements.284 After 
the revolution, the government became a bureaucratic polity with the elites taking 
effective control of the new political system.285 This reinforced the hierarchical 
character of the system with bureaucrats being left in place. They were familiar 
with the system and adhered to the long-standing traditions of bureaucratic 
control.286 
 
Second, there was the role of the military leadership. The Thai military 
leadership has intervened many times in the Thai political system. Samutvanich 
notes, therefore, that Thailand‘s political system has not evolved as a strong 
democracy due to military intervention in government.287 Since the political reforms 
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Figure 3.1 - Thailand‘s coup d'état from after a political transition in 1932 
 
Year Coup d'état leaders 
 
20 June 20 1933 
 
General Phya Phahon Phonpayuhasena 
8 November 1947 General Phin Choonhavan 
 
29 November 1951 
 
Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram (Plaek Kitasanga) 
 
16 September 1957 
 
General Sarit Dhanarajata 
 
20 October 1958 
 
General Sarit Dhanarajata 
 
17 November 1971 
 
General Thanom Kittikachorn 
 
6 October 1976 
 
Admiral Sangad Chalawyoo 
 
20 October 1977 
 
Admiral Sangad Chalawyoo 
 
23 February 1991 
 
General Sundara Kongsompong 
 
19 September 2006 
 
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin 
 
Source: Adapted from Danai Chaiyayotha, Politics and Governance of Thailand (Bangkok: 
Indian store, 2005), pp. 248–269.  
 
After 1932, several of Thailand‘s prime ministers had had backgrounds in 
the military. In addition, between 1957–1963, Thailand was completely under a 
military government led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Field Marshal 
Sarit Thanarat.288 It was noticeable that, even though Thailand had had long 
experience with dictatorships,289 several national development plans had been 
launched after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat‘s coup d‘état, including a National 
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Economic and Social Development Plan in encompassing economic development, 
infrastructure, and industry.290   
From 1991 to 2001, the absence of military control in Thailand allowed the 
political system to become more stable. As Charoenmuang noted, during 1992-
2001, democracy in Thailand was continuous and vigorous. As well as the 
elections, several political institutions were established, including the constitutional 
court, the administrative court, and the office of ombudsman.  The Thai people 
became more aware of their role within democracy.291 In 2006, democracy was 
discontinued with the coup d‘état led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin on the 
grounds of evidence of corruption292 under Thaksin Shinawatra‘s government.293  
Third, there is the view of Thailand as a plutocracy after the period of 
bureaucratic polity. According to this view, Thailand‘s move to a plutocracy was a 
consequence of the coup d‘états in 1971 and 1977. After 14 October 1973,294 there 
was an increase in the awareness of democracy among the Thai people.295 In 
addition, from 1973 onwards, there were economic and social changes in Thailand 
as the country became more industrialised allowing capitalism to play a greater 
role in Thai society. It was noticeable that during this period, the Thai political 
system become a business polity. Money became a most important variable, and 
many politicians were found to lack ethics and morality, leading to a system that 
was increasingly controlled by the wealthy descendents of the aristocracy.296 This 
did imply a greater level of corruption.297 
The fourth issue is democracy, which was intended to be the ideal system 
for Thailand from the time of the political transformation in 1932. However, 
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democracy has never been genuinely or successfully applied.  As mentioned 
earlier, after 24 July 1932, the People‘s Party and some particular elites held the 
power, which later led to the period of dominance by the bureaucratic polity. Soon 
after, there were several coup d‘états, allowing the junta government to rule the 
country. As the military dictatorships were discredited and the Thai people‘s 
political awareness increased, the political system became a plutocracy, instead of 
a democracy.  
 
3.3 Thailand post 2006 
 
After the coup d‘état in 2006, Thailand returned to democratic government 
when the Council for Democratic Reform made an official statement to end its 
contractual obligation. By February 2008, the Thai people were in power and the 
situation was more stable and secure with a new government in place. However, 
there were a number of protests, riots and campaigns driven by two opposing 
groups: The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD)298 and The National United 
Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD).299  Pongsudhirak has stated: 
Now that Thaksin is off the scene, the way forward appears clear. His economic 
and bureaucratic reforms, income-redistribution programs, and policy innovations 
to boost Thailand‘s competitiveness in global markets merit being retained just as 
much as the corruption, cronyism, and abuses of power that flourished under his 
government merit being rejected.  
 
The establishment coalition that engineered Thaksin‘s political decapitation 
needs to accept that not all of what he stood for was wrong. Until his opponents 





According to the 2007 Constitution, the government will continue to pursue 
good governance practices.301 However, this would be only an ideal if it continues 
to be ineffective in the face of difficulties and obstacles.302  
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3.3.1 The structure of the Thai government  
In relation to Thailand‘s National Administrative Structure, the Thai 
government introduced the National Public Administration Act in order to provide 
three different levels of public administration: central, provincial and local in 
1991.303 Thailand‘s central administration consists of 19 ministries, including the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Within each ministry, different organisations, 
departments, offices, bureaus, divisions and subdivisions are established to carry 
out government tasks and operations.304 At the central level, the primary obligation 
of government is not only to govern the country‘s affairs but also to initiate national 
policies to be implemented by the administration.305  
There are four different areas of the central administrative system:  
1. Office of Prime Minister 
The Office of Prime Minister is concerned with the affairs of the Prime 
Minister and the cabinet. In addition, this office is responsible for 
overseeing the national revenue and for ensuring the obligations set 
out in laws and regulations are observed;306  
2. Ministries  
There are 20 ministries in the Thai government:  
 Office of the Prime Minister  
 Ministry of Defence  
 Ministry of Finance  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Ministry of Tourism and Sports  
 Ministry of Social Development and Human Security  
 Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
 Ministry of Transport  
 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment  
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 Ministry of Information and Communication Technology  
 Ministry of Energy  
 Ministry of Commerce  
 Ministry of Interior  
 Ministry of Justice  
 Ministry of Labour  
 Ministry of Culture  
 Ministry of Science and Technology  
 Ministry of Education  
 Ministry of Public Health  
 Ministry of Industry; 
3. Governmental departments under the Office of Prime Minister or 
Ministries. For example, Department of Provincial Administration, 
Ministry of Interior; 
4. Department or other government agencies that are equivalent to 
governmental department, that maybe under the Office of Prime 
Minister or Ministries. 
 
3.3.2 Provincial government  
Thailand is divided into 76 provinces, including the metropolitan area of 
Bangkok, the capital city. Each province has its own governor who is appointed 
directly by the Ministry of the Interior to be a representative of the government and 
coordinator of other government agencies working at the provincial level.  
Provincial administrators are assigned by the central government under the 
concept of deconcentration.307 Central government delegates its authority to staff 
from different departments of the 20 ministries. These staff can work in different 
provinces and districts throughout the country. They are acknowledged as officials 
from central government who have the responsibility of implementing and 
accomplishing any assigned work according to laws and regulations. Each 
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province (called Changwat in Thai) is divided into districts (Amphoe), subdistricts 
(Tambon), and villages (Muban).308  
 
3.3.2.1 Province 
A province is comprised of several districts. Within each province, the 
governor ensures that central government policies are carried out. This is done by 
staff working for the different ministries under the governor‘s control. As well as the 
governor, who is the head of the province, there are a number of other officers 
including the vice governor, the deputy governor, and the heads of the different 
government organisations under ministries who assist the governor, supervise and 
organise staff at lower level and oversee their obligations.309   
 
3.3.2.2 District 
At the district level, a district chief officer, appointed by the Ministry of the 
Interior is the head of staff working at the district level.  Apart from the district chief 
officer, the deputy district chief and heads of government organisations from 
different ministries are appointed to assist, supervise, and organise government 
affairs at the district level.   
 
3.3.2.3 Subdistrict 
A subdistrict is the third administrative subdivision level after the province 
and district. Phong-ngam notes three officers at the subdistrict level that are 
accountable: 
1. The subdistrict headman or Kamnan310 is elected by the community 
members. He is not a government official but his status is 
acknowledged by this community.311 The Kamnan is responsible for 
maintaining peace in his subdistrict. 
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2. The subdistrict medical practitioner is appointed by the governor to 
work in the subdistrict area. Together with the subdistrict headman, the 
subdistrict medical practitioner is expected to oversee and maintain 
peace as well as care for public health and hygiene.  
3. The assistant subdistrict headman assists the subdistrict headman to 
provide the community services quick and effectively. Generally, there 
are two assistant subdistrict headmen in each subdistrict, elected by 
the subdistrict headman and approved by the governor in each 
province.312  
Under the Tambon Council and Tambon Administration Organisation Act of 
BE 2537 (1994) and the Constitution of 1997, the subdistricts were decentralised 
into local government units, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.   
 
3.3.2.4 Village 
The Thai village, or Muban, is the lowest subdivision of the administration 
at provincial level. Generally, there will be approximately a population of 200 living 
in one village,313 with three different people involved in its administration: 
1. The village headman, who is elected from the population in the village, 
has the responsibility to maintain the peace of the community.  
2. There are two assistant village headmen in each village.  Where a 
village requires more than two such assistants then a request has to be 
made for approval by the Ministry of the Interior.  These assistant 
village headmen support the village headman. 
3. The village committees are to assist, advise, and consult the village 
headman. They are also expected to work on other tasks according to 
laws or procedures and tasks assigned by the district chief officer, or 
requested by the village headman. In village committees, there are:  
1. The village headman; 
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3. At least 2, but no more than 10, senior experts who are elected by 
the village members, and approved by the district chief officer.314 
3.3.3 Local government  
Thailand‘s local government, which will be discussed more in chapter 4, 
operates with two different bodies - regular territorial administrative units and self–
government.315  Thai local government has limited autonomy given the high degree 
of centralisation of power.316 Dhiravegin notes that even though local 
administration is very important and it involves many people not only within a 
provincial level but also in local areas, it is largely disregarded by government and 
some people at central level.317 Generally, the Ministry of Interior controls the 
policy, personnel, and finances of the local units at the provincial and district 
levels. Field officials from the ministry as well as other central ministries constitute 
the majority of administrators at local levels.  
In Thailand, there are six different local organisations. These organisations 
are divided into urban and rural bases: 
From the Figure 3.2, below, the urban bases are: 
 the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), a strong-executive 
 form of local government specific to Bangkok;  
 the municipality, governing urban centres in the provinces; and  
 the City of Pattaya, a local government form of a city-manager specific 
 to Pattaya.  
 
The rural-bases are:  
 the Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) constituting local 
 government at the provincial level;  
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 the Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) constituting local 
 government at the subdistrict level, also known as the Subdistrict 
 Administrative organisation (SAO); and  
 the Sukhapiban or Sanitary Committee, a local government in a rural 




Figure 3.2 Government Structure 
 
Source: http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/thailand/thai.html 
There were 150 members of the Senate in 2007, and 480 members of the House of 
Representatives. This is in accordance with the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 







3.4 Problems with Thailand‘s national administration system 
Thailand continues to have difficulties in becoming a full democracy. Since 
the country went from being a monarchical state to a bureaucratic polity, to 
plutocracy, and then democracy, the political system has not developed as 
hoped.318 It has not always been stable, with several interventions by the military 
over the years. In addition, under the plutocratic arrangements, there is 
considerable reliance on wealth, which brings corruption.319 
The national administrative system has not developed with the social and 
economic changes over time.320 Dhiravegin notes that to develop and promote 
democracy in Thailand effectively, it is necessary to develop it as a whole system. 
As the political system is reformed, then the administrative system should also be 
reformed. From this, development can become dependent on the institutions of 
government. Below, in Figure 3.3, Dhiravegin shows the connections between the 
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Figure 3.3 Macro level structure   
 













Source: Likhit Dhiravegin, The evolution of the Thai political system (Bangkok : Thammasat 
University, 1996), p. 248.;  Likhit Dhiravegin, Thailand‘s politics and government (Bangkok : 
Thammasat University, 2010), pp.  293-294.         
 
For Dhiravegin, it is essential in a democracy that all three levels are 
connected as a network. The diagram in Figure 3.3 shows that all three levels link 
to one another. To explain this, at the lowest level, local government is significant 
to the degree that, under decentralisation, people at this level have more 
knowledge and are more aware of the local situation and are, therefore, able to 
come up with more locally appropriate responses. This stage is very important - 
knowledge and understanding are very significant because they are part of the 
foundation of democracy. 
 For the intermediate structure, Dhiravegin sees it as a connection between 
the super structure and infrastructure. This means, on one hand, the intermediate 
structure is a stage for recruiting political leaders - the political parties allow the 
people at infrastructure level to elect their representatives to work for them. On the 
other hand, the pressure groups, interest groups and mass media will work as a 
mirror in order to reflect the work of the government whether it achieves or fails. In 
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addition, the intermediate structure level can be seen as an intermediary 
stimulating the government to work better and to fulfil the needs of the people.321  
Lastly, at the super structure level, while the government‘s responsibility is 
to set out the state‘s righteous constitution, a well-structured parliament, 
government and bureaucratic system are required to provide the people with the 
best service. From this, when the system at all levels is well-structured, operating 
well, and the people get involved, a democratic system can develop.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Thailand‘s national administrative system has developed within an absolute 
monarchy and centralised government for a very long time. Even though the 
political transformation in 1932 changed Thailand into a new face of political 
system, an adherence to the old bureaucratic systems still existed. The national 
administrative system remained focused on centralisation and government officials 
still continued to work according to the style they were familiar with. In addition, the 
military leadership also intervened in Thailand‘s national administrative system. 
Thus, Thailand has had a long experience of military of dictatorships. Because of 
this, Thailand‘s political system has not always been stable and democracy has 
been largely unsuccessful.  
The next chapter presents an historical review of Thailand‘s 
decentralisation. It introduces the decentralisation plan and discusses its limitation 
and provides an evaluation of Thailand‘s decentralisation process and problems 
and the conditions inhibiting the implementation of the government‘s 
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Since Thailand changed from an absolute monarchy to a democracy in 
1932, intergovernmental relations in Thailand‘s political system have been 
dominated by central government.322. 
Under the supervision and direction of the cabinet, the central ministries 
and departments have long played major roles in policy formulation, determination 
and implementation. Local government has been seen as a subordinate unit,323 
since the implementation and administration of policy at the provincial level has 
remained in the hands of the regional offices of ministries and departments. These 
local officers and departments are overseen by a governor in order to facilitate and 
coordinate public programmes of various government agencies.324 The governor, a 
permanent civil servant, is appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, 
local government has had little opportunity to respond to local problems and has 
had only limited functions.325  
Local administration has consisted of people who have been elected 
directly by the people. The local bodies consist of municipalities, including the 
Bangkok Municipality. With the administrative patterns which have developed 
through its long history as a unitary kingdom, Thailand‘s centralised administration 
and strong national government has continued until the present time.326 Central 
government determined everything with the result that there was a large array of 
works and functions across the different areas that it was required to deal with. 
Central government has not succeeded in doing all that was required of it, leaving 
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some areas unattended. In a centralised system, government may address 
problems in some areas but will face challenges in covering all.327 
The concept of ‗decentralisation‘ in Thailand is novel for many Thai people. 
Only a small number know and understand the evolving structure and potential 
role of local government.328 In 1995, the Provincial Councils and the Tambon 
Councils were created to promote and prepare local communities for a self-
governing system. However, the development of local government has been slow 
because members of these organisations were partly appointed and partly elected 
to oversee activities at the local level, while the organisations themselves 
continued to rely directly on central government.329  
The Thai government‘s policy of decentralisation of decision-making 
powers to the local level and supporting increased participation in community 
development has become one of the most important development issues over the 
past two decades. There is a political demand for self-governing bodies at the 
Tambon and sub-district levels because Tambons are the fundamental governing 
units at the provincial administrative level.330 However, there is an overlap across 
Thailand‘s three layers of administrative structure, especially, between the 
provincial administration and the local administration.331 Programmes and projects 
are managed and implemented mainly by central government, and the staff who 
work in the community are appointed by, and responsible to, central government 
rather than to their local community.   
The idea of sustainable development was initiated to promote rural 
development in the fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan in 
1982.332 For sustainable development to take place and people in the local area to 
participate in steering and implementing development activities, efforts to establish 
a ‗bottom-up‘ approach to the development of the community needed to be 
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strengthened.333 It was recognised that people would not participate in planning 
their future and the development processes as long as administrative power and 
resources were in the control of the central offices. The 1982 fifth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan had a number of objectives:  
1. Restoring the country‘s economic and financial position by determining 
the maximum levels of trade and budget deficits as well as mobilising more 
saving and building greater national economic and financial discipline of 
both public and private sectors, and increasing economic efficiency and 
productivity to expand export capability by improving the economic 
structure and national resource utilisation; 
2. Adjusting economic structure and raising economic efficiency by 
restructuring productive sectors and increasing economic efficiency in 
several areas, especially in agriculture and the use of natural resources;   
3. Developing the social structure and distributing social services in order 
to alleviate the effects of economic changes on the social conditions; 
4. Developing the rural areas in order to eliminate poverty in backward 
area; 
5. Coordinating economic development activity with national security 
management; 
6. Reforming the national development administration system both at 
national and local levels to operationalise plans more effectively; 
7. Reforming public development management at the national level, 
which is concerned with national planning, budgeting, and personal 
processes, while the review of development administration at the local level 
requires the devolution of the development administration authority to the 
local level, and promotion of greater participation by the local population in 
governing themselves.334 
Thailand has long followed a ‗top-down‘ approach in its government 
administration but, through its national planning process, the government has 
initiated decentralisation and sought to pass more power to local government. 
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There was an awareness that an effort to establish a ‗bottom-up‘ approach would 
take time, not only for staff at the local level, but also for people who constitute part 
of society. 
 
4.2 Thailand‘s decentralisation 
Decentralisation refers to the responsibilities transferred from national or 
central government to the local or community level.335 Decentralisation is a key part 
of democracy and allows people to understand and practice their role in 
government, and local government is central to this.336 Tanchai notes that local 
government is a significant and necessary part of the democratic system. Local 
government helps people to understand the political system, and as they gain their 
political consciousness, they are likely to participate more.337   
Simon et al. define centralisation and decentralisation:  
Centralization is a word of many meanings. With reference to management 
problems, an administrative organization is centralized to the extent that decisions 
are made at relatively high levels in the organization, and persons at lower levels 
have relatively little discretion. Conversely, an administrative organization is 
decentralized to the extent that important delegations of discretionary and decision 
making authority are made from higher to lower levels of the organization.338  
 
Heywood states that all modern states are divided on a territorial basis 
between central and its peripheral such as regional, provincial, or local institutions. 
While central government has its authority and powers to control the national 
administration, in unitary systems, local government is appointed and recruited by 
the central government in order to distribute national administrative functions and 
obligations.339 Heywood points out that the centre and local rely on one another. 
The responsibilities of central government include:    
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National Unity: Central government alone articulates the interests of the whole 
rather than the various parts: that is, the interests of the nation rather than those of 
sectional, ethnic or regional groups. A strong centre ensures that the government 
addresses the common interests of the entire community; a weak centre leads to 
rivalry and disharmony. 
Uniformity: Central government alone can establish uniform laws and public 
services the help people to move more easily from one part of the country to 
another. Geographical mobility is likely to be restricted when there are differing tax 
regimes and differing legal, educational and social-security systems throughout a 
country.  
Equality: Decentralization has the disadvantage that it forces peripheral institutions 
to rely on the resources available in their locality or region. Only central 
government can rectify inequalities that arise from the fact that the areas with the 
greatest social needs are invariable those with the least potential for raising 
revenue.  
Prosperity: Economic development and centralization invariably go hand in hand. 
Only central government, for instance, can manage a single currency, control tax, 
and spending politics with a view to ensuring sustainable growth, and, if necessary, 
provide an infrastructure in the form of roads, railways, airports, and so on.
340
   
 
Central government has power over national affairs and, Brook states, 
―centralization is supposed to help in allocating resources and in setting goals for a 
whole organization‖.341 There remain several areas where central government is 
less effective.342 Decentralised arrangements are recognised as appropriate for 
meeting the following tasks:343 
Participation: Local or regional government is certainly more effective than central 
government in providing opportunities for citizens to participate in the political life of 
their community. The benefits of widening the scope of political participation 
include the fact that it helps to create a better educated and more informed 
citizenry.  
Responsiveness: Peripheral institutions are usually ‗close‘ to the people and more 
sensitive to their needs. This both strengthens democratic accountability and 
ensures that government responds not merely to the overall interests of society, 
but also to the specific needs of particular communities. 
Legitimacy: Physical distance from government affects the acceptability or 
rightness of its decisions. Decisions made at a ‗local‘ level are more likely to be 
seen as intelligible and therefore legitimate. In contrast, central government may 
appear remote, both geographically and politically.  
Liberty: As power tends to corrupt, centralization threatens to turn government into 
a tyranny against the individual. Decentralization protects liberty by dispersing 
government power, thereby creating a network of checks and balances. Peripheral 
bodies check central government as well as each other.
344
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4.2.1 The evolution of Thailand‘s decentralisation 
Under King Chulalongkorn‘s bureaucratic reforms of 1892, decentralisation 
was not introduced because, at that stage, Thailand needed to strengthen central 
government to ensure control of the national administration system rather than 
risking decentralisation. The administrative reforms of 1892 were to strengthen the 
national administration system so that policy would be implemented more 
effectively. However, the main purpose was to make certain the Thai central 
government was empowered, and had sufficient strength, to remain an 
independent nation state,345 and so protect itself from colonialism. 
The national administrative reforms during King Chulalongkorn‘s regime 
were not only a foundation, but also a turning point towards the present 
administrative system.346 Soon after the reform agenda was announced,347 
Thailand sent higher-level government officials abroad on a tour of inspection to 
gain ideas for reform.  
Government at the provincial level was also subject to change to make the 
administrative system more effective.348 One development at the provincial 
administration level was the establishment of the sanitary district administration 
and the provincial sanitary district administration.349  
The function of the sanitary district350 or ‗Sukhaphiban‘, was to oversee the 
sanitary provisions for both urban and rural districts. While the ‗Sukhaphiban‘ of 
Bangkok‘ was the first urban sanitary district, ‗Tha Chalom‘ was the first rural 
sanitary district that was established eight years later in 1905.351 After the ‗Tha 
Chalom‘ sanitary district was initiated, the Sanitary Management Act was launched 
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in 1908. Under this Act, the ‗Sukhapiban; was divided into 2 types:352 ‗Sukhaphiban 
Muang‘ at the town level and ‗Sukhaphiban Tambon‘ at the Subdistrict level.353  
After Thailand‘s political transformation in 1932, Charoenmuang divides 
Thailand‘s decentralisation into four different periods:354 
1. The first period was the attempt to establish self-government at the 
local level in 1933.  During this period, the government passed the Municipality Act 
(1933) so that there were three types of municipalities: city municipality, town 
municipality, and Tambon municipality. The government aimed to establish all 
4,800 Tambons at that time to be municipalities. As a result, the first target was to 
upgrade the status of all 35 existing Sukhapibans, established during King 
Chulalongkorn‘s reign, to be municipalities. This time the municipalities‘ status 
became that of a juristic person355 that had its own revenue, bureaucrats, as well 
as autonomy according to the law. Nineteen years later in 1952, only 117 
municipalities had been successfully established and developed. The problems 
appearing to inhibit the government‘s objective were the limited revenue and 
autonomy;356 
2. The second period saw the establishment of local government by 
government officials from 1952 to1956. During this period, the municipalities were 
not paid as much attention as the Sukhapibans as government realised that there 
were a small number of local government agencies with most of them established 
in the community of the town area. To develop the local area, resuscitating the 
Sukhapibans was considered in 1952. However, there were no further 
developments regarding local government because the government still decided 
that the Sukhapibans must be directed by the appointed and delegated 
government officials;  
3. During this period, the Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) 
was also established, and it was noticeable that while the government plan was for 
the Sukhapibans to provide services within a town area, the PAOs were expected 
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to provide and serve the people living outside the town area where it was beyond 
the Sukhapibans‘ responsibilities. Under the PAO management, government 
officials who worked at the provincial level directed the PAOs;  
During 1956, the government passed the Tambon Act which established 
Tambons as local administrative agencies. With this status, Tambons had the 
potential to raise their own revenue and manage their expenditure. Furthermore, 
they were granted autonomy to exercise their obligations. However, even though 
the local administrative agencies were established during this period, their 
functions did not change much.357 While the government officials at the provincial 
level directed the PAO, the Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs) were 
also directed by appointed staff supervised by central and provincial government, 
known as Kamnan358 and Phuyaibaan;359 
4. In the period 1961 to 1991, the government paid attention to 
developing economic systems rather than continuing with extending local 
government. However, in 1978, the government passed the law which established 
the Pattaya city government;360 
5. During the period 1992 to 1996, there were issues over the election of 
governors and demands were made for local government reform. There was an 
argument regarding the status once the governors were elected. If they were to be 
the CEO-governor then this would affect national security. To pass the bill 
regarding the CEO-governor election, the government decided to postpone and 
later initiated five different acts.361 Of course, one of them related to SAOs as the 
act resulted in the establishment of first 617 SAOs in 1995. Later in 1996, more 
SAOs were established bringing the total to 2,143.362  At present, there is a total of 
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 4.3 Decentralisation in the 21st Century 
Since being first introduced to Thailand in 1897, decentralisation has been 
the subject of discussion. The 1994 TAO Act was required because the structure of 
the Tambon council and SAO did not genuinely decentralise nor provide or result 
in the desired level of opportunities for the local people to participate. There had 
been ongoing problems caused by the appointment of officials from central and 
provincial government to key positions of control at local government.364   
Raksasat has stated that decentralisation initiatives were far from what we 
might call genuine decentralisation. This is because the bureaucrats who worked 
at the higher level and who were meant to implement the decentralisation 
programme did not comprehend the essence of the policy. It might be concluded, 
then, that decentralisation has been pursued in theory, but not in practice.365  
After little progress in promoting decentralisation to the local level, more 
emphasis was given to it in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, of 1997.  
Chapter V, Section 78 of the Constitution states: 
The State shall decentralise power to localities for the purpose of independence 
and self-determination of local affairs, develop local economics, public utilities and 
facilities systems and information infrastructure in the locality thoroughly and 
equally throughout the country as well as develop into a large-sized local 
government organisation a province ready for such purpose, having regard to the 




Tanchai notes that the Plan for Decentralisation of Power to the Locality, 
passed by the Cabinet on 3 October 2000, has three substantial principles: 1) 
autonomy, 2) clear delineation, and 3) efficiency. These three principles are basic 
ideas of decentralisation, as a central government needs to transfer powers and 
responsibilities to provide social services to the local government organisation so it 
can directly and freely serve the needs of the people in the local area. As a result, 
local government has needed greater autonomy in planning and implementing its 
own public services. Central government can then ensure quality and standardised  
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public services are provided to the people in the locality.367 
Phong-ngam highlights that there are several points where the 1997 
Constitution differed from the previous ones over the matter of local government, 
particularly over the local government agencies before the 1997 constitution, and 
the local government agencies after the 1997 Constitution.  Before the 1997 
constitution: 
1. Bureaucrats at provincial and district levels were appointed to be in 
charge of and hold some position within local government agencies; 
2. A local government‘s responsibilities and role were limited and had to 
be assigned by the central government. In addition, some 
responsibilities that the local government was assigned by the central 
government overlapped with the  government at a national and 
provincial level;  
3. Local government had limited resources as well as revenue in order to 
implement national policies; 
4. The policy of decentralisation was ambiguous influencing the working 
plans and leaving steps undecided; 
5. Local government agencies had limited capabilities in order to fulfil the 
national policy implementation;  
6. Local government lacked the capability to provide sufficient goods and 
services resulting in the local people being unsatisfied and refusing to 
participate or cooperate with local government;  
7. There were several types of autonomous local government 
organisations giving rise to problems of working cooperatively;   
8. Finance for local government was very limited; 
9. Local government administrative systems did not allow the local 
government agencies to work effectively. Most of the local government 
administrative system was under the central government‘s authority; 
10. Local government organisations were supposed to be under the central 
government supervision: however, instead of supervising local 
government organisations, central government commanded them;  
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11. Apart from local elections, the local people had less opportunity to 
participate.368   
 
Local government organisation after the 1997 Constitution had the 
following features: 
1. While local government was empowered in administration and finance, 
there was also a reform of the working system among the central, 
provincial, and local governments. Job descriptions as well as 
authorities and obligations of each government level were more distinct; 
2. Local government organisation and structures were reformed. Aside 
from the adjustments made to the SAO councils and executives, the 
most significant change was that Kamnan and Phuyaibaan no longer 
sat on the board of the SAOs;369  
3. Personnel administration in local government organisations was 
adjusted and reorganised to make them more integrated. At the local 
level, the office of the commission on local government personnel 
standards370 was assigned to set the standard for the personnel 
administration at the local level;  
4. People‘s rights, liberty and political participation were increased. Before 
the 1997 Constitution, Thai people had less opportunity to participate in 
politics. However, under the 1997 Constitution, people were allowed to 
remove the local government organisation‘s executive and committees 
of the council.371  
 
From the above, it can be seen that after the 1997 Constitution, the 
government paid more attention to the local government by reorganising the local 
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government organisations‘ structure, providing more revenue and promoting 
participation, so the local government could work more effectively.  
 
4.4 Thailand‘s decentralisation plan 
In the 1997 Constitution and the Determining Plans and Process of 
Decentralisation to Local Government Organisation Act, B.E. 2542 (1999), the 
government set out a decentralisation plan for local government. The 1999 Act 
sets out how local government organisation should proceed:  
The transferred missions relating to the public services managed by the State on 
the date of enforcement of this Act to local government organisation with the period 
of time as follows:  
(a) The overlap missions between the State and local government organization or 
the mission provided by the State in the area of local government organization, the 
proceeding shall be complete within four years.  
(b) The missions provided by the State in the area of local government 
organization which impacted to other local government organizations, the 
proceeding shall be complete within four years.  
(c) The missions proceeded under the government policy, the proceeding shall be 




The decentralisation plan was divided into three different periods. In the 
first period, 2001-2004, there were two steps to carry out - a restructuring of 
internal administrative system at local government level, including central and 
provincial administrative systems, developing strategy for decentralisation and, 
secondly, to have the staff, the revenue, and the relevant law ready before carrying 
out the transfer of responsibilities. 
In the second period, 2005 to 2010, the transfer of authority took place. 
While the administrative roles of each of the central, provincial and local 
government levels were transformed, the issues of the relationship between the 
three government levels, as well as the relevant law and procedures were 
reviewed to allow the local government organisation work more effectively.   
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In the third period, after 2011, decentralisation is expected to happen 
across all localities.373 The government expects local people will have a better 
standard of living due to the public services being provided at the local level. It is 
also expected that they will participate and cooperate more in local government 
activities. Another expectation is that the local government organisation will have 
more capabilities in order to implement policy more effectively. After ten years of 
power transformation, the local government organisations will have more 
autonomy as well as more revenue to implement policies. In addition, with their 
experience gained from the second period, local government organisations must 
be able to work more effectively.374 
 
4.5 Limitations in Thailand‘s decentralisation 
The moves to centralisation and strengthening central government during 
King Chulalongkorn‘s reign were later to cause problems. Government at lower 
levels, especially at the local level had to participate more and, from this, more 
development from the bottom began to take place. As outlined in chapter 3, the 
government has been working to promote decentralisation but still has difficulty 
with it and Thailand continues to deal with the long-standing tradition of over-
centralisation.375  
In the 1997 Constitution, the government paid a lot of attention to local 
government - reorganising the structure of local government organisation, 
providing more revenue and promoting political participation by the people - so 
local government could work more effectively.  In practice, several conditions have 
resulted in the failure of the development of government at the local level. 
Samutvanich mentions two important points: 1) the degree of Thai people and 
government participation in decentralisation and, 2) the characteristics of 
decentralisation and activities undertaken under decentralisation.376 The following 
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4.5.1 A tendency towards the centre 
Centralisation is viewed as an important system that is more effective in the 
short run in mobilising resources and rapidly implementing coherent policies.377  
Howlett and Ramesh state:  
All government operates at multiple levels, spatially. In unitary system, the 
existence of a clear chain of command or hierarchy linking the different levels of 
government together in a super-ordinate/subordinate relationship reduces the 
complexity of multi–level governance and policy–making.... The national 
government retains, in principle, all decision–making power. It can choose to 
delegate these powers to lower levels of government or dictate to them, as the 
case may be, but the role of the central, national government is essentially 





According to Simon, a key defining difference between centralisation and 
decentralisation is the extent of decision-making. He explains that while decisions 
are made at relatively high levels under a centralised administration, 
decentralisation is to do with the extent that discretion and authority in making 
important decisions are delegated by the top management to other levels having 
executive authority.379 
In outlining the relationship between central and local government, Hague 
and Harrop describe two forms:  
1) A dual system, which maintains a formal separation between the 
central and local government. It is noticeable that the relationship 
between both levels is separated instead of being integrated. While 
central government‘s responsibilities are involved with the national 
overview, local government also has its authority to work on its own. 
2) A fused system, where there is a linkage between the central and other 
government levels; and their works are combined as one single 
sphere.380   
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Hague and Harrop note the methods for distributing power away from the centre as 
below:  
 





Central government functions are executed by 
staff in the field 
Decentralization Central government functions are executed by 
subnational authorities 
Devolution Central government grants some decision-
making autonomy to new lower levels 
 
Note: Deconcentration and decentralisation occur in federal as well as unitary states. 
Source: Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An 
Introduction, 6th edn. (New York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 236. 
 
 
Scholars are agreed that it is not possible to reject centralisation because 
all states require it in governing the country. The question is about the degree to 
which decentralisation should exist. To what extent will central government allow 
local government to participate? Regarding this, Wilson states that:  
Centralization (also known as hierarchy of authority) referred to the degree to 
which power was concentrated in an organization. When all power within an 
organization is concentrated or exercised by a single individual, there is a 
maximum degree of centralization. Conversely, a maximum degree of 
decentralization (and a minimum degree of centralization) is witnessed in 
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According to Wilson, to make decentralisation a success, the central 
government (centralisation) must generate an adequate opportunity and role for its 
local government whereby staff can make decisions and participate well.  
In the case of Thailand, the bureaucratic polity appears to be one of the 
important factors that undermine the decentralisation policy. This is because it is 
concentrated at the national level.382 The power of central government is 
recognised as undermining the move towards decentralisation. Local government 
continues to rely on central government,383 even though it has theoretically been 
empowered by central government to play a much greater role. This has meant 
that central government continues to play an important role in local government, 
which makes it very difficult for local government to exercise its obligations.   
 
4.5.2 Local self-government versus local government by officials  
As mentioned above, decentralisation in Thailand was first introduced and 
directed by the top level.384 Charoenmuang points to a possible contrast between 
decentralisation in some Western countries and decentralisation in Thailand that in 
some Western countries, the servants of the manor have their freedoms and have 
the opportunity to be free from their masters.385 
In contrast, under Thailand‘s Sakdina and Prai systems386 (see chapter 3), 
social class within a Thai society is distinguished between the elites and the 
ordinary people, with the privileged generally living in a metropolis and ordinary, 
lower class people living in the countryside. Thai social hierarchy distinguishes 
between superior and subordinate.387 Thai values are strong regarding tolerance of 
individual variations, but power and respect for authority388 mean that the 
relationships between the elites and commoners are completely unequal. 
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With these circumstances, Charoenmuang described the character of 
Thailand‘s decentralisation as a ‗colonial local government‘ with relationships 
between the two main groups characterised as masters and servants. Moreover, 
since the servants had less opportunity to be free, the only way to acknowledge 
those masters was as their rulers.389  
 
Even though the decentralisation programme was first promulgated in 
1897, it was not until 1997 that the Constitution provided a greater degree of self-
government at the local level. Under the 1997 Constitution, ―a local administrative 
committee or local administrators were to be elected by the people or from the 
approval of a local assembly‖.390 In accordance with the Constitution, this meant 
that the appointed bureaucrats from the central government would no longer be in 
charge of the SAO administration. Local government bureaucrats and agencies 
were now meant to be able to exercise their own power.391  
A core problem with the policy is that local government has no experience 
of self-government. Given the country‘s system of social class, local people are 
ruled by bureaucrats at the national level.392 Therefore, when central government 




Autonomy refers to the situation where units and sub-units possess the 
ability to take decisions for themselves on issues that are normally reserved for a 
higher level.393 Autonomy also refers to the right of a group of people to govern 
themselves and to organise their own activities. In addition, according to Howlett 
and Ramesh, autonomy can affect the ability of the state to make and implement 
policies394   
For there to be decentralisation, central government must allow the 
government at local level to have its own autonomy. The degree of functional 
autonomy that is decentralised by the state plays a significant role in administrative 
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decentralisation.395 If the local government is not provided with the autonomy it 
needs, it cannot fulfil its allocated responsibilities.  
Before discussing how much autonomy is needed under decentralisation, 
Brooke explains two distinct and contradictory notions of decentralisation and 
centralisation by referring to horizontal and vertical views, summarised in Figure 
4.2.  
Figure 4.2 - The horizontal and vertical dimensions 
 
Horizontal Decentralization Centralization 
 Wide participation at all levels, 
group decision-making, 
consultation. 
Autonomy of decision-taking, 
individual decision-taking, 
direction.  
Vertical  Decentralization Centralization 
 Decisions taken at all levels in 
the group, coordination. 
Decisions taken at a high level, 
control.  
 
Source:  Michael Z. Brooke, Centralization and Autonomy : A study in Organization 
Behaviour (New York: Praeger, 1984), p.147. 
 
According to Brooke, one of the most common ways to examine the degree 
of centralisation is to determine the locus of the decision-making.396 With reference 
to figure 4.1, Brooke further mentions that there are two points that can be seen: 1) 
a distinction between making (through consultation) a decision and taking it. This 
shows a degree of autonomy between one who has power and another who is a 
subordinate and, 2) the power and its centralisation that is not equivalent either to 
vertical or horizontal centralisation, but runs diagonally across both. Brooke 
explains that according to a locus of decision analysis, the concept of 
decentralisation is not about decentralisation in terms of power, authority or 
participation. An organisation is decentralised because subsidiary managers are 
autonomous. Therefore, decentralisation to a particular level may imply the 
centralisation from that level downwards. Brooke further mentions that even 
though it is true that to some extent  decentralisation in a vertical sense is related 
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to a greater participation, he says: ―the lower down the hierarchy the authority to 
make decisions goes, the more jealously that authority may be guarded‖.397  
Since a degree of autonomy is very important to decentralisation, then the 
question arises as to the degree of autonomy central government should provide 
to the local level. Rassameepath notes that in order to function as government at 
the local level, central government has to decentralise. In this case, Simon further 
recommends that we should be concerned about the degree of decentralisation 
the central government can provide to its local government.  This means that it 
relates to how far the government shall centralise because what we really need to 
find is a proper level in the organisational hierarchy that is neither too high nor too 
low for each class of decision-making.398 The challenge lies, however, in 
determining the degree to which government at the national level allows 
government at the local level the opportunity to exercise the autonomy. It is vital 
that central government carefully considers providing enough autonomy so local 
government can execute policies smoothly.399  
Furthermore, Rassameepath mentions, that because local government is 
established under decentralisation, it has only limited autonomy to make decisions 
by law. With autonomy, local government must still be under the overall control of 
central government. He explains that central government must fulfil four essential 
different conditions: 
1. The local government organisations must have their own officials. 
These officials must come from election by the local people and must 
not be appointed by the central government;  
2. The local government organisations must have their own revenue as 
well as the authority to exercise control over their budgets.  Revenue 
should come from various sources: the government‘s subsidy, local 
taxes, fees as directed ways, and loans;    
3. The local government organisation must be maintain as a juristic 
person so that it is a guarantee that their status is autonomous and their 
functions are distinct from the central government. Additionally, being a 
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juristic person also means that the obligations and policies they process 
and implement are for public services;  
4. The local government organisation is still under the control and 
supervision of the central government because being autonomous is 
not the same as being independent and having the power to do 
whatever a local government organisation wants to do: the status of 
local government organisations remains as subnational government400 
and has to be under the central government‘s dominance.401 
 
Under the Thai 1997 Constitution, the main purpose of decentralisation was 
to: 
1. Give autonomy to the locality with the principle of self-government 
according to the will of the people in the locality.402  
2. Give any locality which meets the conditions of self-government shall 
have the right to be formed as a local government organisation as 
provided by law.403  
3. Ensure that all local government organizations shall enjoy autonomy in 
laying down policies for their governance, administration, personnel 
administration, finance and shall have powers and duties particularly 
on their own part.404 
4. Ensure that the delineation of powers and duties between the State 
and local government organisation and among local government 
organizations themselves shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
the law, having particular regarding to the promotion of 
decentralisation.405  
 
However, Samutvanich points out how difficult it is for Thailand to operate 
successfully under decentralisation since government officials, in particular, are 
always concerned about patronage and are eager to maintain their hold on power. 
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To decentralise and provide full autonomy to local government is not considered 
by this group to be proper because Thailand is a unitary state. He further 
discusses that in launching a decentralisation programme, the existing ideas of 
what makes for a suitable administrative structure for the nation, together with the 
entrenched hierarchical behaviour associated with this, remain. This makes for 
difficulties in attempting to maintain the stability of government while introducing 
decentralisation. Further, while a decentralisation programme may be launched, 
this does not mean that government organisations change their behaviours, 
attitudes and visions. Since decentralisation has important implications for the old 
centralised and hierarchical systems practised by the traditional administration, it is 
subsequently amended and becomes harmonised with the old system.406 
As long as central government continues to play an important role in 
initiating policies and retaining the authority to make important decisions, while 
local government lacks the real independence it needs for it to make its own 
decisions and the power to carry them out, this major problem remains. The 
empowering process from the central to the local government level has not yet 
genuinely taken place. Even though the structure of the national administration 
system has three layers and several local government agencies have been 




Although Thailand launched a decentralisation policy since 1897,407 local 
government has not been genuinely successful due to the fact that the central 
government always played an important role and controlled a national 
administrative system at all levels. Consequently, working under the supervision 
and direction of central government undermines the ability of bureaucrats and the 
government agencies at the local level to perform their decentralised 
responsibilities. Although the Thai government in 1992 created a new form of local 
body for rural communities, the Tambon Councils, to promote and prepare local 
communities for a self-governing system, the development of local government is 
still limited.  
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In 1997, the government promulgated the new Constitution, which 
emphasised more decentralisation. Attempting to promote a self-governing system 
at a local level, the Constitution was designed to allow the bureaucrats and 
government agencies at the local level to have more opportunities to participate in 
governing their areas. Of course, this also included the local people who played an 
important role in decentralisation. 
Even though the 1997 Constitution endeavoured to promote 
decentralisation, it was obvious that local government has had difficulty in fulfilling 
these opportunities. The next chapter discusses factors that undermine these 























Thailand‘s development plans and decentralisation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Thailand announced its first National Economic and Social Development 
Plan in 1961. The focus of the first plan (1961–1966) was on economic 
development and the promotion of economic growth,408 with social development 
mentioned as one of the primary objectives in raising the standard of living of the 
Thai people.409 By 2009, there had been a total of ten National Economic and 
Social Development Plans. 
The National Economic and Social Development Plans were developed by 
central government, and it was not until the Eighth Plan (1997-2001) that 
government encouraged the Thai people to participate in making proposals for the 
national plan. This development made the Thai people more conscious of their 
roles as members of the society. The Ninth Plan promoted the idea of developing a 
sufficient economy410 through encouraging the participation and development at 
the grass-roots level thereby demonstrating the government‘s new vision of 
working by promoting the ‗bottom-up‘ approach.   
This chapter reviews the National Economic and Social Development Plans 
from 1961 to the present. The Ninth and Tenth Plans will be discussed especially 
in terms of good governance and the attempt to link directly the national 
administrative system with local government. The Ninth Plan introduced the 
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concept of good governance which is very relevant to decentralisation, and the 
Tenth Plan of 2006-2011 seeks to solve the problems regarding the development 
of good governance, and to strengthen the role and capabilities of local 
government. The Tenth Plan emphasises the promotion of mechanisms and 
processes to increase participation across the localities.411 The Ninth and Tenth 
Plans will be assessed as to whether the government‘s objective of good 
governance is on the path to success or failure.  
 
5.2. The National Economic and Social Development Plans (1961 – present) 
Thailand‘s first National Economic and Social Development Plan, 
announced in 1961, was focused on developing agriculture in order to meet world 
market demands. Import substitution was also promoted. During this period, while 
the government assisted and provided the necessary infrastructure as well as 
technical skills, the private sector was urged to participate in production under the 
close guidance of the government. 
The second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971) 
left the basic roles of government and the private sector unchanged. The 
government continued to focus on the construction of physical infrastructure and 
this resulted in roads, railways, and irrigation dams.  Providing health services to 
the rural community was another area of focus. The private sector was urged to 
put more effort into the production of industrial goods on a continuing basis. 
Technology was purchased during this period, although there was little control over 
the selection of the technology imported.412 
While the outcome of the first two plans succeeded,413 the conditions at the 
time that the Third Plan (1972-1976) was launched were not much help to the 
Plan‘s efforts to achieve its goals as Thailand faced difficulties from both internal 
and external conditions. Externally, there was the influence of the superpower 
                                                          
411
 The Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2006-2011), p. 10.  
412
 Saneh Chamarik and Susantha Goonatilake, The United Nations University, 
Technological independence - The Asian Experience (Hong Kong: United Nations 
University Press), updated  1994, 
<http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu04te/uu04te0h.htm> [accessed 13 March 
2010]. 
413
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, The Third National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1976) (Office of Prime Minister), [n.d.], 
<http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=85> [accessed 2 November 2009]. 
95 
 
nations regarding economic issues.414 Internally, Thailand also faced difficulties of 
increased unemployment, increased migration, and water pollution resulting from 
the drainage into waterways of chemical residues and waste materials from 
manufacturing.415 Confronted by these problems, the government responded by 
imposing regulations and codes.416 The Third Plan emphasised maintaining 
economic stability, and also promoted social development, quality of life, income 
distribution,417 and local physical structures, such as roads and local health care 
and rural development projects.418 
In the Fourth Plan (1977-1981), the Thai government remained focused on  
socio-politico-economic transitions. With the uncertain political and economic 
conditions, the Fourth Plan continued to emphasise economic growth, but also 
concentrated on promoting social justice, proposing that the government reduce 
the socio-economic disparities, and also promote a programme of mass welfare.419 
In addition, the Fourth Plan proposed that industry produce enough to meet 
domestic consumption needs. Investment in the construction of the basic physical 
infrastructure for future industrialisation was promoted as well as a policy of 
exporting industrial products, which implied a shift of emphasis from agricultural 
exports to manufacturing and industrial exports.420 
For over two decades from 1962, the Thai government launched four 
consecutive National Economic and Social Development Plans which 
concentrated on the mobilisation and allocation of economic, financial and 
manpower resources, and on reforming the public administration system.421 
Economic conditions changed rapidly and affected the social and environmental 
conditions, with the result that in the Fifth Plan (1982-1986), the government had to 
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concentrate on, and give greater emphasis to, economic stability rather than to 
promoting the economic growth as in the previous four plans.422 
The Fifth Plan differed from the first four plans with its emphasis on 
developing and adopting new approaches to national development, setting out a 
policy to ensure that clear policy directions were translated into operational 
plans.423 One of the most important aims of the Fifth Plan was the proposed reform 
of the national development administration system by decentralisation of more 
government functions to the local level.424 The plan stated the intention: 
to decentralize authority in the development administration to the local 
authorities and promote the participation of the local population to govern 
themselves. At the same time, confusion and complexity concerning the 
administration of rural development activities will be eradicated by stream 
lining the rural development process into two bodies, namely, an urban and 
specific areas development committee and a rural development committee.  
1) Urban and specific area development committees will be responsible for the 
coordination of all development activities in urban areas including the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area and in specific area development programmes.   
2) The rural development committee is responsible for the coordination of all 
rural development activities.
425
   
 
 
During the Fifth Plan, the world‘s economic recession remained severe. 
Consequently, the Sixth Plan (1987-1991) emphasised economic growth, job 
creation, and income distribution, to help solve problems of poverty and strengthen 
the economic stability of the system. As well as these measures, the Plan sought 
ways of developing the means to maintain peace and justice within a society, and 
promoted the maintenance of a national identity, culture and system of values as 
well as developed the quality of life of the people who lived in both rural and urban 
areas.426 The Fifth Plan‘s proposals to reform the national development 
administration system and decentralise government were continued in later plans. 
The Sixth Plan‘s objective was to improve and stabilise the economic system.427   
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Following the Sixth Plan, the economy developed further and grew, 
becoming increasing international, although problems continued with the 
imbalance of income distribution. The need for basic infrastructure remained. As a 
result, the objectives of the Seventh Plan (1992-1996) were to maintain the 
economic growth rates to make certain that the economic system was sustainable 
and stable. This also included redistributing income and decentralising 
development to both the regions and the rural areas more widely, accelerating the 
development of human resources, and promoting and upgrading the quality of life. 
The Seventh Plan also emphasised the development of the environment and 
management of natural resources management.428 Again, decentralisation featured 
in the Seventh Plan as a means of developing the regional centres and upgrading 
the quality of life of the rural people. The Seventh Plan proposed: 
emphasizing decentralization of government authority to the regions and local 
levels. Special budgets be given to the provinces to enable provincial 
authorities to spend on activities which will increase incomes, and upgrade 




In 1997, the Eighth Plan (1997-2001) was launched. Under the National 
Economic and Social Development Plans of the previous three decades, economic 
development had been achieved and the national economy had expanded rapidly.  
Income distribution increased and the number of poor people declined.430 
However, there continued to be a gap between the income for those who lived in 
Bangkok and surrounding provinces, and those who lived in the remote areas.431 
The Eighth Plan emphasised a long-term pattern of development.432 The financial 
system had grown and developed over time and while it appeared the economic 
position became more internationally recognised, sustained public investment in 
the economy and also in social infrastructures had contributed to a significant 
overall rise in incomes, living conditions and quality of life.433 According to the 
Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan: 
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The Eight Economic and Social Development Plan is the first step towards 
adopting a new approach to national development aimed at achieving the long 
term vision of an ideal Thai society. Thai people from all walks of life and from 
various regions of the country have taken the opportunity to participate in 
drafting this plan from its inception. This was a deliberate change in plan 
formulation in order to move away from the top-down approach practised by 
the public sector in the past. This can be considered the beginning of a new 





As well as maintaining economic stability, the Eighth Plan sought to solve 
the lack of development of social conditions by promoting a stable society and so 
improve the quality of life435 and human potential.436 The economic crisis in 1997, 
just one year after the plan was launched, meant that the objectives of the Eighth 
Plan could not succeed. Following the economic turmoil, the government reviewed 
proposed policies and, as a result, the Ninth Plan (2002–2006) reconsidered 
policies and emphasised four different objectives: 
1.   Promotion of economic stability and sustainability. 
2.  Establishment of a strong national development foundation to 
better enable Thai people to meet the challenges arising from 
globalization and other changes. 
3.  Establishment of good governance at all levels of the Thai society. 
4.  Reduction of poverty and empowerment of Thai people.437 
 
 The previous eight plans mainly focused on the development of economic 
growth, as well as improving the social condition and human potential. Only some 
of these outcomes were achieved. There was no genuinely sustainable 
development and problems remained with the economy, adjustment to current 
changes and to future global trends, and to improving the population‘s quality of 
life. All of these influenced the imbalance in the country‘s development.438 The 
Ninth Plan was based on the philosophy of a sufficient economy, as outlined by 
His Majesty the King as the guiding principle of national development and 
management.  
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It has been noticeable that on one hand, the philosophy of sufficient 
economy is based on adherence to the middle path439 as to overcome the current 
economic crisis brought about by unexpected changes under conditions of rapid 
globalisation. On the other hand, the people who formulated the Ninth Plan 
responded and adopted the King‘s philosophy of a ‗sufficient economy‘ in order to 
achieve sustainable development over the country.440 As noted in the Ninth Plan:  
‗sufficient economy‘ is a philosophy that stresses the middle path as an overriding 
 principle for appropriate  conduct and way of life of the entire populace. It applies 
 to conduct and way of life at individual, family, and community levels. At the 
 national level, the philosophy is consistent with a balanced development strategy 
 that would reduce the vulnerability of the nation to shocks and excesses that may 
 arise as a result of globalization. ‗Sufficiency‘ means moderation and due 
 consideration in all modes of conduct, and incorporates the need for sufficient 
 protection from internal and external shocks. To achieve this, the prudent 
 application of knowledge is essential. In  particular, great care is needed in the 
 application of theories and technical know-how and in planning and 
 implementation. At the same time, it is essential to strengthen the moral  fiber of 
 the nation so that everyone, particularly public officials, academics, business 
 people,  and financiers adhere first and foremost  to the principles of honesty and 
 integrity. A balanced approach combining patience, perseverance, diligence, 
 wisdom, and prudence is indispensable to extensive and rapid socio-economic, 




 After previous policies for economic and social development proved 
unsuccessful, there was the necessity for more attention from government. The 
notion of the ‗Sufficiency Economy‘ implied that not only the economy, but other 
aspects of Thai society, especially the way of life and the principles of honesty and 
integrity, were necessary to create a principled and moral national 
administration.442 The Ninth Plan was formulated on the basis of a shared vision of 
Thai society, which reflected the views of all Thai people in all social sectors, 
whether at provincial, sub-regional, regional, and national levels.443 Building on the 
Eight Plan‘s concept of people-centred development,444 the Ninth Plan was 
prepared and set regarding the basis of a broad people-participation processes 
and emphasised the balance of human, social, economic and environmental 
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resources. This was a significant step in the organisation of government and the 
behaviour of people because, aside from the Ninth Plan that was set to promote 
the local context and economic development,445 all government organisations and 
the bureaucrats within them were to pursue transparency and accountability.446 
This also affected the people as they were expected to take part in the decision-
making process447 as well as monitor the bureaucrats‘ operations.448 As a result, 
one the most important aspects of the Ninth Plan was the promotion of sustainable 
development and the laying of a foundation for good governance at all levels of 
society.449  
The Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan was 
implemented in 2007 with the primary goal of advancing the Eighth Plan‘s concept 
of people-centred development, as well as the philosophy of a Sufficient Economy 
from the Ninth Plan. From these, it was anticipated that the Ninth Plan would 
pursue the Eighth Plan‘s concept of creating a balance in the development of the 
economy, society, and environment, while the philosophy of the sufficient economy 
concept in the Ninth Plan would create a balanced development with respect to the 
people, society, and the environment, so that a sustainable development could 
occur in the long run.450 
The Tenth Plan‘s emphasis on pursuing the sufficient economy philosophy, 
in order to create a green and happy society, involved four missions. First, that 
people develop their quality of life, have integrity, knowledge of world standards, 
good living and security within a balanced diversity of culture, natural resources 
and environment. Second was to promote an economy which is efficient, stable 
and equitable by reforming the structure of the economy to be competitive and 
assured in facing the risks and fluctuations arising from globalisation. Third, to 
conserve biodiversity, build a secure natural resource base, and conserve the 
quality of the environment. Lastly, to develop and promote a national 
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administration system in order to achieve good governance under democracy with 
the King as head of state.451  
 
5.3 The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan: A turning point to 
a new era of decentralisation 
 A ‗bottom-up‘ approach was evident in the Eight Plan with the government 
allowing Thai people from all walks of life and from all different regions at all 
levels,452 from the bottom level to the national level, to participate in brainstorming 
and proposing their ideas in order to set the framework of the plan and a direction 
for the development of the country.453 However, it was not until the Ninth Plan that 
the government genuinely focused on good governance, which was a turning point 
in the new scheme of the national administration system. Previous plans, until the 
Seventh Plan, were formulated under to the ‗top-down‘ approach. The country had 
to face several problems and conditions arising from globalisation - the global 
economic system, corruption, and a national administrative system that was highly 
centralised and dominated by the public sector.454 Promoting good governance 
required initiating a new working approach ―to create a more efficient 
bureaucracy‖.455   
  As noted above, Thailand‘s National Economic and Social Development 
Plans were not consistently successful due to several unexpected and 
uncontrolled conditions external to the country, creating difficulties for the 
government in its efforts to achieve the country‘s holistic development. From the 
First Plan, the primary aim was to boost economic development. This caused an 
imbalance of economic and social development. As a result, government had to 
reconsider and reconstruct the plan to close the wide gap between a high level of 
economic development and a low level of social development. 
Under the proposal for good governance, the government encouraged the 
decentralisation of work and responsibility to local administrative organisations. 
The capabilities of local administrative organisations were to be enhanced, along 
with opportunities for greater participation by civil society,456 and the staff in local 
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administrative organisations, such as the SAO, would play important roles. The 
‗top-down‘ approach to government policy is seen in the Ninth Plan with the 
declared intention that SAOs should function with greater autonomy in providing 
public services. In effect, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach was introduced as the more 
important approach and the Plan set out several objectives for the development of 
good governance457 in Thai society. These objectives were: 
1.1  To establish good governance in all parts of Thai society – the political 
sector, the government, the private sector, communities and families.  
Good governance is considered necessary to provide the basis for 
balanced and sustainable development in the long run. 
1.2  To enhance efficiency of government service delivery, based on 
 people‘s participation as well as resource optimization, transparency, 
 and open access to information in order to allow a monitoring to the 
 general public.   
1.3  To promote a decentralization process by allowing local administrations 
 to play a greater role in local development in accordance with the intent 
 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997). 
1.4  To set up checks and balances on the basis of rights and duties of all 
 sections in the Thai society to make the national administration system 




The Ninth Plan also concentrated on working with the target group, local 
government, and set out several of the development targets in the following terms: 
1. To appropriately size and structure the public sector, and increase 
 administration efficiency.  
2.  To increase the capability and opportunities of local organizations for 
 developing  independent sources of income.  
3. To have more transparent, honest, and socially responsible government 
 service, private business operations, and political sector. 
4.  To have an internationally competitive Thai business sector both in the 
 short-and long term. 
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The Ninth Plan also focused on the decentralisation of functions and 
responsibilities to local administrative organisations so that public services were in 
line with the people‘s needs and that resources were equitably distributed.  
Participation in local administration decision-making processes and in the 
monitoring of their operations were encouraged in terms of the Thai government‘s 
plan:   
1.  To restructure the oversight system so the decentralized administrative 
authority can  be more flexible to operate in a more expeditious and 
efficient manner.  
2.  To improve the capacity and upgrade the efficiency of local 
 administrative bodies to cope with newly decentralized functions.  
3.   To establish supportive systems for the decentralization of power. 





5.4 The Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan: An attempt for a 
sustainable national administration system and good governance 
The Tenth Plan, implemented in 2007, brought several changes in 
Thailand‘s approach to its goal of development. The Plan sets out five major 
changes. First, there are the economic grouping and changes in the global 
financial market. The transactions in global trade and finance have increased inter-
country flows of capital, goods, services, and people. As a consequence, Thailand 
has to be more concerned with facing the realities of the world economic system, 
and to take an aggressive approach to trade policy both in expanding markets and 
in encouraging domestic producers to improve and develop their competitiveness.  
Second, there are leapfrog advances in technology. With globalisation, 
there have been many advances in communications technology, biotechnology, 
materials technology and nanotechnology. Their rapid advance presents Thailand 
with both opportunities and threats to its economy and society. The existing body 
of knowledge needs to be preserved, new bodies of knowledge need to be created 
and developed, and new and existing technologies need to be applied so they will 
strengthen Thai society.  
Third, there are social changes. An ageing society presents both 
opportunities and threats to Thailand. On the one hand, Thailand has great 
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opportunities to expand the market for health goods and services, health food, 
local wisdom and traditional medical practitioners, tourist destinations and long-
stay residence for the aged people. Thailand has a good opportunity to create and 
develop the intellectual capital of Thai local wisdom. This also influences the 
movement of skilled and trained labour to countries offering higher payments. In 
addition, the borderless dissemination of information presents a risk to children 
and youth because the government has difficulty protecting and screening young 
people from undesirable influences.   
Fourth is the free movement of people. More people are travelling for 
business and tourism and are more knowledgeable about, and responsive to, the 
competitive capacity in different countries. Bilateral and multilateral pacts mean 
that labour and entrepreneurs can now move more freely to work and invest 
overseas, and the Thai government has to pay more attention to the foreigners it 
needs for work in the country.  
Fifth are the changes in the environment and natural resources. It is 
noticeable that the increase in the world‘s population causes deterioration to the 
environment and depletes natural resources, which later affects the climate and 
the incidence of national disasters, as well as the spread of new communicable 
diseases. As a result, Thailand has to upgrade its standards of environmental 
management in order to protect its resource base and maintain a sustainable 
balance in the natural environment.461 
As well as the development of people, an economy that is efficient, stable 
and equitable which has a secure biodiversity strategy and a secure natural 
resource base, a quality environment, and, importantly for Thailand, the 
development of a national administration to achieve good governance is a desired 
objective.462  
The Tenth Plan continues from the Ninth Plan: 
Develop national administration to achieve good governance under democracy 
with the king as head of state, by building mechanisms and regulations which 
promoted distribution of benefits of development to all parties, ensuring 
transparency, honesty, justice and public responsibility, decentralization of 
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power, and providing systems for all parties to participate in decision-making, 




Consistent with the objectives of the Tenth Plan, the government aims to promote 
a concept of good governance within government administration, the private 
business sector, and the people‘s sector by expanding the role and capacity of 
local government bodies, to promote mechanisms and processes of participation in 
development, and to nurture a culture of democracy for peaceful coexistence.464 In 
order to fulfil the plan‘s objectives, the government set out several strategies on 
different issues. However, in the case of good governance, seven major strategies 
are outlined in order to create social justice and sustainability: 
1. To promote and develop a democratic culture and good governance as 
part of the way of life. In order to scrutinise the use of power and politics to be freer, 
stronger, and more efficient, to create learning processes, and to instill a 
consciousness of the core values of democratic culture for the youth and people 
consistently at all levels. From this, the people realise their roles and participate 
more in politics;  
2. To strengthen the people‘s participation in national administration. 
Under democracy, the system is ruled by the people465 who need to be encouraged 
to create strong cooperative networks. This will result not only through equal 
access to the judicial process, but also by participating in the national 
administration, which will strengthen the system of monitoring and scrutinising the 
government‘s use of power;  
3. To create a public administration that works with efficiency and good 
governance, emphasising service rather than control and working in cooperation 
with developing partners. For public administration to work more effectively, it is 
essential that the government‘s roles, structures, and mechanisms are modernised. 
Besides, while the government has to be concerned that its staff can work well in 
serving the needs of the people, the ‗top-down‘ approach is too limited. State 
enterprises and development partners need to be able to move more freely and 
effectively than under the ‗top-down‘ approach;  
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4. To continue the decentralisation of administration to the regions, 
localities, and communities. Decentralisation is very important to democracy and 
local capabilities need to be developed and decision-making power devolved to 
local levels where local government is able to take responsibility for public 
administration and public service, solve problems in response of the needs of the 
people, while also assisting government at the national level to work faster and 
more effectively. With decentralisation to the regions, localities and communities, 
the government also expects that this will provide the local people with the 
opportunity to participate in the development of their own localities as they realise 
their important role as a part of their communities; 
5. To promote strength, honesty and good governance in the private 
sector.  The government aims to foster a consciousness regarding the importance 
of honesty, equity for the consumers, fair competition, social responsibility, and 
sharing benefits with the public;  
6. To reform laws, regulations, procedures, and processes relating to 
economic and social development for balanced distribution of benefits in 
development.  Laws, regulations, procedures and process are very significant to all 
people, to those who are employed by government at any level, and also for the 
whole population. In considering laws and regulations, the government aims to 
encourage and provide opportunities to various groups and interests so that they 
propose and draft laws which accommodate the interests of various parties with 
balance and equity. Furthermore, while the government aims to promote economic 
equity, the use of discretion by government officials needs to be reduced to 
strengthen the mechanisms of law enforcement; 
7. To promote national security in administration aiming at balance and 
sustainability of the country. Maintaining the nation‘s security through national 
defence is a key issue for government. However, this is difficult to achieve if there 
is not much awareness of it and its importance. As a result, the government aims to 
promote and develop not only the government agencies, but also to have 
cooperation with other sectors, so that they will be more efficient and ready to 
defend the country and respond to threats in whatever form they take. In upholding 
good governance, all people are expected to protect national sovereignty, the 
monarchy, national interests, and a government under the system of democracy 
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with the king as head of state, and the safety and security of the people and 
society.466    
 The Tenth Plan set to create and maintain sustainable governance 
arrangements. However, there remain a number of obstacles. These will be 
discussed below. 
 
5.5 Decentralisation – the Ninth and the Tenth National Economic and Social 
Development Plans  
 The concept of good governance is very significant for Thailand‘s national 
administration system and decentralisation policy. However, a number of problems 
arise with its implementation. First, during the Ninth Plan, the concept of good 
governance was new to many of the government employees at all levels. The Fifth 
Plan was the first to mention the concept of decentralisation467 when such a policy 
was considered as a way to reform the administration system at the local level. 
Both the approach of decentralisation and participation of the local population in 
governing themselves was promoted.468 During the Sixth Plan, the concept of 
decentralisation continued and extended the notion of decentralisation and 
participation by the local people. The Sixth Plan was concerned with developing 
local organisation at the village and subdistrict levels.469 Both the Seventh and 
Eighth Plans continued these proposals with the Eighth Plan also promoting and 
developing the national administration system so that it would be more effective. 
However, the main objective of the Eighth Plan gave more emphasis to managing 
the government organisations at the central level rather than those organisations 
at the local level.470 Moreover, with the consequence of the economic crisis in 
Southeast Asia during 1997, the development of the national administration 
system indicated in the Eight Plan was not a success. From this, the Ninth Plan 
was concerned with promoting the genuine development of administrative and 
management systems by introducing a concept of good governance and allowing 
government officials at a local level to have more opportunity to participate in the 
national administration system. Moreover, the Tenth Plan has emphasised the 
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maintenance of the sustainable development of the national administration system 
by expanding the capacity of government officials at the local level.471    
Even though the Thai government focused on the development of 
administrative and management systems at both the national and local level from 
the time of the Fifth Plan, the main emphasis of those plans was on the economic 
situation. It was not until the Ninth Plan that the government concentrated more on 
administration at the local level by promoting the concept of good governance, 
which became a key point in order to achieve an effective national administrative 
system. However, even though good governance was advocated in the Ninth Plan, 
it did not set out any plans for a further step as to guide the bureaucrats in working 
under good governance effectively.  
The Ninth Plan set out to provide solutions to the problems of economic 
turmoil and the quality of life for the Thai population. Previously, the way of life was 
able to create a strong and balanced society,472 and the performance under the 
Ninth Plan was summarised in the Tenth Plan as having been adequately 
successful:  
The national economy grew steadily at an average of 5.7 per cent a year. The 
stability of the economy improved. Poverty fell, while the quality of life of 
people improved greatly as a result of the expansion of health services, better 
health insurance in both quality and quantity covering a majority of the 
population, and a decline in drug problems. But the Thai economy remains 
vulnerable to external instabilities, while problems persist over poverty, income 
distribution, quality of education, security of life and property, and transparency 




Second, there was a lack of experience in the practice of good governance.  
The Ninth Plan and the 1997 Constitution, with their promotion of decentralisation 
and good governance, did not result in government officials demonstrating good 
practice as they performed their obligations under good governance. In theory, the 
government wanted to achieve effective decentralisation and good governance. In 
practice, however, the staff who were directly affected by the Plan had never been 
trained to work under such arrangements.  For example, the Plan for 
Decentralisation of Power to the Locality approved by the Cabinet on 3 October 
2000 had three substantial principles of autonomy, clear delineation, and 
efficiency. These three principles are basic ideas of decentralisation as central 
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government seeks to transfer the powers and responsibilities for providing social 
services to the local government organisation. Local government needs to have 
the autonomy for planning and implementing its own public services as set out in 
law. Central government can then ensure that quality and standardised public 
services are provided to the people in the locality.474  
The 1997 Constitution set out to promote Thai popular participation at both 
local and national levels.475 As the supreme law, it emphasised the decentralisation 
of power to local government in the following terms:   
The State shall decentralize powers to localities for the purpose of 
independence and self-determination of local affairs, development of local 
economics, public utilities and facility systems and information infrastructure in 
the locality thoroughly and equally throughout the country as well as develop a 
province ready for such purpose, having regard to the will of the people in that 
province.476   
 
To carry out this intention of the government, good practice was required of staff at 
all levels, especially those at the local level. It takes time for staff to get 
accustomed to working in accordance with good practice. 
Third, the ‗top-down‘ approach continued to operate throughout the national 
administrative system. The national administrative system remained centralised 
and did not change as expected. Therefore, government at the local level had 
never been genuinely encouraged and promoted to become self-governing so the 
strengthening of the local administration could not work effectively. The Tenth Plan 
noted: 
Government administration still lacks good governance because it remains 
centralized, and denies opportunities for popular participation in decision 
making. Although there has been greater progress in decentralization, local 
government bodies are not yet strong and lack freedom to collect adequate 
revenue for self-reliance. In addition, judicial and legal systems have not 
adjusted in step with change and are unable to provide justice for all parties. 
Mechanisms for monitoring the use of state power remain inefficient. Private-
sector checks-and-balances still have a limited role, and lack ability to build a 
network that collectively could monitor effectively. Though transparency in 
government administration shows a tendency to improve, and the rating by 
Transparency International rose to 3.8 out of 10 in 2005, this level remains 
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rather low. The deep-seated patronage system remains an obstacle to the 
spread of good governance in Thailand. Coupled with a lack of quality and 
public consciousness, it results in an inability to separate individual benefit 





Fourth, staff have various levels of ability. While the Tenth Plan thought the 
outcome of good governance was quite successful, this could be interpreted as 
saying that the staff performed quite differently in fulfilling the goal. Staff have 
different experiences and capabilities and for staff to respond fully to the 
government‘s objectives and fulfil their responsibilities effectively requires that they 
be trained in how to do that. 
The Tenth Plan set out to provide the means of developing and solving the 
problems that occurred during the period of the Ninth Plan, recommending the 
promotion of good governance:  
Under the promotion of good governance, emphasis will be placed on installing 
consciousness of good governance and the cultures of democracy and peace, 
in people at all levels, sectors, and institutions. Opportunities will be created for 
the people‘s sector to cooperate in thinking, decision making, implementation, 
responsibility and evolution of national administration. Bodies of knowledge will 
be compiled on the development of democratic culture and good 
governance
478
   
 
By creating a consciousness of good governance and the culture of democracy, 
the Tenth Plan saw a means that will allow the Thai people, the public officials, 
both private and public sections of the government agencies, to be aware of, and 
get used to, the culture of democracy. Furthermore, the people‘s cooperation will 
help to enhance the government officials‘ working methods because it will be 
regarded as a check and balance system by the people. Government officials need 
to be enthusiastic but work cautiously on their responsibilities. Of course, to do 
this, they will have to improve and practise their skills automatically.  
 
5.6 Conclusion and analysis of the Ninth and Tenth Plans  
Thailand is now implementing the Tenth Plan (2007-2011), but continues to 
experience difficulties both internally and externally. On the one hand, the 
government deliberately initiated a new national administrative system so that the 
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478
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system would be more vigorous as a whole. On the other hand, there remains a 
lack of awareness by government officials and the Thai people who need more 
time to become familiar with it. 
The Ninth Plan was the turning point for a new scheme of decentralisation 
to be introduced allowing the government at the local level to have a greater 
power. Nevertheless, there are several gaps requiring further consideration. For 
instance, the Ninth Plan paid too much attention to the anticipated outcomes as 
local government became more autonomous, rather than laying a foundation of 
how and what the officials at all levels must focus on in order to achieve the goal.  
First, the Ninth Plan identified the problems of imbalanced development, as 
seen in the weaknesses in the economic, political and administrative management 
systems that were centralised and inadequate. In addition, the legal system also 
required an urgent review removing outdated and obsolete legislation that inhibited 
and obstructed reform.479 However, the Plan did not allow much discussion about 
the source of these problems or provide clear solutions. Government officials must 
understand the core concept of the perspective of the Plan so that they can 
implement the aims in the way the objective was set.  
Second, rather than discussing how well officials at all levels could fulfil the 
Plan, the emphasis went to the development of systems and functions to create a 
new working system under good governance. These included restructuring the 
public administrative system based on the good governance approach, 
restructuring the management system and adjusting the roles of public 
administration, establishing a system for tax and intergovernmental transfer to the 
local government, and decentralisation of function and responsibilities to local 
administrative organisations.  
The government anticipated the creation of a new role for local government 
and increased political participation among local people, as a way of achieving the 
economic, political and social improvements once there was a movement initiated 
within the community. It was expected that while the officials at the local level 
fulfilled their responsibilities under decentralisation, the local people would be 
―monitoring and protecting the public interest‖.480 However, to put the Plan into 
practice effectively, more is needed than developing administrative systems. The 
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staff who deliver the Plan are key people that must comprehend fully what is 
needed. Otherwise, the Plan is doomed to failure.   
In the case of Thailand, one of the major issues with which the government 
had to contend was the limited numbers of officials who fully grasped the 
objectives of decentralisation – those who could actually respond to the calls for 
good governance and decentralization were in the upper level of government. With 
the Thai national administration focused on centralisation for centuries, the 
majority of officials who were tasked with implementing the Plan had not receive 
sufficient training to act on their own, but were rather expected to respond to the 
commands of their superiors. While the Plan provided the guidelines to achieve an 
efficient governance system, it did not provide a clear step-by-step outline of what 
should be done to enhance the capabilities of the staff. The government‘s 
objectives were not clear to most officials.  
In the Tenth Plan, the themes of good governance and decentralisation 
continued, with the focus on setting guidelines for major development strategies. 
The Tenth Plan recommended:  
1)  accelerating the development of laws to support efficient and effective 
implementation of the plan‘s strategies to support a better administrative system; 
2)  studying and researching bodies of knowledge and learning processes 
to support implementation of the strategies both at the operational level and at the 
policy level to strengthen the implementation process;  
3) developing systems of monitoring and evolution, and devising indicators 
of development outcome at all levels to upgrade and extend the implementation so 
that a clear standard and measurement approach can be used to monitor and 
compare the result of government agencies;  
4)  developing databases and networks at all levels linking central policy, 
regional, and local administrative bodies. The data network will be easily and 
speedily accessible.481 
The government envisages the additional strategies will facilitate a more 
effective national policy implementation process.  
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The next chapter describes the significance of establishing of the 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisations (SAOs), as well as the roles, 




























Subdistrict Administrative Organisation - Chiang Rai 
 
6.1 Background 
The Subdistrict Administrative Organisation (SAO) was established under 
the Tambon Council and Tambon Administration Organisation Act of 1994. The 
SAO is a sublevel below a district (amphoe) and a province (changwat).482 The 
2008 census (15 August 2008) lists 6,157 SAOs within the country, 108 of them 
established in Chiang Rai province.483  
The main purposes of SAOs are to decentralise administrative power to the 
local people and to revitalize the participation of the local people in community 
development affairs. It has been the government‘s intention that decision-making 
power be decentralised to people at the Tambon and village levels. As a local 
organisation subdistrict organisations are allocated within a Tambon area and  
administered at the provincial level. The governors in each province are delegated 
from central government and are appointed to oversee the accountably of the 
SAOs. 
Rajchagool identifies four milestones in the development of SAOs. First 
was the process which began at the early stage of state formation around the turn 
of the century; second, was the process in 1932 when the absolute monarchy was 
transformed into a constitutional monarchy; third was the intense struggle for 
democracy during the period 1973-1976; and, fourth, the significant turning point in 
popular democratisation during the reform period between 1992 and 1997, 
together with the context of constitution B.E. 2540 which affected the TAO Act 
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 There are three  forms  of the administrative subdivision level:  a province (Changwat),  
district (Amphoe) and a subdistrict (Tambon). 
483
 Department of Local Administration, Ministry in Interior, [n.d.],  
<http://www.thailocaladmin.go.th/work/apt/apt150851.pdf> [accessed 19 November 2008]. 
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 Chaiyan Rajchagool, ‗Tambon Administrative Organization: Are the People in the 
Dramatis Personae or in the Audience?‘(UNESCAP), [n.d.],  
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/Publications/TPTS_pubs/TxBulletin_69/bulletin69_b.pdf> 
[accessed 2 June 2006]. (pp. 32 -33). 
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6.2 Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in general  
6.2.1 Classes and Ranking of Subdisrict Administrative Organisation 
In accordance with the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative 
Authority Act BE 2537 (1994) as well as the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997), the subdistricts were decentralised into local 
government units by an elected Tambon Council. The establishment of the SAOs 
depended on five different criteria: tax incomes they gained,485 amounts of the 
SAO‘s expenses on personnel, economic and sociality status,486 effectiveness of 
the SAO capability487 on their working. Generally, there were three different sizes: 
large, medium, and small.  
 To qualify as the TAO (SAO), the organisation must have a minimum 
annual average income, excluding the government support budget, of 150,000 
baht, calculated from the last three consecutive fiscal years. At the beginning, 
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 The criterion categorizing the SAO based on tax income has been set to divide three 
different sizes of SAO. They are:  1) Large size  SAO must earn more than 20 million Baht, 
medium size SAO must earn between 6-20 million Baht , and small size SAO must earn 
below 6 millions Baht. 
King Prajadhipok‘s Institute, Classes and Criteria of the SAOs ranking,      
[n.d.],<http://www.thaipoliticsgovernment.org/wiki/2ระดบัช ัน้และเกณฑ์การแบง่ระดบัองค์การ 
บริหารสว่นต าบล> [accessed 29 January 2010]. 
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 A criterion categorizing the SAO based on economic and sociality status are (1) Area, 
(2) Population, (3) Number of basic Infrastructure, (4) Number of slaughtered animals, (5) 
Number of fresh markets, (6) Number of factory Industrial Estates, (7) Number of schools, 
(8) Number of Child Development Centres, (9) Number of hotels (10) Number of religious 
places, (11) Number of hospitals or health centre, (12) Number of shopping centres, (13) 
Announcement to the SAO for being the building control area, (14) Announcement to the 
SAO to declare the law on cleanliness and tidiness, (15) Number of  materials and tools of 
prevention and disaster relief, (16) Number of materials, equipment and disposal of 
garbage and filth, (17) Number of government structure, and (18) Number of commercial 
business units. See King Prajadhipok‘s Institute, Classes and Criteria of the SAOs 
ranking.Ibid.  
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 A criterion categorizing the SAO based on effectiveness of its capability are measured 
from levels of good governance. The indexes of good governance to be measured are: (1) 
Rule of law, (2) Integrity (3) Principle of transparency (4) The participation of the people (5) 
Primary responsibility and (6) Value. See King Prajadhipok‘s Institute, Classes and Criteria 





Class of Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
 
Class of SAO Income Number of officers 
 
SAO class 1 
 
More than 20 millions Baht 
 
21 
SAO class 2 Between 12-20 millions Baht 12 
SAO class 3 Between 6-12 millions Baht 6 
SAO class 4 No larger than 6 millions Baht 4 
SAO class 5 No larger than 3 millions Baht 3 
 
Sources: Adapted from the Office of Committee of Decentralization to Local Government 
Organization, The Prime Minister Office, Handbook of Decentralization to Local 
Government Organization, 2002), p. 5., King Prajadhipok‘s Institute, Classes and Criteria of 
the SAOs ranking, [n.d.],<http://www.thaipoliticsgovernment.org/wiki/2ระดบัช ัน้และเกณฑ์การ
แบง่ระดบัองค์การบริหารสว่นต าบล> [accessed 29 January 2010] 
 
 In July 2004, the SAOs ranks were revised into three different levels as 













Revised Subdistrict Administrative Organisation Ranking 
 
Class of SAO (Old) Class (New) Criteria 
 




More than 20 million Baht 
SAO class 2  
 Medium* 
 
Between 6-20 millions Baht SAO class 3 
SAO class 4 
Small** Below 6 million Baht 
SAO class 5 
 
*Majority of the medium sized SAO are former classes 2 and 3. 
** Majority of the medium sized SAO are former classes 4 and 5. 
Sources: Adapted from King Prajadhipok‘s Institute, Classes and Criteria of the SAOs 
ranking,[n.d.],<http://www.thaipoliticsgovernment.org/wiki/2ระดบัช ัน้และเกณฑ์การแบง่ระดบั
องค์การบรหิารสว่นต าบล> [accessed 29 January 2010] 
 
6.2.2 Structure  
 
The structure of the SAO organisation is comprised of the council-
representative, in which the members of a Tambon council and the representatives 
are elected by voters and appointed by the provincial governor. Under the Tambon 
Council and Tambon Administration Organisation Act of 1994, the structure of the 
SAO has two different parts:  
1. the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation Council; 
2. the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation Commission.  
 
 The term of members of the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation Council 
is 4 years, while the term of the Chairman of the Council is 2 years.  The SAO 
Council is comprised of 1) Chairman of the SAO Council, 2) 1 Deputy of Chairman 
of the Council, 1 secretary, and from 3-7 council members. The functions of the 





 1)  to approve SAO development plans;  
 2)  to consider and approve the draft SAO rules of procedure, draft of 
 annual expenditure rule of procedure, and draft of extra expenditure; 
 3)  to oversee the administrative committee‘s operation in following the  
  Tambon development plan. 
   
 For the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation Commission, the term of the 
members is 4 years. The SAO commission is comprised of: 1) Chief Executive, 2) 
2 Deputies, and 3) 1 secretary. The functions of the Commission are:  
1) to administer the SAO in accordance with the rules of procedure and 
 the Tambon development plan; 
2) to oversee the Tambon development plan, annual expenditure rules of 
 procedure, and extra expenditure proposals for the SAO Council; 
3) to report on the SAO‘s performance and expenditure to the SAO 
 Council at least twice a year; 
4) to perform other obligations as specified  by the government. 
 
The Office of the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation is another part of 
the administration that acts in response to the SAO obligations. In the case of the 
office of the SAO, its responsibility is to work on the administrative responsibilities 
document regarding its district development plan. Moreover, while the staff of this 
office have to prepare the drafting of regulations, they are expected to respond in 
the SAO‘s general administration, including the Council meeting, organising  and 
respond to the government policy, for example.  
According to the law, the SAO administration is divided into at least three 
different divisions: 1) Office of the SAO, 2) Division of Finance, 3) Division of Civil 
Works, and 4) other divisions if required such as Health Care or Education.  
While the members of the SAO Council and Commission are elected, most 
of the staff in the Office of the SAO are government officials. According to Phong-
ngam, and Chotechuang, The Chief Administrator and the Deputy Chief 
Administrator are accountable in many areas of responsibility for the Office of the 
SAO. 488   
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 Kovit Phong-ngam and Preedee Chotechuang, What? Why? How? Subdistrict 
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Publication House, 2001), pp. 42-44. 
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Duties/roles of Office of the SAO   
 To respond in terms of general administration, general affairs, and 
typing; 
 Personnel and welfare; 
 Meetings and rules of Tambon procedures; 
 Legal and commercial affairs;  
 Public ceremony and public relations; 
 To prepare the Tambon Development plan; 
 To prepare rules of procedure for the fiscal year; 
 To respond in proposing for ratification according to rules of procedure;  
 To respond in any specified responsibility 
 
Duties/roles of Division of Finance 
 To respond in financial and transfer services; 
 To respond in tax services; 
 To respond in salaries/monthly expenses; 
 To respond in balance statement;  
 To respond in payments; 
 To respond in financial services; 
 To respond in debit-credit controls 
 
Duties/roles of Division of Civil works 
 To respond in survey, plan design and drawing, road works, buildings, 
 bridges, and reservoirs, water sources; 
 To respond in expenses balance; 
 To respond in building control; 
 To respond in construction, maintenance, control; 
 To respond in any specified responsibility  
More significant responsibilities that the Office of the SAO responds to 








Promotion of Agriculture   
 Technology relating to agriculture and livestock 
 Prevent and control animal diseases 
 
Promoting in Social Welfare   
 Community Development and Social Welfare;  
 Organising community events;  
 Organising cremation welfare associations; 
 Protecting the rights of women and children;  
 Promoting and developing community social welfare centres;  
 Promoting community social order; 
 Job Support Fund villages and urban affairs;  
 Promoting community‘s cooperative enterprises;   
 Promoting and developing district and community enterprises;  
 Promote and support the One Tambon One Product project. 
 The organisational structure of the Office of the Subdistrict Administrative 






















Source: Kovit Phong-ngam and Preedee Chotechuang, What? Why? How? Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization Democracy for Local Populations  (Bangkok:Winyuchon 
Publication House, 2001), p. 41. 
 


























Figure 6.4 Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
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Sources:  Adapted from Office of Committee of Decentralization to Local Government Organization, The Prime Minister Office. Handbook of   Decentralization 
to Local Government Organization (2002) p.14.   
* Elected representative
Council 
Councillors from each village: 
1. 2 Eelected member from each 
village 
2. Any SAO that has 2 villages 
has 3 elected members from 
each village 
3. Any SAO that has 1 village has 
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Deputy of Chairman of the Council 
Chairman of the Council 
Councillors from SAO council elect 
Executive Committees (appointed 
by the District)  
1. Chief Executive 
2. Deputies 







 In relation to the Tambon Council and Tambon Administration 
Organisation Act of 1994 (No. 3, 1999), section 66, part 3, the SAOs statutory 
functions are to provide service, as well as to develop their subdistrict in the 
economy, society, and culture. In addition, under section 67, part 3, the following 
are the SAOs‘ obligatory functions:  
 Provision and maintenance of public transport infrastructure both of 
 water and land transportation; 
 Provision and maintenance of public sanitary services (roads, 
 waterways, walkways and public spaces and the disposal of waste; 
 Provision of prevention and eradication of epidemic diseases; 
 Provision of surveillance of public safety; 
 Provision of promotion of education, religion and culture; 
 Provision of promotion of the development of women, children, youth, 
 elderly people and people with disabilities; 
 Provision of protection and preservation of natural resources and the 
 environment; 
 Provision of preservation and maintenance of arts, traditions, local 
 wisdom, and local cultures;   
 Performance of assignments from government agencies by allocation 
 and distribution of appropriate revenues.  
 
In addition, the SAOs may work in the following obligations:          
 provision of water for consumption, utilities and agriculture; 
 provision and maintenance of electricity, or of light by other means; 
 procurement and maintenance of sewage systems; 
 The procurement and maintenance of meeting places, sports, public 
 recreation spaces and facilities and parks;  
 Provision of agricultural groups and  cooperatives; 
 Provision of promotion of family industry; 
 Provision of preservation and promotion of  citizen‘s occupations;  
 Preservation and maintenance of public properties;  
 Gaining advantages and profits from SAOs‘ properties; 
 Provision of market places, ports and ferry services; 




 City Planning.489 
 
6.2.4 Finance 
  Revenue 
 Because the SAO must have adequate amounts of revenue in order to put 
the policy into practice effectively, according to the law, the SAOs‘ revenues are 
derived from different sources: 
 Section 29, the SAO receive revenue allocated from the Provincial 
Administrative Organisation:   
o Taxes such as municipality, land, building, sign boards; 
o Tax of Duties (charges, surcharges, fees, fines, licenses, permits; 
o Gambling licenses;  
o Value added tax (VAT), special business taxes; 
o Taxes of liquor; 
o taxes, excise taxes, automobile/vehicle registration490 
  
 Section 30, every fiscal year, the national government allocates: 
o Grant-in-aids  
 
Section 31, the SAO may also gain from several of the following 
revenues: 
o Income from the SAOs‘ own property; 
o Income from the provision of infrastructure facilities and services; 
o Donation from any kind of sources; 
o Supplements/contributions from government agencies or other 
allocated arrangements; 
o Miscellaneous revenue491 
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o Office supplies; 
o Office equipment; 
o Land, building, and other properties; 
o Other organisation support; 
o Any tied expenditure according to laws or regulations of the Ministry 
of Interior492 
 
6.2.5 Territory  
To develop SAO autonomy Patpui identifies four key principles:  
1)   The transfer of some operations of the central administration organization to 
 the local  administration governments.  
2)   An increase of the earmarked budget to be allocated by at least 20% for 
 1997 and not less than 35% for 2006 (Before decentralisation, local 
 administration units received only 9% of the total earmarked budget).  
3)  The transfer of personnel from the central administration organization to the 
 relevant local government units.  




 However, even though the SAO has autonomy to operate its own 
obligations, it is indeed not designed to run vital affairs in its area of jurisdiction.494 
As mentioned by Rajchagool,  
The provincial governor and the nai amphoe
495
are to direct and oversee the 
operation of TAO
496
 to ensure that it functions within the framework of law and 
follows the rules laid by the officialdom. The duty of the governor and nai amphe 
are specified in the TAO Act (2537) as follows: the nai amphie is (a) to organize 
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Development Institute, LIFE-UNDP Thailand), [n.d.], 
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 Rajchagool, pp. 32 -33.  
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496
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and run the TAO election;(b) to receive resignations of TAO members; (c) to 
ratify/validate the appointment of the president, the deputy president and the 
secretary; and (d) to approve the annual budget; the governor is (e) to approve 
TAO activities outside the Tambon geographical jurisdiction; and (f) other duties 
are to be specified and assigned to the nai amphoe and the governor by the 
Ministry of Interior and other ministries. Moreover, the governor and the nai 
amphoe can remove a TAO member on behavioral or moral grounds, or if a 




To explain this, the SAO‘s place is principally under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Interior; a District Chief Officer is a representative according to the 
regulation.498   
 
6.3 Chiang Rai Province  
6.3.1 History, Demography and Geography 
 Founded by King Mengrai in 1262, the city of Chiang Rai became the 
capital of the Mengrai Dynasty, Kingdom of Lanna, for over three decades. 
However, after King Mengrai built a new city named Chaing Mai, the city of 
Chiang Rai lost its status to Chiang Mai in 1296 and later only became Chiang 
Mai‘s vassal city in 1786. 
 In the case of its geography, the city of Chiang Rai is located in the 
northernmost part of Thailand. With its area of some 11,678 square kilometres, it 
shares its boundary with four countries and one province: North to the Union of 
Myanmar and Lao People's Democratic Republic, South to Lampang province, 
East to the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Phayao province and West to 
Chiang Mai province. In accordance with Statistics for 2008, the Chiang Rai 




 Chiang Rai is administratively divided into 18 districts499 as well as further 
subdivided into 124 communes and 1751 villages.500 This makes Chiang Rai the 
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 The SAO is subject to the Department of Local Administration, the Ministry of Interior.  
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 Data provided in November 2009. Chiang Rai Provincial Governor's Office.  
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twelfth largest province of the country. Public administrations of Chiang Rai 
province are divided into 34 government organisations under the provincial level, 
84 government organisations under the central level, and 120 government 
organisations under the local level. With consisting of 1 City Municipality, 26 
Subdistrict Municipalities, 1 Provincial Administrative Organisation, and 116 
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 Chiang Rai‘s 18 districts are:  1. Muang Chiang Rai, 2. Wing Chai, 3. Chiang Khong, 4. 
Thoeng, 5.Phan, 6. Pa Daet, 7. Mae Chan, 8. Chiang Saen, 9. Mae Sai, 10. Mae Suei, 
11. Wiang Pa Pao, 12.Phaya Mengrai, 13. Wing Kaen, 14. Khun Tan, 15. Mae Lao, 16. 
Mae Fah Luang, 17. Wiang Chiang Rung, and 18. Doi Luang.  
501
 In 2008 and 2009, 24 Subdistrict Administrative Organisations were transformed to 









6.4 Chiang Rai Subdistrict Administrative Organisation  
Under the ideal of decentralisation, as spelt out in the Royal Thai 
Constitution, the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation was established to 
improve the quality of life and public services and to meet community needs.502  
 
6.4.1 Establishment of Chiang Rai Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
 In the case of Chiang Rai, 92 Subdistrict Administrative Organisations503 
were established to work under the supervision of the Chiang Rai provincial 
government. They were established at different times, the first six in 1995, 33 
were established in 1996, 49 in 1997, and 4 in 1999.504 (See appendix C)   
 
6.4.2 Problems in implementation  
Even though the government has acknowledged the value and therefore 
the importance of localisation, and has attempted to shift power to its local 
government, Thailand‘s administrative system continues to be characterised by a 
―top-down‖ approach to policy development and implementation. 
Like other Subdistrict Administrative Organisations across the county, 
most of Chiang Rai‘s SAOs face difficulties carrying out their obligations under 
the government‘s decentralisation policy. These include:  
1. Problems relating to their establishment 
As noted by Phong-ngam, conditions inhibiting SAO operations are: 
 Territorial considerations 
The establishment of the SAOs by reference to geographical 
criteria has led to a great difference in size and population. Such 
criteria has resulted in some SAOs with large populations and 
many resources, and others without these. Those SAOs with small 
populations will always face difficulty in gaining sufficient revenue 
to develop their localities.  
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 The size and number of villages 
The size and number of villages within a SAO will influence the 
capacity to develop policy and implement it effectively. This can be 
explained in two ways: 1) where there is a small number of 
villages within a local area, the size of the SAO will also be small, 
meaning it will be less likely to have the staff capacity to carry out 
its role in cases where that local area requires a lot of staff to fulfil 
the SAO‘s work;  2) where there is a large number of villages, the 
SAO may not have a problem regarding the availability of staff, but 
it will require more expenditure in order to pay the staff‘ s 
wages.505 
 
The Chiang Rai geography does present difficulties for SAO operation. 
Several SAOs in Chiang Rai face problems regarding their location. Where the 
landscape is full of forest and mountain ranges or far from the city, there are real 
difficulties in operating effectively. For example, the Nong Rad Subdistrict 
Administrative Organisation situated in Thoeng district is a small sized SAO, 
where its location is  far away from any city in the Thoeng  District, will face more 
difficulty in operating its responsibilities than the Wiang Chiang Saen Subdistrict  
Administrative Organisation, which is a small sized of SAO and situated in a city 
of the Chiang Saen district.  
2. Problems regarding the scope and responsibilities of SAOs 
According to Sopchokchai, in theory, Article 69 of the Act of 1994 
attempted to establish a coordination mechanism between government agencies 
and local authorities by requiring all government agencies to operate 
development activities at the Tambon level. In practice, however, there are still 
conflicts in central agencies and civil servants‘ minds not to accept a SAO‘s 
status as an equal working partner. This is because those government agencies 
feel unsure whether the staff at the SAO, particularly elected representatives will 
work effectively as there are many of them who lack of experience, information 
and knowledge on how to design the projects506 outlined in chapter 9.   
                                                          
505
 Kovit Phong-ngam,Thailand‘s Local Governance: Principle and Administration in the 
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Through People's Participation: A Case of Thailand (World Bank), updated 2001 
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/orapin_paper.pdf> [accessed 22 July 
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In the case of problems regarding scope and responsibilities, Phong-
ngam describes six different conditions SAO face507: 
   The SAO authority and functions stipulated in regulations are not 
clear enough to the SAO staff to follow correctly. As a result, the SAO 
staff who have limited capabilities will always have difficulty 
performing their roles. 
  The SAO concentrates too much in fulfilling and initiating public 
activities that involve physical areas and basic structures, instead of 
promoting a good living standard and environment, health care, and 
education. 
  The SAO cannot complete all of the responsibilities according to its 
authority and function, due to the responsibilities not being transferred 
from the former central government and/or there are problems 
stemming from the overlap of regulations at different levels of 
government.    
 There is only a small number of SAOs that collaborate with other 
government organisations. This happens because the SAO staff either 
ignore or do not really understand how to cooperate well with other 
organisations.   
 The SAO staff, especially those who are elected representatives, 
do not understand their role, authority, and responsibilities in order to 
work effectively.  
 
As with other SAOs in other provinces, Chiang Rai SAOs also face 
difficulties in terms of scope and responsibilities. It was noticeable that even 
though the government promoted a decentralisation policy both in the 1997 
Constitution and in the Ninth Plan, the SAOs still lack capability to fulfil the policy.  
However, as outlined in chapter 7, while a decentralisation policy was 
promulgated, the SAO staff who put the policy into practice were not prepared.  
3. Problems regarding insufficient revenue 
It has been noted that all SAOs have limited and unstable revenue 
due to the nature of the taxes they collect.508 Besides the grants-in-aid and 
                                                          
507
 Phong-ngam, pp. 268-272. 
508
 Sopchokchai, p. 9. 
132 
 
support from the government at national level, the SAOs have limited capabilities 
to create activities to earn income.  
Phong-ngam describes the two main problems regarding finance as: 
 SAOs only have limited capability to earn their own revenue. 
Consequently, they continue to rely on state funds for support.  
 The SAO staff who have responsibility for finance have limited 
capability in finance. There are few staff members with relevant 
experience.509  
In the case of Chinag Rai province, most of SAOs have limited revenue 
and rely heavily on the central government‘s grants-in–aid. According to the 
revenue information shown in appendix F, it can be seen that on the one hand, 
there are only three SAOs, namely Tantawan SAO, Paan district, Rim Kong SAO, 
Chiang Kong district, and San Makha SAO, Paded district, that receive the 
grants-in-aid from the government that are less than their incomes earned within 
their local area. On the other hand, 115 SAOs out of 118 SAOs in the years of 
2005 and 2006 gained most of their revenue from central government. This 
becomes a more severe problem for those SAOs with small populations, as they 
face more difficulty in gaining income to meet their obligations and provide goods 
and services to their local area. Further, given the different degrees of need 
within the different SAO areas, some SAOs face greater demands for financial 
support.  
4. Problems regarding conflict (input and output) between traditional 
forms of local leadership and SAOs  
In theory, although the SAO plays a role as an autonomous organisation 
which can operate by itself under terms set by the central government, conflict 
(input and output) between traditional forms of local leadership and SAOs can 
undermine the ability to function effectively. In the case of Chiang Rai province, 
such problems stem from the significant influence that traditional leaders 
continue to have in SAO areas, by comparison with SAO staff; and the influence 
of politicians from both at national and local levels, but especially those 
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Although the SAOs have been established since 1995, their development 
has not been successful due to several obstacles. According to Charoenmuang, 
on one hand, Thailand‘s local administrative organisations had long been under a 
combination of democracy and aristocracy; the local organisations are more 
influenced by aristocracy than democracy undermining the foundation of local 
self-governance.511  
The next chapter presents findings according to an understanding of 
decentralisation of the government‘s agencies at central, provincial, and local 
levels, as well as problems and conditions inhibiting the implementation of the 
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Policy Implementation Under The Government‘s Decentralisation Policy  
 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, SAOs were developed to play an 
important role at the local government level. In addition, because the SAOs were 
expected to provide services and fulfil the needs of the people at the local level, 
the people, especially those who would directly benefit, began to look to their 
SAOs to solve local problems and to develop their local areas.   
Even though they had already been established for 14 years at the time of 
writing, SAOs continue to have difficulties in implementing the decentralisation 
policy. The very organisations established to accomplish the government‘s 
decentralisation policy have been inhibited in carrying out their functions by both 
internal and external factors. Central government and its staff have been 
concerned that the SAOs have failed to bring about the successful 
implementation of the decentralisation programme. This chapter presents data on 
the understanding and attitudes of staff at various levels involved with the policy 
of decentralisation and the difficulties in implementing the policy. 
The information in this chapter was obtained through in-depth interviews, 
focus group interviews, group discussions and private discussions. All 
participants attended one of the interviews. Some participants who had worked 
for the government for many years or who otherwise had a good understanding 
of decentralisation were invited to participate in more than one interview, 
normally both a focus group discussion and an in-depth interview.  
In-depth and focus group interviews took place at provincial and local 
levels, while individual discussions took place mainly at the central level.  Some 
respondents, particularly those at the central level and given their positions and 
responsibilities, were cautious in saying much about the government‘s 
decentralisation policy. It was evident that they were concerned that something 
they said during an interview might later affect their work.  However, when the 
interview was replaced by a questionnaire (See Appendices A and B) they were 
able to respond more fully. Questionnaires were therefore used to help the 
central level staff feel more comfortable in responding to the research questions.  
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Staff at the local level who had some difficulty in being part of a 
conversation during a focus group interview were invited to have a private 
session where there was a more relaxed environment. Having one or two 
participants at a private session made them feel more comfortable and confident 
in expressing their opinions, rather than participating in a focus group interview 
with 3-4 participants from different positions within the organisation, where some 
of the participants were their supervisors.  
 
7.2 The respondents  
The interviews in this research were held in Chiang Rai province. In total, 
45 interviews were conducted: 17 were in-depth interviews with key individuals 
and 28 were focus group interviews. There were six respondents from central 
government, four respondents from provincial governments and 35 respondents 
from the local level.512 
Respondents from both the central and provincial levels were government 
officials responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Respondents from the local 
level were SAO staff from six different Tambons (Subdistricts): Tambon Paa Or 
Don Chai, Tambon Rimkok, Tambon Mae Chan, Tambon Nong Rad, Tambon Yo 
Nok, and Tambon Chaing Saen. The SAO staff held different positions and job 
descriptions, including members of an SAO council, SAO representatives, an 
SAO Chief Administrator, and heads of division, such as public works, 
agricultural affairs, education, and policy and planning. 
 
7.2.1 Research questions 
Questions focused on four main issues: 1) SAO staff understanding of the 
policy of decentralisation; 2) inter-relationships between organisations; 3) 
interpreting the decentralisation policy; and 4) problems and impediments in 
implementing the decentralisation policy. Difficulties in implementing the 
decentralisation policy include the capacity of SAOs, and the autonomy and 
revenue provided by the central government.  
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Questions were open to allow staff to express their understating of 
decentralisation as well as their opinions about the policy and the problems they 
faced in policy making and implementing, and about the capacities of staff to 
carry out the decentralisation policy. Staff were also asked about the problems 
they experienced during and after the policy was delivered, and their suggestions 
about what government needed to do to solve the problems.  
Staff at the local level who requested a private session were asked the 
same questions as those used in the focus group interviews. Participants were 
more forthcoming in their responses during the individual sessions and they not 
only answered the interview questions, but also commented on problems and 
conflicts in other organisations which sometimes affected their organisation. This 
was unexpected and additional information.  
  
7.3.1 Decentralisation from a central government perspective 
 
When asked what specific changes had occurred since the policy of 
decentralisation was announced in 1997, central government respondents 
asserted that local government had become more important in the development 
of the country and they showed enthusiasm for decentralisation. Interestingly, 
two of the six central government respondents noted that central government 
must keep in mind the lack of understanding about decentralisation among local 
government staff and, more broadly, among the Thai people. They commented 
that caution was therefore necessary in pursuing the decentralisation of 
government. They also considered that central government needed to empower 
local staff and focus more on the implementation of the policy. They commented 
that it took time for local staff and the Thai people to understand the purpose of 
decentralisation and how to participate more fully in local government. This lack 
of understanding was seen to inhibit the decentralisation process, but there was 
evidence that this was improving and that the system appeared to be working 
better than when decentralisation was first introduced. The remaining four 
thought that the national administrative system was only slightly improved, and 
that there were still several problems inhibiting the implementation of 
decentralisation.  
 When asked how decentralisation had worked, all six central government 
respondents thought the implementation of the policy had been rushed and this 
had made it less successful than it could have been. They saw a gap between 
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central government staff and staff at the local level with responsibility for 
implementing the policy. They thought the policy would have been better if it had 
been implemented when everything had been well organised. Two of the six 
considered that the decentralisation policy had been pushed too hard by central 
government in its wish to announce the policy, and that only the central 
government staff were ready for decentralisation. They noted that the capability 
of staff at the local level was a concern and that the government had needed to 
ensure enough revenue to support local government when launching the policy. 
One respondent commented that the decentralisation programme had not been 
well prepared in terms of the allocation of authority, the provision of revenue 
streams, and the preparation of staff who understood the policy and what was 
required of them by central government.513 Another respondent pointed out that 
while the decentralisation was forced upon them by central government, it had 
not been promoted and encouraged at the local level to ensure staff had the 
necessary knowledge, experience and capacities.514 Two respondents stated that 
there was no guarantee that the people would benefit from the decentralisation 
programme. They asserted that the central government had failed to inform of the 
broader population of the significance of the policy and how it could benefit the 
country.   
 When asked what was required to ensure that the SAOs could effectively 
carry out their new responsibilities, four of the six central government 
respondents said that SAO staff were poorly prepared and did not understand the 
purpose and potential of the policy. They said central government needed to 
ensure SAO staff had a good understanding of the policy and the changes it 
meant for their roles. SAO staff needed to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the bureaucratic system, law and regulations, roles and duties, and also a very 
good understanding of what they were doing. It was not only about having 
knowledge of decentralisation, but also gaining experience in working with the 
policy.   
 Interestingly, the central government respondents commented that it was 
undue attention to public needs by SAO representatives that was problematic. 
The respondents noted that as SAO executive positions were determined by 
public election, these representatives would pursue activities that would enhance 
their chance for re-election.  While this was local democracy in action, there was 
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a view from central government respondents that this was not a good thing. They 
suggested that SAO representatives were promising the local people that they 
would fulfil their needs without knowing whether this would be in line with central 
government policy and that these representatives were too concerned about 
future votes instead of working for the public and providing public services. These 
central government respondents did consider the revenue for the SAOs to be 
inadequate for the responsibilities and policies they had to carry out. Four 
respondents pointed out that it was essential for central government to 
encourage and provide all useful information and support to SAOs to assist them 
in achieving the government‘s goals in the decentralisation policy.  
 When asked to identify the main problems with the policy, two of the six 
central government respondents stated that, in its concern to announce the 
decentralisation policy, central government had failed to take into account that 
the local government, especially the SAO staff, needed to have a much better 
understanding of the policy if decentralisation was to be effective. They saw the 
main problem arising from the lack of readiness and limited capabilities of SAO 
staff. These respondents stated that central government had transferred many 
more responsibilities to the SAOs than they could actually complete and that the 
SAOs‘ revenue was quite inadequate for the responsibilities under 
decentralisation. Four respondents drew attention to the role of politicians who 
represented the provinces at the national level. They noted that these national 
level politicians had on several occasions attempted to interfere with local 
development plans, influencing the implementation of decentralisation.  
 In summary, the central government respondents thought that SAO staff 
capability was the most important issue. They suggested that both the SAOs and 
central government needed to be aware of the problems inhibiting 
decentralisation and that central government needed to do more to support and 
assist SAOs to solve any problems. As SAO staff came to understand their roles 
better, and as they gained more experience, they would be able to contribute to 








7.3.2 Decentralisation from a provincial government perspective 
 
 When asked what specific changes had occurred since the policy of 
decentralisation was announced in 1997, the provincial level respondents 
reported that the local areas appeared to be developing faster. One of the four 
considered that local problems were being solved more rapidly and appropriately 
under the decentralisation policy. Two out of the four provincial level respondents 
pointed out that there were several factors that inhibited their performance, also 
referring to the lack of preparedness of local staff. The result, they suggested, 
was an ongoing reliance on central government. They saw this as a matter of 
education and that staff at the local level were gaining more experience with their 
new responsibilities and they had more opportunity to participate in the national 
administration.515 As staff and local people understood decentralisation better, the 
system improved. The following quote captures this:  
The decentralisation policy - it encouraged the SAOs and local people: 1) to 
acknowledge and understand their own problems, which would be different 
depending on their areas. Consequently, they could seek solutions to the 
problems. 2) To allow the staff and local people to genuinely practice working 
under decentralisation and democracy, and 3) after they were well practiced, not 
only the staff, but also the local people would realize how important 
decentralisation was. They would also have greater political consciousness and 
local people‘s participation would encourage transparency and open access to 




  When asked how decentralisation had worked, it was apparent that 
provincial government respondents held different views. Three of the four 
considered that ―after the decentralisation policy was introduced, there were 
several improvements‖.517 but that the decentralisation policy was only of limited 
success. One respondent did not see decentralisation as a success due to 
several problems inhibiting its implementation.  
 The two provincial government respondents who thought the policy had 
worked stated that after it was launched the local administrative system 
improved. ―The system was faster than previously because the SAOs could 
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exercise their autonomy to work‖.518 In addition, ―there was more participation at 
the local level, which was a good beginning for national development, especially 
when SAOs could work better with the local people‖.519 These two respondents 
also noted several matters that needed to be improved, especially the capabilities 
of SAO staff. One respondent thought that the system had gradually improved 
after the policy was introduced. Even though central government attempted to 
encourage and promote decentralisation, ―the scheme developed slowly, due to 
adherence to the old fashioned national administrative system‖.520 While these 
respondents considered that the decentralisation policy was somewhat 
successful, one stated that there was nothing much that had changed. He said:  
The policy was not genuinely successful because there were several obstacles 
making difficulties for the SAOs in implementing the policy. Moreover, because of 
the SAOs‘ limited understanding of decentralisation and limited staff capabilities, 





 When asked what was required to ensure the SAOs could effectively 
carry out their new responsibilities, provincial level respondents referred to the 
limited capabilities of staff and had suggestions about solving these problems. 
One respondent thought it necessary for central government to ensure that 
central and provincial level staff were good role models for SAO staff. Reference 
was also made to the need for good relationships between staff at different levels 
of government and of the need to supervise and assist SAO staff to work more 
effectively. It may seem ironic when the purpose of the policy was the promotion 
of local autonomy, but the supervision was meant to empower local level staff. 
This tension was also evident in suggestions that SAOs be cautious and always 
consult with central and provincial levels to ensure that they were on the right 
track. Related ministries, organisations, departments, and divisions were 
recommended as mentors and providers of assistance when required.  
Another respondent pointed out that the central government must always 
be aware of what SAOs were doing in order to ensure that the decentralisation 
policy was carried out without obstacles. This respondent stated that every plan 
and step must be towards the objectives set by central government. In addition, 
government must ensure that local staff can respond to the demands of the 
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decentralisation policy. ―The government must know how well staff at the local 
level can respond to the decentralisation policy, as well as how well they are 
ready for the change‖.522 From this, central government was seen has having a 
large degree of responsibility for solving problems confronting SAOs.   
  When asked what the main problems were, all four provincial level 
respondents were of the view that the limited understanding and experience of 
SAO staff was important. The difficulty arises, they said, from there being two 
sources of SAO staff: by appointment or by election.523 Given the lack of 
understanding of decentralisation, one respondent mentioned that SAOs have 
less opportunity to practice and gain the required experience. So ―when central 
government transforms an SAO‘s obligations, they face the added difficulty of 
exercising their autonomy as well as carrying out their responsibilities‖.524 Another 
respondent noted that ensuring ―staff at the local level, especially SAO staff, were 
well prepared for decentralisation was a fundamental step‖.525   
If the government ignores this matter, the decentralisation policy will not be 
 successful. Consequently, SAOs that fail to meet the policy‘s ultimate goal 
 affect not only the decentralisation policy but also the government‘s policy 
 making. This occurs because the government can‘t set the policy at a further step 
 with a higher expectation, but has to set the scope of the policy to a level which 





One respondent stated that the consequence of a lack of understanding 
and experience in decentralisation made working relationships between local 
level staff and staff at other levels difficult. New staff have only limited experience 
and they may carry out the policy in a way that is rather different from what was 
expected. At times they did not realise that what they were doing was against the 
procedure, and neither did they realise and understand their roles and 
responsibilities.  
Another problem facing SAOs is the number of responsibilities transferred 
from other levels and the lack of resources to carry them out. The government 
does not provide sufficient revenue or grants-in–aid for the tasks. SAOs cannot 
earn much and what they do earn is quite inadequate for them to perform their 
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obligations effectively. All they could do was to implement their policy to the best 
of their abilities in the limited conditions.527    
Yet another problem for SAOs in implementing the decentralisation policy 
was noted by one provincial government respondent who mentioned that ―even 
though the transferred obligations and the SAOs administration are very distinct, 
those obligations did not always serve the local needs, due to the different 
degrees of development‖.528 In addition, while the problem regarding the 
continuation and clarity of the decentralisation is of concern, the failure to correct 
the limited understanding of the superintendents of the SAOs rapidly creates 
more difficulties. The superintendents are also variables that influence the 
success of the decentralisation policy.529 
  When asked the main points to which the SAOs should pay more 
attention, all provincial government respondents were in agreement that SAO 
staff should pay more attention to self-development, gaining more knowledge and 
experience, and developing a greater capacity to implement the decentralisation 
policy. The more they can develop, the more they can enhance their 
performance. One respondent indicated that as well as self-development, SAO 
staff should realise how important their work is. The development of the policy at 
the foundation level was significant to the national administration. In addition, 
SAOs should be aware of the dangers of corruption when opportunists seek to 
gain advantages. Another respondent considered that SAOs must realise their 
roles and obligations as well as be aware that their work is very important. ―To 
request mentoring and assistance are very necessary at the beginning and 
should continue occasionally afterwards. If SAOs demand assistance from the 
government all the time, they would never be able to govern themselves‖.530 One 
respondent noted that SAO staff have to keep in mind that they work for the 
government, not for a business company, observing that ―several SAO staff do 
not devote themselves to work as a good team with others‖.531 Lastly, another 
provincial government respondent stated that SAO staff should enhance their 
capabilities to serve their local area, and as their potential increases, they will 
work more effectively on the implementation policy.  
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7.3.3 Local level perspectives  
  When local level respondents were asked what specific changes had 
occurred since the policy of decentralisation was announced in 1997, all seven 
considered it significant for the local area. Three observed that with 
decentralisation, the local area appeared to be developing faster.532 One of these 
respondents went on to mention that local problems were also solved more 
rapidly.533 The other four respondents stated that even though the government 
empowered and promoted local government decentralisation, it had not been 
successful for several reasons. As one respondent stated,  
 Even though the government attempted to promote the decentralisation policy, it 
 somehow seems very difficult to make the policy benefit the local area a lot. 
 We could see there were several problems that the government needed to 
 solve before launching the programme.
534
   
 
This is supported by two other respondents. One said,  
I agree that the government aimed to do the best thing by launching the 
decentralisation policy: however, to say that the policy was successful would be 
an exaggeration. In fact, the policy itself was a very good policy, but the staff and 
organizations that were expected to work under the policy were not ready.
535
    
 
Two of the seven respondents indicated that there were few, if any, 
changes after the policy was launched, because the local staff lacked the 
capabilities to make the decentralisation policy succeed. One respondent said:  
The decentralisation policy initiated by central government could only be of 
benefit to the locals and the SAOs if they are ready to work under 
decentralisation. Among the SAOs established all over the country, there were 
only a limited number of SAOs that could actually accomplish the 
decentralisation policy. Of course, those SAOs who have limited capabilities 
could not do anything much but attempt to work as best as they could.
536
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One respondent observed,  
The purpose of the decentralisation policy was to allow and provide local 
government with self-governance. However, with different understandings and 
points of view, many SAO staff have the wrong idea about the autonomy and 




 When asked how decentralisation had worked, there were a number of 
views put forward by these respondents. Two believed that the policy had 
worked. As one stated:  
After the decentralisation policy was promulgated, development at the local level 
improved. The problems were solved more rapidly and the local people also had 
more opportunity to participate more in politics.
538
   
 
Two considered that the decentralisation policy had been only somewhat 
successful:  
Decentralisation was not actually a success due to several problems inhibiting its 
implementation.
539
   
 
One respondent also mentioned that ―even though the system was faster than 
previously because the SAOs could exercise the autonomy to work, in fact, the 
SAO staff still had difficulty in implementing the policy‖.540  
 Lastly, two respondents said that the decentralisation policy had 
developed only slowly because of several factors. One was the limited 
capabilities, knowledge and experience of SAO staff in working under 
decentralisation. One of these respondents stated:  
Even though the central government attempted to promote decentralisation at the 
local level, the scheme developed only very slowly. There was a big gap between 
the staff who work at higher government levels (central and provincial levels) and 
those who work at the local level. … while the working system was flowing and 
well organized between the government at central and provincial level, the 
working system at local government was different. With different conditions for 
each SAO, there needed to be the staff who could enhance the work of the SAO 
while gaining more experience of working more effectively, and also a better 
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The other stated:  
The adherence to the monarchy and the hierarchical bureaucratic system saw 
central government paying too much attention to centralization, which later 
affected decentralisation at the local level to make it unsuccessful. … it was not 
possible that the local level government could practice their autonomy. … local 
government had never learned and practiced before, it had no clue to work 
following the policy.
542
   
 
  When asked what was required to ensure the SAOs could effectively 
carry out their new responsibilities, all seven local level respondents agreed that 
training and educating SAO staff about decentralisation was the most important 
thing to be done. One stated that it was necessary that central government 
mentor SAO staff. He stated: ―To make certain that the local level staff, especially 
SAO staff, were on the right track was a very important issue that the government 
could not ignore‖.543 Another respondent said that SAO staff should always 
consult with the staff at central, provincial and local levels.544 The following 
comment acknowledges the haste with which the policy was implemented, the 
problems that emerged from this and the need to look forward:  
At this point, we should not talk about the mistake that the government launched 
the programme too soon. It was in the past and we could not change anything 
about that. However, what we could do now is to encourage SAO staff to be more 
enthusiastic and to understand what their roles are under decentralisation. With 
this, they will build their  consciousness and realize that their work is very 
significant. They will be aware that central government, and also the local people, 




  When asked what the main problems were, three local level respondents 
stated that the limited understanding and experience of SAO staff affected the 
policy‘s implementation the most, while two of them considered that the 
decentralisation policy was promoted before SAO staff had prepared themselves 
for the change. Two respondents indicated that the origin of the problem arose 
from the national administrative system. For those who considered the limited 
capabilities of SAO staff to be the main problem, one respondent said:  
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  While the staff who work at central, provincial and some organisations at the local 
 level had to pass administration procedures before working being employed        
in government, those who were politicians working as the SAO elected 
 representative team gained their places through election. The government 
 officials had more capabilities for their work than those who were elected. 
 Therefore when working together, those SAO staff with less experience could not 





  Two respondents further indicated that with a lack of understanding of 
decentralisation SAO staff had less opportunity to practice and gain experience 
of working under decentralisation.547 One respondent noted: ―Their limited 
understanding of decentralisation led them to interpret and implement the policy 
differently from what they were expected to do‖.548 If SAOs continued to work like 
that, then the decentralisation policy would never succeed.549 The combination of 
limited staff capabilities, together with the many different factors and conditions 
faced by SAOs during the policy implementation process, resulted in different 
degrees of success in implementing the decentralisation policy.550 
The respondents who suggested the main problem with the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy was the national administrative 
system stated:  
Even though the government promoted the decentralisation policy, it appeared 
that centralization continued to play an important role in the nation‘s 
administrative system. Of course, if the government continued to pay too much 
attention to centralization and ignored decentralisation at the local level, then 
decentralisation would never happen at the local level.
551
   
 
The complicated national administrative system brought many difficulties for 
SAOs. One respondent stated:  
The SAOs already had a problem regarding the high numbers of transferred 
responsibilities, which came on top of the hierarchical system the SAOs had to 
deal with.  It meant the SAOs could not work properly and the hierarchical system 
took time, making the SAOs take longer than was needed. If the SAOs had 
reasonable levels of responsibilities, even though they had to deal with the 
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hierarchy, then this would be much better and more efficient than the chaos of 




  When asked what SAOs should be paying more attention to, all of the 
local level respondents suggested they should pay more attention to gaining 
more knowledge, experience and capacity to perform the new roles expected of 
them. They could do so by attending different training programmes offered by 
central government,553 by sharing their experiences with the senior staff or staff at 
provincial and local levels,554 and by consulting the staff at higher levels for useful 
information.555 The respondents considered that SAOs must understand their 
roles and obligations, and be aware that their work was significant.556  One 
respondent observed: ―The more SAO staff realise their role, the more they can 
work properly and effectively‖.557  
 
7.4 Inter-relationships between levels of government 
 
 
The SAOs worked with other local organisations, provincial level 
government and central government. These inter-relationships are captured in 
the following quote:  
The SAOs sometimes contact some of us for advice regarding the regulations 
and procedures when they are not sure, and we try our best to assist them.  
Sometimes, we recommend that they contact other organisations that can give 




7.4.1 Central government perspectives on the inter-relationships between levels 
of government 
  Central government respondents were asked to describe how the process 
of policy implementation had worked in terms of cooperation between the SAO 
and other organisations at the provincial levels and local levels. When asked 
about the challenges in these inter-organisational relationships, the central 
government respondents identified a number of factors. One respondent 
                                                          
552
 Respondent 17. 
553
 Ibid., Respondents 12, and 15. 
554
 Respondent 12. 
555
 Respondent 15. 
556
 Respondent 11. 
557
 Respondent 13. 
558
 Respondent 3, Questionnaire. Ministry of Interior. 28 June 2008. 
148 
 
considered that the different background of staff at different levels of government 
was an issue: ―We can see that there are several working approaches and 
techniques of staff at the three levels‖.559  He added:  
 Those staff from the central and provincial levels are not the problem but, at the 
 local level, because staff join under different terms, it is sometimes very  difficult 
 for them to work together very well. In addition, while some staff at central and 
 provincial level  understood the procedures and system very well, staff at the 
 local level appeared to have no background to work from and therefore faced 
 difficulties.
560
   
 
  When asked about the character of the hierarchical nature of the inter-
relationships between provincial and local government, all central government 
respondents considered that a complicated working process existed. The degree 
of hierarchy between provincial and local government was less than that between 
central and local government. One respondent stated:  
 Staff at the provincial and local levels are actually more intimately acquainted, 
 compared to the central level because they have to work together or even have 
to attend the same meetings occasionally.
561
   
 
  These respondents considered hierarchy as a natural part of the working 
relationship between provincial and local levels, but one stated that:  
 Personal conflicts among staff appear to be more of a problem than the hierarchy 
 which only applies during the working process as a way of making the whole 
 system run properly. If the working line operates in the same way, then the 
 problem should not occur.
562
   
 
 The complexity of the hierarchical system was seen by several 
respondents as requiring attention, to reduce it and make it less complex so it 
can work faster. One respondent had a different opinion:  
Even though we realize that the hierarchical system inhibits the smooth 
implementation of policy, it is very difficult for the government to change a whole 
system while it is still being used.
563
   
 
 
 Two respondents suggested that problems could be solved by 
transferring some staff from the provincial level and other relevant organisations 
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to work at the local level.564 Such staff transfers were seen as having potential to 
bring relevant experience to the local level.   
One respondent noted:  
Because several staff, especially those at the local level, are not familiar with the 
bureaucratic system, with all its rules and processes, it can be difficult for staff to 




7.4.2 Provincial government perspectives on the inter-relationships between 
levels of government 
 Provincial government respondents stated that there was cooperation 
between the SAO and other organisations at the provincial levels and local 
levels. Staff at the provincial level were expected to provide information to SAOs 
as well as assist them as necessary.  As one provincial government respondent 
said: ―Local government must assist and support SAOs, providing mentoring and 
making suggestions for better performance‖.566 Two other respondents mentioned 
that the provincial level always supports the SAOs when they had problems. He 
said:  
We make suggestions to SAO staff on different issues from time to time. Of 
course, with different conditions and limited SAO staff capabilities, there are 
different issues depending on their local area. However, most of the advice that 





Provincial government respondents saw the lack of experience and skill in 
working with other organisations under decentralisation as the cause of 
difficulties for the SAOs.  While there was no big problem in working with SAO 
staff, somehow, ―it can take longer to work together properly, according to the 
different degree of staff experience‖.568 Another respondent commented:  
Sometimes it is very difficult to work with SAO staff because of the gap of 
experience in working under a bureaucracy. The different degrees of 
understanding SAO staff have of the national administration, as well as 
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decentralisation, means that SAO staff sometimes work against a regulation or 




Another provincial government observed:  
Because the SAO working system is slightly different from other organizations at 
the provincial level, for example, in having the autonomy to implement their 
development plans, we sometimes have difficulty in dealing with SAO staff 
because their understanding of the working approach is different from what we 





Because we are government officials, there is barely any problem for us to work 
in the bureaucratic system. However, with some SAO staff, especially those staff 
who are politicians, it will be difficult for them to gain more understanding and 
experience in a limited time during their terms. From this, we can see that there 
are several times when SAOs are unaware of what is required and work against 
the procedures.  Since we have to advise them to work in the correct way, 
sometimes it makes them feel uncomfortable and embarrassed.  They sometimes 
may feel like we are annoying and demanding, even though, in fact, we do not 
mean to be that way. We just want to do our job.
571
   
 
One respondent further explained: ―There were several times that SAOs 
called staff at the provincial level to ask and make sure that what they were 
working on in their policy implementation was correct. Generally, they were 
unsure of the regulations and rules‖.572 
One provincial government respondent pointed out that one of the 
challenges in the working relationship between the provincial and local level 
arose because ―staff prefer to work at the provincial level, instead of being 
transferred to work at the local level. This is probably because they feel that their 
duties and positions are degraded, which is not true‖.573  This comment suggests 
there is a lower status in working at the local level by comparison with the 
provincial or central level.  
All provincial government respondents considered that the hierarchical 
nature of their relationships with SAOs influenced their work by the making 
relationships more formal. ―It is not possible to avoid the hierarchy, since the 
national administration somehow requires it to make the whole system work 
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effectively and systematically‖.574 That means even though the elected 
representatives are elected as to bring concerns on the agenda within their local 
areas, they have to work in relevant or under the provision of the law. As a result, 
these respondents pointed out that experience in working under the provisions of 
the law and established procedures were very important. Two respondents saw 
problems with staff at the local level in following the formal rules and regulations 
required for their work. One stated:  
Generally, government officials have to work under the formal procedures, rule 
and disciplines laid down. From this, if the staff do something against a regimen, 
he will be automatically punished with different penalties according to the 
provisions established.
575
   
 
However, because some SAO personnel were elected politicians, they may not 
have formal education or training in the rules of the bureaucracy. One respondent 
said  
Having a limited knowledge of the bureaucratic discipline, as well as the 
regulations, formal rules, and procedures made them have a hard time and the 






One respondent stated: ―We appreciate that the government decided to 
devolve power to the local level and allow bureaucrats at the local level, as well 
as the local people, to participate in decentralisation. However, with different 
degrees of readiness among SAOs in working under decentralisation, it appeared 
that the decentralisation policy was launched too soon‖.577  
Another provincial government respondent mentioned that central 
government had pushed the decentralisation policy too hard. He said:  
While staff and the local people required more time to be well prepared, the 
government appeared to be in a hurry to promote the policy. From this, a problem 
occurred when only the staff at central and provincial levels were ready for 
decentralisation and staff at the local level had difficulties in working under 
decentralisation.
578
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Yet another respondent said:  
The decentralisation policy was appropriate because the policy could actually 
develop, solve and fulfil the people‘s needs. Moreover, most of all, the 
decentralisation policy is depicted as one of the government‘s tools to promote 
decentralisation to local levels. Nevertheless, there were several issues the 
government must take into account in reconsidering whenever the government 
planned to make a new policy afterwards. SAOs required more practice in 
working under decentralisation. They also needed to understand their staff in 
order to work more effectively. Of course, this also referred to the local people 
that needed to gain more knowledge in decentralisation. If SAOs and the local 





Again, provincial government respondents suggested the importance of 
SAO staff enhancing their knowledge and experience through training. They 
tended to see problems in individuals rather than within the system of 
government. 
 
7.4.3 Local government perspectives on the inter-relationships between levels of 
government 
All seven local level respondents agreed that it is sometimes difficult for 
SAO and provincial staff to work together because SAO staff are not always sure 
that they are on the right track. As one respondent stated:  
Even though central government encouraged decentralisation and prepared the 
staff to work under it, in fact, it appeared that those staff expected to carry out the 
policy did not do very well in their work. Along with the difficulty of understanding 
the requirements under decentralisation, which already gave them a hard time, 
there was the added difficulty of working with the bureaucratic system. Since they 
had to interpret and work on the policy, there was no wonder that they could not 
complete the goal.
580
   
 
Another local level respondent stated:  
 
We understood that the government worked very hard to develop the country. 
However, the decentralisation policy which was intended to make things better 
turned out to be a problem.  It seemed that only the staff at central and provincial 
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These difficulties were expanded upon:  
We tried the best we could but, sometimes, it was very difficult for us. We already 
faced difficulties regarding the limited numbers of staff, staff capabilities, limited 
revenue, and limited autonomy. Of course, we also had difficulty with policy 
interpretation because of the different conditions outside that are unexpected, 





One local level respondent stated: ―SAO staff must contact and request 
assistance from different organisations at the provincial level when they require it, 
depending on the particular policy‖.583 Cooperation between the SAO and other 
organisations at the local level was easier than working in cooperation with 
organisations at the provincial level.584 As one respondent stated:  
Sometimes, we did not understand the content of the policy. Generally, when we 
were confused and uncertain about the policy or what we had to do, we asked 
other SAOs to check whether we understood the same thing. If our understanding 
coincided then we continued with our work. But if not, we called staff at the 




Another respondent stated: ―With different and complicated layers of 
governments and departments, it means SAOs have difficulty in working with 
staff at the provincial and, sometimes, central level.‖ He added:  
We feel more comfortable working with staff at the local level rather than contact 
those staff at the higher level, especially those at the central level. This is 
probably because we work at the same level, so when we talk we feel we speak 
the same language.
586
   
 
Importantly, one respondent referred to inconsistency in the regulations 
they were required to work within.  
Because the regulations in force are not consistent, SAOs have difficulty in 
continuing our performance. We have to contact them more often and so it 
appears that we do not have sufficient capability to do anything.
587
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Another local level respondent explained:  
Because SAOs are small organizations at the foundation level, several staff 
neglect and underestimate our potential. We do not argue that all SAO staff have 
a good understanding and have plenty of capabilities. We know that we need 
more practice, but personal attitudes appear to affect a lot.
588
   
 
It was noted that staff at the higher level, especially the provincial level, often 
interfered with SAO work:  
The staff at the higher level may see that we cannot work well, so it may be 
easier if they give us a hand. However, they forget that if they do that all the time, 
SAO staff will never learn.  And then we can see that the bureaucracy and 




Two of the local level respondents considered the inter-relationships 
between the provincial and local government were challenging. This was due to 
the overlap between these levels of government due to shared responsibilities 
and similar job descriptions for staff. Three out of the seven respondents 
mentioned staff overlap in areas of responsibility, and that ―policy is also the 
responsibility of other organisations at a higher level‖.590 In this situation staff may 
have to wait for approval from the higher level. One respondent gave an 
example:  
For SAOs to operate any public services located within their local area, they may 
sometimes have to get the programme approved by the district before they can 
move on because there is an overlap of responsibility within organizations at 




Another respondent said:  
If SAOs want to develop a swamp or landscape any public area, they have to 
propose the plan as well as hold a public hearing and get consent from the 
community members before submitting it in writing to the district to acknowledge 
before they can move on.
592
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One respondent referred to the limited capabilities of SAO staff:  
In the past several years, we have had a very big gap in understanding that 
affects the way staff at different levels are able to work effortlessly.  The different 
experiences of staff, their educational backgrounds, and working techniques, 





All local level respondents accepted the hierarchical nature of the 
relationship between provincial and local government. These relationships were 
very formal and contact was usually in the form of paper work, because 
everything had to be completed in an official way. This process not only inhibited 
the relationships between provincial and local governments but also delayed the 
work of SAOs. One respondent stated:  
There are too many steps that SAOs have to deal with. This makes the working 
process very slow. Sometimes, the urgent issue that we propose takes too long 
and the problem is almost too late to be solved when the request is approved.
594
   
 
 Two respondents portrayed the hierarchical system as firmly entrenched 
and very difficult to change. One of the two respondents said: ―The bureaucratic 
and national administrative system stays very close to the hierarchy.‖595 Another 
respondent stated that the government must consider revising the rules and 
regulations that are out of date, as well as those rules that cause the policy 
implementation process to slow down.596  
The local level respondents reported no major problems in cooperation 
with provincial government. Individual disagreements did arise from time to time, 
and the interactions based on hierarchy were seen as annoying to staff at both 
levels. Even though staff know each other personally, and even though they 
informed each other of issues, they were required to operate through formally 
established channels and the necessary documentation. Where SAO plans had 
been worked through in cooperation with other organisations from different levels 
then approval came more quickly. Under the hierarchical system, staff generally 
worked within their areas of responsibility, but SAO staff were constrained by the 
need to get the right person within provincial government for advice.   
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Again, local level respondents recommended ensuring SAOs were 
equipped to carry out their new roles. One respondent said: ―If the government 
considers expanding SAO responsibilities to the SAOs that are genuinely ready 
for change, it will help make the decentralisation policy more successful‖.597 He 
said:  
The government should transfer the responsibilities only to SAOs that are ready 
for that. For those SAOs that are not quite ready, the government must allow 
them to enhance their capabilities first. Once they are ready, then the 
responsibilities can be transferred.
598
   
 
 Another respondent said: ―The government is concerned too much with 
increasing the areas of responsibility for SAOs, but ignores that only a limited 
number of SAOs can actually work under decentralisation. If the government 
pays more attention to encouraging SAO staff, as well as to enhancing SAO staff 
capability, it will also strengthen greater cooperation between different levels, and 
assist the decentralisation policy as a whole‖.599  
Five of the seven local level respondents thought that the significant issue 
for consideration was the conflict between the community leaders and SAO staff. 
The difficulties between the community leaders (Kamnan and Phuyaibaan) and 
the SAOs they referred to involved a lack of cooperation as well as to the 
negative attitudes between them. To tackle this difficulty, SAO staff had 
attempted to encourage the community leaders to participate in SAO activities. 
One mentioned: ―After the SAOs were established, the community leaders‘ role in 
the local area decreased. This made several of the community leaders unhappy 
as they felt they had lost some of their power‖.600 Two others mentioned that they 
sometimes faced some difficulty in working with those community leaders, and 
one indicated that on several occasions the community leaders had interfered 
with the SAOs‘ policy implementation process. With the influence the community 
leaders have among the local people, they could create difficulties for SAO staff 
in performing their tasks. One stated: ―On the one hand those community leaders 
had their powers but they had no money to work.  On the other hand, the SAOs 
had the money, but we had no power to work. In addition, the SAOs could not 
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work very closely with the people. We always had to get them to inform us, or we 
had to ask the local people to participate in what we needed them to‖.601  
Two of the local level respondents stated that personal conflicts between 
staff were also a major cause of poor inter-relationships among staff. One 
respondent stated: ―No matter whether the personal conflicts occurred among 
staff at the same level or at different levels, it could later cause the policy process 
to go awry. With the lines of duty and the different areas of responsibility, 
sometimes they had to work together and this could cause them to avoid 
contacting or interacting with each other. Instead of working at 100 percent, they 
might only work for 50 percent which made the gap between them‖.602   
 
7.4.4 The perspectives of community leaders, SAO representatives and SAO 
staff 
 Many of the themes raised by respondents at the central, provincial and 
local level were reiterated in the interviews with community leaders, SAO 
representatives and SAO staff, although this group of respondents did tend to 
emphasise different reasons for the problems. Two community leaders, 13 SAO 
representatives and 20 SAO staff were interviewed.  
All 20 SAO staff who were interviewed revealed that there were 
challenges in implementing the policy of decentralisation. One of these was the 
simple fact that the policy was new to the staff at the local level, especially those 
staff who had gained their position by being elected, as one respondent said:  
Sometimes we really had a problem with the SAO Representatives who were 
unsure about their role and responsibility...They sometimes even change the 




 Other comments confirmed that this was a view that was shared. Another 
SAO staff member said: ―It was very often that those representatives‘ job 
assignments were not clear‖.604 and another saw difficulties because ―those 
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Executive staff had never worked in the government system before‖.605 A part of 
the problem, according to these staff, was the lack of knowledge of what was 
permissible: 
Because the people who live in the local area elected the SAO representatives, 
then those representative who held their position as the SAO representatives had 
to rely on the vote. As a result, they already made promises to do or provide 
goods and services so as to please them, but what they had promised was 





 The SAO representatives saw things differently. Two of the SAO 
representatives stated that difficulties arose from the limited number of staff who 
could carry out the policy. As one said:  
 
There were so many duties and responsibilities that were transferred to the SAO 
to oversee. In fact, we did not mean to complain about this, but with the capability 





 Another SAO executive stated: ―The lack of SAO staff who could 
understand and carry out the policy inhibited the performance‖.608 
 SAO staff reported difficulties in working cooperatively with community 
leaders because they tended to have different attitudes and points of view. One 
respondent said: ―The community leaders always gave us a hard time when we 
had any project or plan to do in the area, because we always had different points 
of view‖.609 One of these commented: 
 
Because the community leaders worked within the community for a long time, this 
gave them some prestige and power over the community, which allowed them to 
be privileged. From this, when the SAO was established and had its 
responsibilities to the community, the community members did not actually give 





  Another SAO staff member commented: ―The people who live in the 
community did not actually give the SAO credit as they still adhered to the former 
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system that the community leader, such as Kamnan, was in charge of within the 
local area‖.611 And another argued: ―In fact, the SAO was new to those community 
members and they did not genuinely understand the role and responsibility of the 
organisation in serving the community‖.612  
Community leaders also tended to blame SAO staff. One of the community 
leaders stated:  
 
The problem that the government at lower levels were not well prepared for the 
decentralisation policy was because the staff at the higher level were not aware 
about this. As a result, the decentralisation policy was not carried out effectively 
because the staff who were to implement the policy had a limited capacity. That 
was why we ended up with the policy failure.
613
   
 
 
Community leaders therefore referred to the need for further training:  
 
Because the government could not recruit the officials and staff who fully 
comprehended a certain job description, it was necessary the government 
provide its government officials to attend the training. This was not only to 
develop the officials and staff, but also so the government could make certain 






  The hierarchical nature of government administration was also seen as 
problematic by the community leaders, SAO representatives and staff. One SAO 
executive said: ―We face difficulties in dealing with the numerous steps that we 
have to deal with before the task was actually finished‖.615 A community leader 
commented on this:  
 
Sometimes, the assistance provided from the government to the SAOs or other 





The SAO representatives also stated that there were problems associated with 
the hierarchical nature of government:  
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The SAO could not avoid problems caused by the hierarchical system of 






SAO representatives and staff commented that they were dependent on getting 
advice from other organisations, SAOs or from higher up the chain of 
government. One respondent said:  
 
We always tried our best to interpret the policy correctly, but sometimes the 
context of the rules of procedure and law were very complicated. As we all know, 
a legal term can have a very wide meaning and sometimes we needed to know 





Respondents mentioned several processes used by the SAO in interpreting 
policy. 
1. Referring to SAO guidelines, rules of procedure and regulations to 
make certain that what they interpret is in terms of the law. 
2. Forwarding their interpretation of the policy to their supervisors to 
check whether it is correct and meets the policy requirements. 
3. Checking their interpretation with staff from other organisations. 
4. Asking other SAOs with more experience on the issue to check their 
understanding.  
5. By referring to previous policy or policies with similar content and 
following what was done before. 
 
One respondent said that, 
 
Generally, the key people who could advise on the policy in detail could vary. For 
example, they were, first, the officials who work at a higher level; second, the 
officials who work at the local level; third, the staff who work in related 
organizations or with related policy; fourth, SAO supervisors or senior staff who 
can make the information available; and fifth, other SAO staff who can provide 
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Another respondent noted, 
 
We need the key person or organization that can provide us with advice because, 
frequently, we have to ask the staff who were not actually in charge of that task 





Another SAO staff member added that what was needed was:  
 
A centre that could actually provide all of us with information. Of course, SAOs 
can use the working guidelines, regulations, and mandates they have as 
information references. But to check with the key people who really know about 





SAO staff did report that political interference was problematic:  
 
The politicians always take part and interfere in the SAO‘s performance, which is 







  Community leaders, SAO representatives and SAO staff were asked to 
describe their degree of autonomy. SAO staff participated in decision making and 
policy implementation by submitting to the three-year development plan, the five-
year development plan and an annual revenue plan, also known as the one year 
plan.  Community leaders noted, however, that the government ignored the SAOs 
in making decisions. One of these commented:   
SAOs only received policy from the government to implement, except the 
development plans which the SAO prepare according to the national plan.
623
   
 
  The SAO staff reported that apart from the three year plan, the five-year 
development plan and the annual revenue plan, SAOs hardly participated in any 
decision making, and mainly followed the policy set and approved by central 
government.   
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 The policies to be implemented by SAOs, therefore, emerge partly from 
the development plans they had earlier proposed to the central government. 
SAOs are also required to implement other policies. SAOs usually know of policy 
to be implemented as they have already set the policy. They were responsible for 
providing goods and services, for example, for the local community infrastructure, 
public services and utilities, and public facilities.624 However, for the new policies 
assigned by central government, the SAOs have to interpret and implement those 
policies. In doing this, SAO staff follow the guidelines and laws. To make certain 
that they are following the right track, SAO staff check with government officials 
at higher levels.  
 The SAO representatives mentioned challenges arising from the 
decentralisation policy in terms of regulations and procedures. Three of these 
respondents explained:  
 
The SAO staff always have difficulty in interpreting and carrying out policy 





 In addition, because ―the SAOs‘ position was the lowest level of 
government organisation. When there was an overlap, we, as the SAO staff, 
could not actually continue our work but had to wait and contact the government 
or related organisations before moving on‖.626   
 While the SAO Representatives mentioned bureaucratic system and 
unclear policies made difficulties for SAOs in implementing policy, fourteen 
stated that the SAO staff also had other factors which affected their performance.   
1) The influence of politicians at the national level interfered with the 
SAOs‘ policy implementation and created difficulties for SAO staff in 
completing their performance.627  
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2) There were few SAO staff who had the necessary experience and 
understood what was necessary to implement the policies and work 
within the organisation.628 
3) SAO staff had limited experience and backgrounds in understanding 
and solving problems arising in the policy implementation process.629 
4) The SAOs had limited autonomy compared to the responsibilities 
transferred to them by the government.630 
 
7.6 Revenue 
 The issue of revenue was raised with SAO representatives and staff. SAO 
staff mentioned the imbalance between the responsibilities of the SAO and the 
limited revenue, giving rise to difficulties in carrying out their obligations. One 
said:  
 
This problem appears when there are too many duties transferred to the SAOs to 





 This was seen by these SAO staff as being linked with the speed with 
which the policy was implemented: ―Because the government launched the policy 
too soon, there was nothing well prepared‖.632 
 SAO staff generally knew in advance the revenue they require to implement 
policies. SAOs have to work on the three-year development plan, the five-year 
development plan and the annual plan, before submitting proposals to the 
government. In preparing their proposals to the government, SAO staff generally 
start work on their plan by carrying out a survey, holding a public hearing, and 
collecting information based on public needs.  
One respondent said: ―We actually know what we have to do as we must 
submit the plan to the government for approval. Of course, the plans have to be 
within the scope set by the government‖.633 Another respondent added: ―After the 
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development plan had been approved, we had to consider and distribute the 
revenue to make certain that all projects would be implemented. However, with 
the limited revenue, we could not do well as we wished but only as good as it 
could be‖.634  
According to SAO staff, after the SAO has finished preparing the plan, as 
well as the estimated expenditure needed for its implementation, the plan is 
submitted to the government. Later, once the government approves the proposal, 
the three-year plan will be announced and become effective. As mentioned by 
one respondent: ―Normally the amount of revenue the government approved to 
the SAOs was less than the amount stated in the proposal‖.635 Another 
commented: ―With the limited revenue, the SAO is required to continue 
implementing the policy‖.636  
Ten SAO staff respondents argued that even though the SAO receives 
only limited revenue, the SAO plan is significant for the local people, and SAO 
staff can request assistance from the other local organisations, such as the 
Provincial Administrative Organisation. Therefore, the program can continue 
once it is approved.637 
Community leaders recognised that the SAOs faced difficulty as a 
consequence of limited revenue. While one community leader said that the 
government provided too little revenue,638 the other argued that even though 
revenue from government was limited, it was SAO staff capabilities that were the 
real problem. He said:  
 
If one SAO could complete their work without any problem, then it must be the 
problem with the staff themselves that is not able to manage their work within the 
limited amount of the revenue provided. So, we could not blame the government 




                                                          
634
 Respondent 42. 
635
 Respondent 21. 
636
 Respondent 20. 
637
 Respondent 28. 
638
 Respondent 41. 
639
 Respondent 44. 
165 
 
 The eighteen SAO staff agreed that revenue affected the success of their 
work. One said: ―the problem was the revenue that we actually received was too 
little for what was needed for the projects we had to complete‖.640  
SAO representatives agreed that their organisations always faced the 
problem of insufficient revenue. With limited revenue, SAO staff could not carry 
out SAO obligations effectively. One executive said: ―It was very difficult for us to 
manage and distribute the revenues to all the projects and policies we had to 
carry out‖.641  
 Another added that it was not possible to complete all policy with the 
limited revenue available. As he said: ―what we usually did was we had to work 
on the most important or urgent projects and policy first‖.642 Later, if there was still 
some money left, then we could come back and consider the rest of the 
policies.643  
When considering alternative approaches to solving the revenue 
problems, three of the seven representatives noted that SAOs could propose 
plans. Four of the seven representatives said they could find ways of earning 
more income.644 Two of these commented: the policy implementation was indeed 
inhibited because there was very limited revenue we received and we could not 
do anything much with this.645   
 Another added: ―It was very difficult for us to always rely on other 
organisations for help‖.646 Two other respondents added:  
According to the law, we could earn more income besides the revenue, however, 
it was very difficult for us to earn much because we faced several factors. The 
amount of income the SAO could earn depends on the size of the population, the 
type of property the SAO owned, the amount of infrastructure facilities and 
services, and the sources of donation in each local area. From this, several SAOs 
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 The SAO staff commented on several key issues.648 One noted: ―For us, 
the problem regarding sources of extra income did not cause as many problems 
as the capability to collect the income effectively. Those staff who worked on this 
did not comprehend what was involved. With a lack of experience, there was a 




  In summary, the comments made by those interviewed pointed to a 
variety of issues that help explain problems in the implementation of the 
programme of government decentralisation. These included: 
1. SAO staff not having an educational background which is relevant, 
with the consequence that they had difficulty in interpreting the 
policies correctly;   
2. Few SAO staff having the experience and understanding, especially 
in technical aspects of a policy, some of them with insufficient 
academic backgrounds for working on decentralisation;650 
3. The limited time for staff to adjust and gain the necessary experience 
to work effectively;651 
4. The discontinuous nature of many policies initiated by central 
government, with changes made by government from time to time to 
the policies‘ aspects, context, and aims;652   
5. The lack of clarity in the policies set by central government, and 
policies that are too complicated to be interpreted correctly; 
6. The limitation of autonomy provided from the central government that 
allows the SAO staff to participate in decision making and policy 
implementation; 
7. The imbalance between the SAO‘ responsibilities and limitation of 
revenue that the SAO gain. 
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With several problems as mentioned above, even though the SAO staff try 
their best to achieve the government‘s policy implementation process, the 
outcome comes out at different degrees of success.    
 The next chapter will present an analysis of the government‘s 
decentralisation policy, how the decentralisation policy works, the difficulties of 
the policy‘s implementation, what causes the decentralisation policy 
implementation to be a failure or a success, and how the government must fix the 
























Analysis of decentralisation at the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 The decentralisation policy is a part of the National Economic and Social 
Development plan653 to develop Thailand‘s society, economy and bureaucracy 
over the long term. For Thailand to succeed with its decentralised national 
administration, the government has to pay careful attention not only to the 
national policies launched from time to time, but also to make certain that the 
different levels of government can carry out the policies through to the end. With 
well-organised implementation, the policy outcomes are likely to be of 
considerable benefit to the country as a whole.   
 The decentralisation policy is one of the most significant policies for the 
Thai government in recent times and with the policy fully implemented the 
country can develop more quickly as people in the local areas participate more 
fully in politics. The decentralisation of national administration to the local level 
will result in more appropriate policies locally, these being delivered more quickly. 
An effective local government will greatly assist the national administration solve 
the problems at the local level.  
Even though decentralisation is a part of the national plan, central 
government has an important role to play in putting the decentralisation policy 
into practice. The previous chapter has shown that central government needs to 
be more concerned with matters of staffing at local levels. This chapter brings 
together the information derived from the interviews with staff at three 
government levels, central, provincial, and local government levels, as well as 
insights from key official documents, and scholarly books and articles.  
 
8.2 Thailand‘s decentralisation policies 
The policies of decentralisation and popular participation were introduced 
in the Fifth National Development Plan (1981-1986). The next several plans 
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extended the notion of decentralisation and participation.654 It is timely to consider 
a number of questions about whether the decentralisation policy in Thailand has 
been successful. From the interview data in chapter 7, it is apparent that those in 
key positions consider decentralisation to have been inhibited, this being due to 
different problems at both the local and central levels of government. 
In his discussion of decentralisation, Charoenmuang sees problems 
occurring as a consequence of the neglect of local government by political elites 
and a failure to promote the development of local governance.655 Charoenmuang 
explained the problems which weaken Thailand‘s policy for local administration in 
terms of political, economic and social conditions.     
1. Thailand‘s national administration is accustomed to centralisation and 
has ignored government at the local level. In failing to promote self-rule 
local people have only limited opportunities for local administration, with 
the result that staff at the local level have less opportunity to carry out 
their work under a decentralised government structure.  
2. Thailand‘s bureaucracy had developed as part of the economic 
system in terms of the Sakdina system656 under which local government 
was carried out by government officials.657 This meant that staff at the 
local level have lacked the understanding and experience of local self 
government and have therefore been less able to implement a policy of 
decentralisation.658 
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3. The impact of WWII and the subsequent ideological tensions 
regarding communism and liberalism659 in Indochina influenced Thailand‘s 
political system.  It was liberalism which later came to have an influence 
in Thailand as liberal countries attempted to persuade and support the 
Thai government to strengthen its national administration. This was 
important to the way Thailand went on to focus on ensuring that 
government was well founded and vigorous, and secure from 
communism.660   
 
In his discussion, Dhiravegin notes that although local administration is 
significant because it involves the majority of the people in provincial and rural 
areas, in recent years the Thai central government has in fact ignored 
government at the local level, despite the National Plan, by paying more attention 
to the national administration. The obstacle inhibiting the operation of the 
decentralisation policy has been central government‘s delegated administration 
in the provincial administration.661 Power and authority continue to be held by 
provincial staff who are directly appointed by the central government.662 As stated 
by Patpui:  
[…] the pressure from the majority of the people became minimized and less 
people took part in the local administration governments‘ tasks in developing 
capacities needed for the smooth transfer of the authorities from the central 
administration agencies. Besides, some key middle-class figures, for lack of 
information flows, held and still maintained a negative attitude towards some of 
the local administration governments. 
 
The development of the needed capacities of the local administration units was 
slow and did not keep pace with the modern changes. Two reasons for this were 
that the central administration units did not care enough for the requirements and 
the existing body of the knowledge possessed by the present bureaucracy was  
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As Patpui notes, for the decentralisation policy to be effective, 
government has to fulfil several conditions: the transfer of operations, which is 
one of the most significant conditions, ensuring adequate revenue, the policy 
implementation process itself and removing the obstacles inhibiting the 
decentralisation process.  
There are two different aspects which need to be considered with the 
transfer of operations: 1) how well the government organises the plan, and 2) the 
operational capacity of the government at the local level after the plan is 
launched.  
According to Patpui, even though central government has planned for the 
transfer of operations, it has not planned for the enforcement of this. Central 
government has continued to face difficulties in transferring national operations to 
the local level.664 Dhiravegin notes that, instead of paying attention to the 
government at every level before launching the decentralisation policy, central 
government has tended to be distracted by questions about the constitution, 
political parties, elections and government itself.665   
It was not until 1995 that the SAOs were finally established. With little 
experience of government at the local level, preparing local staff for 
decentralisation was always going to be difficult. With only a limited number of 
people in local administration, these having only limited capacities, a lack of 
information and negative attitudes of staff at central and provincial levels towards 
some of the staff at local governments,666 there have been many problems in 
implementing the decentralisation policy.  
The slow transfer of power from the central level is another problem 
affecting public participation at the local level. To work effectively, the 
decentralisation policy needs to have many people participating in government at 
the local level. There needs to be an adequate transfer of personnel and there 
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needs to be clear job descriptions for the decentralisation policy to work.667 Patpui 
considers the development of the capacity of local administration units to respond 
to the new demands to be very limited, and identifies two reasons for this lack of 
development. These were: 
1. The central administration units did not care enough about the 
requirements of decentralisation for local government. 
2. The existing knowledge of the present bureaucracy was not adequate 
to create new forms for local government.668 
Suwanno has analysed the structures that have restrained government‘s 
decentralisation policy, focusing on the issues of resource management. For the 
decentralisation policy to be successful, government must deliberately amend the 
old paradigm of seeing central government control as the most important issue, 
to one of generating a new scheme of decentralisation. With this, a local 
community can genuinely play an important role in the national administration 
through, for example, voting and participating in the decision-making process at 
the local level.669 Suwanno identifies three main obstacles to the decentralisation 
process.  
1. Central government has always played an important role. National 
authority was conceived at the national level as a state. Central 
government was the provider, with local communities and people the 
recipients. 
2. Decentralisation was classified as a state authority structure, which 
was automatically linked to politics rather than paying attention to 
people and social and economic factors within local communities.   
3. There was no distinction in terms of social and economic conditions 
between urban and rural communities, yet urban and rural 
communities have different social and economic structures.670  
 
 






 Bawornsak Suwanno, cited in Meechai, pp. 24-26.      
670
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To Suwanno, any attempt to implement decentralisation under the old 
paradigm would not be change for the better. Government must seek new paths 
for staff under the decentralisation policy, and find solutions to problems quickly. 
A programme which is appropriate and suits local conditions will enable the 
improvements to take place, and the local community and organisation will 
become more important as basic knowledge of decentralisation is generated and 
local participation promoted.671 Central government and staff have to accept the 
local as a part of the decentralisation plan and government has to recognise and 
give credit to local communities as an important institution.672 Staff who work at 
central and provincial governments have to be concerned with and accept local 
government and local communities as the way they are, not as state and 
community.673 Decentralisation cannot take place at the local level when the 
government at central and provincial levels continues to intervene in local 
government operations.674 
These observations allude to the point made by Brooke that although the 
government is the most all–embracing of organisations, it also shares with other 
organisations the difficulty of identifying a suitable locus of decentralisation.675 In 
addition, because the administrative structure at the rural level has been adopted 
from Western models,676 the same structure for use at the local level cannot be 
used. Different environments of local government require different systems. The 
result may not be a good quality outcome. For this reason, central government 
should ensure that the structures of central government administration and 
management are different from those in force at the local level.677 Central 
government can encourage what is required of local government before 
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8.3 Analysis of decentralisation at the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
In analysing Thailand‘s decentralisation programme, it is important 
therefore to understand the characteristics of the national administration. As 
noted in chapter 7, staff who work at the local level understand decentralisation 
differently from staff who work at central and provincial levels. Staff at each level 
have different qualifications and work in quite different environments.  
Sorensen states that the administrative characteristics at both the national 
and local levels are important for understanding the operation of multilevel 
government. He identifies a number of administrative characterises that inhibit 
government effectiveness:   
At a national level, institutional and administrative structures are weak and 
ineffective. They are controlled by state elites who do not primarily seek to 
provide public or collective good. The state apparatus is rather a source of 
income for those clever enough to control it. The spoils of office are shared by a 
group of followers making up a network of patron-client relationships.  
 
At the local level, some groups attempt to get access to state resources and 
international aid. They do this by securing a place on the lower rungs of the state 
elite‘s patron-client network, but the great majority of the population attempts to 
cut itself loose from any state influence whatsoever. People know very well that 
the state is a source of pillage, threat and exploitation. It is by no means a 
provider of welfare, security and order. Instead, ethnic communities attempt to 





 In the case of Thailand, the central government has historically played an 
important role and controlled almost every issue, with government at other levels 
dependent on the central level. Factors inhibiting decentralisation include, at the 
national level, the legal provisions and organisational structures for 
decentralisation have to be enacted by central government, indicating a top-down 
approach. This approach seems to be the only way of functioning that central 
government can recognise. Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve point out that, in 
fact, there have been a number of efforts to recentralise power and they cite the 
example of the office of the CEO-governor (provincial governor). This could be 
viewed as an attempt to re-establish a strong central presence in territorial 
administration over local government administration and control over access to 
resources and decision-making.  (Recognising the fundamental role of the centre 
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does not detract from the recognition that the forces of decentralisation are also 
being driven from the localities themselves either directly or through their 
representative agencies such as the municipal league that has recently taken 
steps to be more independent to assume some of the tasks and responsibilities 
previously under central government control).679  
According to Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve, instead of recentralisation 
of power to the governors, power must be directly transferred to the local level. 
The staff who work at the local level must be from the local level, not delegated 
from central government. If this is not the case and if central government re-
establishes a strong central territorial administration over the local government, 
decentralisation at the local level will by an implicit centralisation controlled by 
government at the provincial level resulting in reduced local powers.  
As noted in chapter 7, SAO staff and staff at different government levels 
referred to problems arising from the fact that many aspects of the 
decentralisation policy were not clear. Nagel outlines the stages in policy 
formation and implementation and outlines how they are always related to one 
another and refers to how and why statutes are adopted in different branches of 
government, such as legislatures, precedent in courts, and administrative 
decisions among government executives and administrators. As each 
government agency knows the specific area of each policy adoption method, they 
raise their awareness of how to implement those policy adoption procedures 
effectively,680 making it easier for staff to carry out the policy.  
Successful policy implementation means ensuring the whole policy 
implementation process is carried out to the end. Once a policy is initiated, the 
government continues to the next step, until it is fully implemented. The 
implementation process can affect the results, particularly where there are 
different behaviours representing different degrees of commitment and 
coordination.681 In addition, since a well-designed policy is not simple, it is 
important that the government and policy makers pay attention to the whole 
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policy process. Every decision on the policy‘s implementation is important and 
the policy making process has to be well set from the beginning.682  
The interviews showed that staff were concerned that the policy initiated 
from the central government should be interpreted consistently, from the time the 
policy was launched to its implementation at the local level. If staff interpret, 
understand and deliver the same policy using different approaches, the goal is 
unlikely to be achieved. The outcome can be a waste of time and resources and 
can actually damage the country‘s development.   
 Even though the staff at the provincial level have less opportunity to affect 
the staff at the local level, compared with those at the national level, the 
hierarchical, bureaucratic system is a key cause of problems in implementing the 
decentralisation policy. Under delegation from central government, provincial 
government is in charge of the performance of SAOs as they carry out their 
obligations. Development plans and local registrations are overseen by district 
officers and by the governor. The decentralisation policy, therefore, does not give 
the SAOs the necessary autonomy because all issues involving the budget have 
to be approved at the provincial level.  
 
8.4 Problems with the decentralisation programme 
Establishing SAOs was not simply a matter of passing a law. Many 
problems have been identified, especially by those who used to have control and 
hold power, and who are now sceptical of the policy.683 Most people in Thailand 
have heard of decentralisation over the decades, but the depth of understanding 
among the Thai people is limited. Several circumstances now threaten the 
decentralisation programme, as revealed in the interviews in six SAOs in Chiang 
Rai province. Generally, the problems are based on the readiness of local 
organisations for decentralisation. Some eight different problem areas were 
identified: 
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1.  There is a lack of understanding in decentralisation;  
2.  There are conflicts among different organisations and staff at the 
local level, and in the input and output from the traditional forms of 
local leadership, and the SAOs; 
3.  There are different policy interpretations among staff at different 
government levels, especially between provincial and local levels; 
4.  Problems arising from the influences of the hierarchical system and 
 the bureaucracy in the national administration over government at the 
 local level; 
5.  There is an overlap or lack of clarity concerning the constitutional 
 responsibilities of provincial and local governments;  
6.  Local government has difficulty gaining even limited autonomy; 
7.  Local government struggles with the limited and unstable flow of 
 revenue; 
8.  The administrative rules and regulations issued by central 
 government are sophisticated for staff at the local level to understand.  
 
8.4.1 Lack of understanding in decentralisation 
One of the most basic problems regarding the decentralisation policy has 
been the readiness of staff at all government levels to put the policy into practice 
and to operate within it. The central government‘s persistent focus on its own 
role, and comparative lack of attention to supporting the development of local 
level government has resulted in an incongruence of power and authority among 
the different levels of government. Supremacy continues to be exercised by 
government at the central level.  
The interview data revealed disagreements among respondents regarding 
whether Thailand‘s national administration was sufficiently prepared before 
government launched decentralisation. They showed that basic preparation 
necessary to support decentralisation was insufficient and that government 
should do further work.  
As already noted, there are different understandings of decentralisation at 
each of the levels of government.  One outcome has been that the process of 
transferring power was not genuinely put into practice. Staff hear about 
decentralisation from the government, but they are not generally well informed 
about decentralisation. They will hear that with the implementation of 
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decentralisation local communities will develop in a sustained way be allowing 
the local level to work on and solve local problems more quickly and with better 
results than central government can expect to do. Only a small number of staff, 
especially at the local level where the problems occur and affect the outcomes 
the most, know what decentralisation really is.  
Puang-ngam notes that the weakness of a community and the local 
organisations are a result of government‘s monopoly on power as well as a 
consequence of the attention paid to centralisation.684 With central government 
providing the resources and subsidising local government in almost everything 
and, as a result, local government always gets used to being served and 
supported by central government all the time. At the local government level, it is 
noticeable that the staff cannot exercise the powers which were to have been 
transferred to them.685 They continue to be dependent on what the central 
government requires. Yet even when central government does empower the local 
level with some real autonomy, staff are not necessarily trained and experienced 
in exercising such power. Staff do their best and they are able to achieve a 
degree of success in carrying out the policy.  Power actually needs to be 
transferred to government at the local level. As long as central government 
continues to hold onto its power, SAOs are inhibited in what they can do.     
A lack of understanding about decentralisation is seen also in the difficulty 
staff at central and local levels face in determining functions, scope of 
responsibilities, and obligations at the local level. In relation to Thailand‘s 
bureaucratic system, the local government has less opportunity to play an 
important role within the national administration unless it is assigned to do so. 
Without central government‘s determination, government at the local level can do 
little, other than respond to what central government determines. Local 
government faces confusion over the role it has to play.    
 
8.4.2 Inter-relationships between organisations 
 Positive human interactions between staff at all levels will enhance 
implementation of the policy. Positive interactions and good communication, 
particularly between staff at central and local government levels, will do much to 
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enhance implementation of the decentralisation policy as well as achieving the 
purposes of the policy. Some SAO staff referred to their inter-relationships with 
other levels of government as acceptable, but not as good as they should be. 
Inter-relationships among staff are seen as being formal rather than collegial. 
Furthermore, in a hierarchical system, seniority is an issue that can undermine 
effective working relationships. In the Thai tradition, awareness of seniority is 
very strong. To be polite to people is not sufficient. People have to pay respect to 
others and the more senior people someone knows then the more they have to 
be polite and pay respect. This can weaken the links in the implementation chain 
with resistance from staff at central and provincial levels to the aspirations for 
autonomy from staff at the local level. The central level has the most formal 
authority and responsibilities compared to the two lower levels, and with this 
major difference it is noticeable that the existence of good relationships depends 
on staff attitudes.  
Staff attitudes can be shaped by their areas of responsibility. For 
example, even though the position of staff at the central level can be at the same 
level as those at the local level, their responsibilities set out in their job 
descriptions and sphere of duty are different. Staff at the national level are 
responsible for the whole country or for an area that is larger than that covered by 
local government staff. Staff at the central level therefore have more authority 
and power than those at lower levels. Those at the higher level, therefore, tend to 
see their positions as more important than those at the local level. Relations 
between the different levels are more likely to be in terms of superior and 
subordinate, creating a strong hierarchy of duty.   
Negative attitudes leading conflicts between different organisations and 
staff at the local level, particularly between traditional local leadership and SAOs, 
is another aspect of the problem. As mentioned above, community leaders, who 
were formerly officials appointed by the Ministry of the Interior through a 
provincial Governor, were reported as from time to time causing problems for 
SAOs. These community leaders reportedly saw SAO staff as having limited 
capacity to develop policies and believed they could do this work more 
appropriately. 
 With the establishment of the SAOs, the Constitution was amended to 
include the provision that the responsibilities of the community leaders were 
transferred to the SAO. While the Kamnan and Phuyaibaan are no longer in 
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charge and responsible for the community‘s affairs, they continued to work as 
staff in local government and from time to time with SAO staff.  After their duties 
were transferred, three areas of significant difference between the traditional 
community leaders and the newly established SAOs became apparent. 
 First, there are the differences in educational backgrounds. In their work 
on policy implementation, the SAO executives (SAO representatives) and SAO 
administrators (SAO appointed administrators) had different views. The positions 
of the SAOs executives depended on the votes they received and their priority 
was working to maintain their vote. For their part, SAO administrators achieve 
their permanent positions after passing the recruitment process, which included 
an examination initiated by the department of local administration. As permanent 
staff they did not have to seek votes from the local people.  
Second, there is a reluctance to share power between the executives and 
the administrators. The community leaders had not accepted that their roles, 
responsibilities and power had been reformed with the law change in 1999 in 
such a way that they no longer had the power they enjoyed earlier. Under the 
new arrangements, SAOs have more power compared with the community 
leaders. This has left the community leaders irritated and they felt less important 
and that, somehow, they had lost face. These tensions affected their working 
relationships.  
Third, the community leaders still had some power and people living in 
the area continued to pay respect to them and show rather less attention to the 
new concept of decentralisation. Part of this was due to the importance of 
seniority in Thai culture, particularly the respect younger people must pay to 
elders or superiors. Community leaders are perceived as seniors in a community 
and community members respect their leaders.  According to the interviews, 
senior people in the community are respected and are able to play important 
roles in the decentralisation policy, leading also to concern that they can work 
against the implementation policy.686 Where SAO staff were new and 
inexperienced, there was an opportunity for these people to influence the 
implementation of the decentralisation process or even inhibit the work of the 
SAO. The interviews did suggest, however, that the tensions between the 
community leaders and SAO administrators had decreased since the SAOs were 
first introduced and established.  
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According to Sopchokchai, ―[F]ormer community leaders (Kannan and 
Village Headmen), who were appointed as members of the Tambon Executive 
Committee before the law was changed in 1999, always played a major role in 
planning and allocating TAO budgets for development activities. Elected TAO 
members who are new and inexperienced do not usually have much information 
and cannot actively participate in this process. As a result, limited resources are 
allocated for constructing projects‖.687 
In Thailand, seniority has long been part of social activity and, unlike other 
Asian societies, seniority has long been a major part of Thailand‘s tradition and 
culture. Seniority has been a major factor in the national administration as well. 
On seniority, Dhiravegin has noted:  
Today, the existence of a legal state where the rule of law serves as the pillar of a 
society and of the modus operandi in an organization, to blindly follow a poo-
yai
688
 just because of his or her superior status could land one in troubles. Of 
more importance, such a value also destroyed confidence and propriety. It also 




Paying respect to senior citizens is taught and learned at a young age by 
all Thai citizens.690 Anyone, no matter how advanced their age, who is seen to be 
behaving in an immature manner, would be submissive and polite once in front of 
senior people. In general, the issue of right and wrong is not decided on principle 
but on the opinion of a senior person. Dhiravegin writes:  
In a society where principles are criteria for conduct, it may be easier to give a flat 
no to whatever that is not right. If whatever order given, be it from a poo-yai or 
anyone, which goes against the right principle, it is to be considered wrong and 
shall be discarded. Principle is thus the key word here. In a society where 
principles are loose and where situational ethics serve as the rule, respect for 
seniority shall feature and hence right and wrong will be confused and twisted. 
Indeed, it is believed that following the foot-steps of the senior will spare one from 
being bitten by a dog. That might be true in an age when the rule of law was not a 
sacrosanct tenet. Today, the existence of a legal state where the rule of law 
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serves as the pillar of a society and of the modus operandi in an organization, to 





The issue of seniority in Thailand does have an influence on the 
bureaucracy. Seniors are not only older, but they also have more experience and 
so play an important role in the bureaucracy, particularly in encouraging and 
supporting the juniors. However, seniors can lag behind the local community in 
terms of culture, knowledge, information, and values. Who would be the people to 
respond in these consequences, and what would follow?  An important question 
is that if seniors exercise a lot of control in a society, how would this affect the 
national bureaucracy?  Dhiravegin notes:  
This is especially true of the state bureaucracy. Such a situation could lead to 
damages. Indeed, the high-handed politicians who wrecked the society by their 
high-handed behaviors and corruption practices were allowed to proceed with no 
single voice of objection simply because of this poo-yai and poo-noi value and 
the pattern of behaviors derived there from.[…] Many a time, mistakes were made 
because no one had the guts to stand up and argue against a wrong decision out 
of respect for the poo-yai. But of more importance are the absence of principles, 




 The issue of seniority has caused concern at the local level in the past, 
but it was not obvious or serious. There was confidence that the staff and the 
people that power and authority would be transferred from the traditional local 
leaders to the newly established SAOs. In his study of promotion based on 
seniority in Thailand, McCampbell confirms the importance of seniority and 
shows that the majority of Thai companies use the seniority-based promotion 
structure.693 McCampbell shows this also happens at the national level where the 
bureaucracy is based on senior staff who also work in high level positions,694 and 
that the way Thai people respond to seniority adversely affects the organisation's 
efficiency.695  As Dhiravegin observes: 
Everyone is looking up to the nod of a poo-yai rather than following the dictum of 
the correct principles. The society is thus full of people who lack confidence, 
unsure of what they said and did, turning many them to appear temporary. Such 
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an environment will not be supportive of fighting for principle, let alone producing 




However, the problem seems no longer to happen regularly. It is 
important that local people are all encouraged to participate because once they 
understand decentralisation, they can assist the organisations at the local level, 
especially the SAOs, to work efficiently.  There are two matters, which both SAO 
staff and the people who influence SAO policy within the local area must keep in 
mind. First, the senior people and politicians need to cooperate with the SAOs 
and give opinions to SAO staff that support the role of the SAO staff and are 
reasonable. An overreaction can discredit the work of SAO staff in the way the 
local people respect the work of the SAOs in the long run. 
Second, SAO staff said there had been many times when they followed 
the suggestions of senior community members to ensure that their actions would 
be supported by the rest of the community members. This reveals some 
weakness in the SAO when staff feel dependent and unable to work on their own. 
It is good to ask for an opinion but SAOs must not allow themselves to be unduly 
influenced by such opinions.  SAOs face the specific circumstances in their local 
situation and they have to solve the problems which arise, whatever the case 
may be, because their responsibility is to carry out the policy initiated by the 
government and to follow it through.  
In interviews, several of the community leaders indicated they did not 
agree with the approach to work of the SAOs. While some community leaders 
thought that the SAOs could perform their work better if they gained more 
capacity and experience, others mentioned that several SAO staff did not fully 
understand what they were supposed to do in their positions and how much they 
need to respond to their duties. Some community leaders even stated that SAO 
staff cannot complete their work because they do not understand fully what they 
have to do.  
Some SAO staff did not work to carry out their tasks as intended 
preferring, instead, to follow the directions of their supervisors at a higher level. 
This can happen at anytime once the staff who work at a higher level make some 
comment or recommendation related to the work. If the staff at the higher level 
give them the right advice, problems can be resolved. However, the bottom line is 
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if they make the wrong suggestions and give the wrong instructions then the 
outcome can be seriously affected and the policy initiated by government placed 
at risk.   
 
8.4.3 Different Interpretations  
In any process of policy implementation, difficulties and problems occur 
and can be important in determining the outcome of the policy. One area of 
difficulty arises where there are either staff at different levels having different 
understandings of the national policies, or through the conflicts and 
misunderstandings among staff. As mentioned above, while staff at both central 
and provincial levels share a common understanding of decentralisation, staff at 
the local level may understand decentralisation differently. For example, staff at 
central and provincial levels understand that power is devolved to the local level 
under decentralisation, but it does not mean that the SAOs gain autonomy. Only 
limited power, authority and autonomy are provided to SAOs, sufficient for them 
to be able to carry out a policy effectively. Many SAO staff do not understand this 
in the same way, with several of them believing that the power and autonomy 
granted by government are insufficient for them to carry out their responsibilities. 
These different understandings leave SAO staff confused about their roles and 
responsibilities. This may not affect the outcome of policy implementation as a 
whole, but it may mean that the local people do not get what they are supposed 
to get.   
Problems over interpreting national policies are of more concern to staff at 
the local level rather than at the central and provincial levels. Staff at the local 
level are drawn from different groups of people, including local politicians who are 
elected as well as appointed staff. Some of these local staff lack a full 
understanding of government affairs, and of the processes, regulations and rules, 
and so do not interpret the national policies in the same way as staff at central 
and provincial levels.      
Another issue causing difficulty for staff, especially at the local level, 
arises where the policy is unclear. There are two issues in this.  First, SAO staff 
report that they find they have difficulty in interpreting policy in accordance with 
the range of the mandates, directives, acts, regulations and procedures they 
have to work with. Respondents 34-36 reported the policies are always related to 
the legal statements. Even though SAO staff realise that the policies are difficult 
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to interpret, they are concerned about understanding the importance of the 
policies and to do their best in interpreting the policies.697 However, because SAO 
staff are unsure whether the policies they are dealing with are on the right 
track,698 they sometimes have to use their individual experiences and background 
to assist them with the policy.699  
Second, SAO staff faced problems when the policy content was 
complicated. They reported that there are several times when the policy 
implementation was inhibited700 because they had to work through the whole 
policy and interpret it carefully. This happened when there was a brand new 
policy to interpret and there was no information available to refer to.701 Several 
SAO staff reported problems in interpreting a new national policy framework 
before they could work on a development plan. Under the old policy, SAO staff 
had experience in interpreting the same or a similar policy. Where a policy can be 
referred back to previous work they have done then SAO staff can work more 
rapidly in interpreting a new policy. However, when a policy is quite new then 
SAO staff were unsure whether they were on the right track.  
 It is challenging for SAO staff to interpret complicated policy in the way 
staff at higher levels would themselves interpret the same policy and expect 
SAOs to carry out the policy.702 Where policy is unclear or complicated, some 
SAO staff stated that they normally cross-check with other SAOs or with staff at 
higher levels. SAO staff also declared that they sometimes had to decide to 
modify policy to make it more suited to their local conditions which vary 
depending on their location.703 Respondents therefore also found that central 
government policies required modification to suit local conditions. They 
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commented that when doing so, the goal was to make sure the intentions of the 
policy were carried out.704 
 Another factor influencing the SAO staff‘s interpretation of policies is their 
limited capability. Policies from central government actually provide sufficient 
details for SAO staff to interpret: however, difficulties can arise in achieving 
common interpretations of policy when a policy is applied by central government 
through the same national policy frameworks across the entire country. Some 
SAO staff are able to interpret and work on implementing the policy without 
difficulty, making it easier for the other SAO staff to work on the policy. The 
capabilities of staff are an important factor.  
According to respondent 13, SAO staff had no difficulty in interpreting and 
working on the development plan. They can actually form a team and work very 
well both within the SAO and with staff at higher levels.705 Some SAO staff do find 
themselves having difficulties in interpreting policies, for various reasons, starting 
with their lack of experience of working with staff at different government levels.   
Not only is the SAO a newly established organisation, but also new to 
both the organisation staff and its work. It takes time for them to adjust to work 
with staff at higher levels. In addition, the SAO executives706 who depend on 
winning the election for their position in the SAO often do not have the 
experience of working with the appointed staff. In these circumstances it can be 
difficult to follow the national frameworks because they have not learned to work 
well with the people who can guide them with the policy.  
Another factor is the readiness of SAO staff to interpret policy and 
implement it. Several staff can interpret central government policy, but many staff 
simply lack the experience and learning to work with the policy. Respondent 9 
confirmed that only some staff know what they are supposed to do on the policy.  
Several SAO staff find it difficult because of the many regulations and details to 
comprehend.707 At times they are unsure whether they have made the right 
decision, and they get confused regarding the policy‘s content.708  
                                                          
704
 Respondent 36.   
705
 Respondent 13. 
706
 Every two years for the chief of Tambon Council and every four years for the Tambon 
Executive Committee. 
707
 Respondent 9. 
708
 Respondent 36.  
187 
 
Having well-prepared staff is very important because SAOs cannot expect 
the few with the necessary experience in understanding a policy reference and 
getting assistance with policy interpretation, in dealing with the regulations and 
processes, to work on policy interpretation all the time. It is necessary to train the 
new staff for them to become proficient.  
As noted in chapter 7, even though SAO staff can develop plans, the 
implementation of them has to take into account the local conditions. In this, they 
draw on their own localised knowledge and expertise.     
When a policy is unclear, it is noticeable that those SAO staff who were 
formerly working at the provincial level reported they had no difficulty in 
interpreting and working on a policy. With their experience as government 
officials they have the ability and confidence to work on policy implementation. In 
addition, with the benefit of their former positions in the government, it is easier 
for SAO staff to work well with staff in other local organisations and those at 
higher levels. As SAO executives or SAO administrators they have fewer 
obstacles in interpreting policy and performing their obligations.  
 Yet several SAO staff do not have such a capacity and have no 
background working in the government. In relation to the information in chapter 7, 
it can be seen that different staff at different levels interpret policy differently. The 
policy interpretations made by staff are largely determined by their position in 
government, especially staff in higher positions, who generally interpret policy in 
a holistic view, which is broader than the implementer at lower level. It is 
noticeable that staff at the central level interpret the national policy by directive.  
The policy process is implemented in each organisation by the head of 
the organisations who distribute the requirements of the policy to staff, taking into 
account the policy content and the expertise of staff. At the central and local 
levels the directive will be given to staff to implement the policy within a given 
framework which does not give staff the opportunity to argue or discuss the 
policy. Also, those overseeing staff ensure that staff follow the directives and do 
not make modifications to suit themselves. SAO staff do have the authority 
transferred to them by central government to work on their policy. In their 
development plans, SAO staff can actually have more opportunity to interpret the 
national policy framework and then create the development plan that facilitates 
their policy implementation process.  
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After the transition to democracy in 1932 and with the TAO act in 1997, if 
the decentralisation policy and the procedure were promoted well and done at 
the right time, local government in Thailand could have been much stronger than 
it is now. Unfortunately, there were difficulties in distributing not only the basic 
knowledge of decentralisation but also in the limited number of experienced staff 
able to work well under decentralisation. 
As noted in chapter 3, Thailand‘s national administration was always top 
down in its perspective. Adhering to centralisation leaves staff at lower levels 
always relying on central government for directives and procedures. Even though 
Thailand‘s national administration was reformed in 1932 and the political system 
was transformed to democracy, the Thai government still followed a policy of 
centralisation making central government the primary organisation governing the 
country. This stimulated the emergence of a hierarchical system of 
administration. Consequently, even though the government launched the 
decentralisation programme, there was always something missing and 
government responses ignored the local level policy proposals. The top-down 
perspective of the higher levels of government persist, while the SAO level 
perspective assumes a bottom–up approach.   
 
8.4.4 There are influences of the hierarchical system and bureaucracy polity in a 
national administration to a government at local level 
The Thai national administrative system has long been hierarchical 
(constitution, political culture, and historical background), and it has had a 
powerful influence on the bureaucracy and the behaviour and work of all 
government officials. This traditional pattern has had important implications for 
implementing the decentralisation policy. Hierarchy and the bureaucratic system 
are closely related.709 The bureaucracy invariably is associated with big, 
unresponsive government programmes that do not work well, and agencies that 
no one can control.710 The staff are typically viewed as pariahs of modern 
government, tied up with red tape, clumsy regulation, and policy blunders. In 
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addition, the staff have been called ―the dead hand of government and are 
accused of behaving like public tyrants instead of public servants.‖711  
Weber‘s analysis leads him to argue for the ideal–type bureaucracy in 
which ―every system of autocracy must establish and secure a belief in its 
legitimacy, which can be done in many different ways.‖712 In Thailand the 
government has always been concerned with the hierarchical system.713 At the 
national level everything is set in a certain way714 and a government‘s working 
processes are fixed systematically,715 and this results in delays for SAO staff. 
Staff at different levels have different opinions about hierarchy. SAO staff 
certainly saw problems with the hierarchical system, while staff at central and 
provincial levels considered it important in the working process. In dealing with 
several different organisations the government has to have a working process 
which is well organised, and this can take time. 
The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, 
B.E.2546 (2003) was formulated to ensure the working processes were well 
organised. As stated in section 6, in the Royal Decree, good governance is an 
administration that meets the following 7 targets:  
(1) responsiveness; 
(2) result-based management; 
(3) effectiveness and value for money; 
(4) reducing unnecessary work processes; 
(5) reviewing missions to meet changing situations; 
(6) providing convenient and favourable services; 
(7) regular evaluation.716 
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Target 4, lessening unnecessary steps of work, is required to make the 
working process run rapidly and effectively. In the case of the Thailand‘s national 
administrative system, bureaucracy and hierarchy go together and under it, staff 
are able to work under seniority and directives. Under the decentralisation policy, 
the link between central and provincial levels, as well as the delegated staff at the 
local level, can continue to work as they usually do. Nonetheless, with SAOs that 
are unfamiliar with the bureaucratic and hierarchical system, the working process 
does appear to be rather complicated.  
 
8.4.5 Overlap and lack of clarity between provincial and local governments 
Because staff‘s implementation in the policy process is important, central 
government needs to avoid overlap or lack of clarity in staff job descriptions. Yet 
there are several problems regarding the overlap or lack of clarity in the 
responsibilities of provincial and local government levels, which not only inhibit 
the implementation of the decentralisation policy, but also give rise to tensions in 
their working relationships. Among staff at the provincial and local levels, this 
problem is not so much in evidence because the local level is subordinate to the 
provincial level. Generally, the problem occurs where regulations place some 
contexts against one another.717 The problems of overlapping job descriptions are 
less of a problem since the responsibilities at both provincial and local levels are 
indistinguishable from each other. Moreover, as SAO responsibilities are 
transferred to the provincial and local levels, it means SAOs can actually carry 
out their obligations.718  
According to Raksasat, overlap between different government levels 
occurs from a misunderstanding of the authority and power of job descriptions, 
which can seriously affect the success of decentralisation.719 On the other hand, 
Dhiravegin argues that one of the serious long-term consequences of Thailand‘s 
national administrative system is the problem regarding power snatching  
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between concentration and decentralisation.720 Moreover, staff at central and 
provincial levels did not always provide helpful suggestions, with some of them 
ambiguous. According to respondent 26, when SAOs have to work and engage 
with other organisations and each are following different procedures then SAOs 
are inhibited in carrying out the policy. Generally, overlap occurs when SAOs are 
working on an issue where two to three organisations are involved, each of them 
holding different views on laws and regulations.721 There appeared some overlap 
of content and, in addition, the SAOs do face difficulties in implementing the 
policy, particularly where SAOs are dealing with an issue in which another 
organisation is involved. SAOs normally have to postpone their work while they 
make certain that there is no overlap with any other organisation‘s 
responsibilities.  
As indicated by respondent 15, overlap with the provincial level and with 
other local organisations occurs when the SAOs and other organisations have 
the same area of responsibility.722 Whenever SAOs have to collaborate with other 
organisations, especially with the government at a higher level, the SAOs always 
have to obtain approval first because the areas and scope of responsibilities 
overlap. SAOs are subordinate to the higher-level organisations. For example, 
Tasood SAO faced a problem regarding roadworks requiring  that a street island 
be constructed to reduce possible accidents. However, the SAO could not 
proceed with the work because the highway district and other provincial 
organisations also had responsibilities in this. As a result, the SAO could not get 
on with the project but had to contact the relevant organisation for notices, 
approvals, and cooperation in working together. It took some time for Tasood 
SAO to finally carry out the work.723  
Another example of overlap between organisations was where one SAO 
could not solve an irrigation problem because the SAOs‘ area of responsibility 
also involved the Provincial administration, as well as the Department of 
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Irrigation. Consequently, the SAO could not continue its obligation but had to ask 
for permission to be able to proceed with a project and whether it had to be 
assisted by the Department of Irrigation. Another example was from Chiang Saen 
SAO, located at the border, which found that its area of responsibility, work 
scope, and activities all overlapped with those of the provincial organisations. 
Further, some organisations were also delegated by central government to work 
with SAOs. This meant the Chiang Saen SAO had to inform and obtain approval 
before they could do anything.  
As noted above, another issue arises where the responsibilities of a 
position are not clear. According to respondent 13, the overlap between 
provincial and local governments generally happens when SAOs are located in 
large or important districts, like the Muang district, where all provincial 
governments are located, rather than in a remote district.724 For example, the 
SAO in Muang district had to ask for permission and approval from the office of 
Land Development before using or developing a public area.725  
Another example is the Chiang Sean SAO which has difficulty in working 
with another organisation and with the provincial level. Chiang Sean is in the 
border area of a country where there was a port connecting with China and Laos 
and so there are many government offices and organisations, including 
immigration, customs, marine police, the Mekong Security Unit, the aquatic 
animal inspection station, and the plant inspection station. In contrast, Nong Rad 
SAO was situated in the inland area where there are no borders with any county. 
As a result, the Nong Rad SAO has less difficultly in dealing with different staff 
from central and provincial levels of government compared to the Chiang Sean 
SAO. Therefore, while some SAOs face the same problems, the rest of them 
have difficulties in some matter, depending on their location and the different 
conditions inside or outside their environment.  
When power was transferred to the SAOs, the different regulations in 
force for different organisations were not brought into line so that they were in 
accordance with other regulations, leaving some contradictions in the guidelines. 
Similarly, the areas of responsibility for each organisation were not established 
clearly and discretely. Central government needs to tidy up these matters so that 
the organisations‘ working tasks will flow smoothly. The issue of overlap among 
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organisations is one of the most important issues that needs to be addressed 
because it influences working structures and regulations. Even though several 
SAOs face difficulties in delivering the policy, the local conditions turn out to be a 
cause that initiates the problem itself.  
 
8.4.6 Limited autonomy 
The degree of autonomy provided by central government is one of the 
most important factors determining the success of Thailand‘s decentralisation. 
The autonomy has to be sufficient for local government to function and carry out 
its responsibilities effectively.  A core concept of decentralisation is allowing local 
government to work on its own.726 With only limited autonomy, local government 
cannot implement the policy of decentralisation.  
As noted above, Thailand has paid a lot of attention to centralisation with 
the result that the requirements for autonomy at the local level have been largely 
ignored. Despite the launch of the decentralisation policy, staff at the local level 
have continued to struggle, as outlined above in this chapter. Staff directly 
appointed by the central ministry continued to play an important role at the local 
level. The autonomy granted to SAO staff was discussed in interviews with two 
main issues raised. First, the overlaps between provincial and local 
administrations, and even among local organisations, outlined above, also affect 
the autonomy of SAOs, particularly where SAOs are dealing with two to three 
organisations.727 Some organisations hold different regulations728 which are not in 
accordance with one another,729 making it very difficult for the SAO to exercise its 
autonomy and sometimes unable to operate as they should be able to do.   
Second, SAO staff mentioned that the central government is unwilling to 
distribute its power to the local level. Even though central government has 
transferred powers and responsibilities to SAOs, those government agencies 
from both central and provincial levels are still significantly involved in the SAOs‘ 
workloads. As a result, rather than having responsibilities to perform more 
complicated and important responsibilities, the SAOs‘ scope of the obligations 
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are normally involved with basic needs, such as infrastructure and general 
works.730   
 During the interviews, staff at central and provincial levels said they 
thought that central government actually provided SAOs with sufficient autonomy. 
SAO staff disagreed with this statement, and argued that even though the central 
government considered that SAOs had adequate autonomy, SAOs found the 
autonomy was limited. In addition, with different outside environments and 
conditions, such as overlap with other levels of government, the local context, 
and limited revenue, the SAOs had difficulty in exercising the autonomy they had 
been granted to put policy into practice.   
Some staff at central and provincial levels agreed that SAOs did not have 
enough autonomy, but only a few of them were prepared to talk about the issue. 
The question arises as to how much autonomy government should grant to the 
local level. Amonvivat points to Articles, 284 and 285 of the Constitution of Thai 
Kingdom, BA 2540 (1997) as providing Thailand‘s constitutional mandate for 
decentralisation. Regarding local autonomy, these state: 1) local authorities shall 
have autonomous power in policy formulation, administration, finance, and 
personnel management; 2) the autonomy should be issued coherently regarding 
a delineation of functions and responsibilities, and tax between the state and 
local authorities, as well as among local authorities, and 3) the establishment of a 
decentralisation committee that can prepare the decentralisation plan, review, 
monitor, and provide policy recommendations for the Cabinet concerning the 
implementation of the decentralisation plan and process.731  
In practice, during the interviews this argument was mentioned in every 
SAO where the research interview took place. According to SAO staff, they found 
themselves having difficulty in carrying out their work, even though power was 
officially transferred. With only limited autonomy SAOs had a power deficit. They 
also mentioned that central government must provide SAOs with more autonomy, 
so they can do their jobs better. Central government should consider:  
1. What degree of autonomy the central government should consider? 
2. How much more is necessary so that the SAOs can complete their 
policy implementation? 
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3. What if there is still limited autonomy, can SAO staff work to meet the 
highest ultimate goal?  
The answers to these questions are:    
1. Thailand‘s national administration has always been centralised, 
effectively making a local government administered from central 
government. With every activity and responsibility being determined, local 
government can then follow the directions of central government. Once 
local government has its own power to manage their responsibilities, 
some local organisations have some difficulty, particular where the 
situation is not clear.  
2. Ignoring the local level has had serious long-term consequences 
because external developments interfere with decentralisation.   
3. Instead of distributing power so that local government has the 
autonomy to exercise its responsibilities, people who hold the power are 
reluctant to transfer it, creating a major obstacle to decentralisation. 
 
According to respondent 16, since the SAOs were established, the SAO 
staff have had insufficient understanding of, and insufficient information about 
decentralisation. The highly centralised thinking of staff who work at higher levels 
has caused difficulties for SAO staff in implementing national policies.732 Working 
as a government official in Thailand is very distinguished, so that there is an 
incongruity between government officials at central level and ordinary people 
regarding their social statuses. Moreover, having locally elected politicians as 
part of SAOs causes a reluctance to decentralise power, because central 
government staff see local level staff as not being ready for change.733   
 
8.4.7 SAOs and revenue 
Another issue to emerge from interviews was the number of SAO staff 
who mentioned insufficient revenue. Some said that they could not complete the 
decentralisation programme, while others argued that they could carry on the 
programme, although they were able to accomplish what they needed to for the 
policy to be as successful as it should be, and it was expected to be. Opinions 
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differed among several government officials about the revenue. Some 
acknowledged that there was insufficient revenue but went on to say that what 
challenged the SAO was how they could organise those budgets to best effect, 
as well as making their policy implementation successful.734 In addition, they 
thought the degree of success should be higher than the minimum required, 
which does not depend on the amount of revenue, but how best and how well the 
SAO staff can do with the revenue they get.735  
 The officials said they understood how difficult it was to have less revenue 
than what SAO staff expected. However, SAOs must understand that 
government has to consider how the budget should be distributed and, 
sometimes, even to arrange revenue for the most important programme or urgent 
issues. As a result, instead of paying too much attention to the amount of the 
revenue provided by central government, SAO staff should use their competence 
and plan to earn extra income.736 Then they could benefit the programme most 
and to keep running the launched programme. 
As stated by Sopchokchai, the SAOs have limited and unstable revenue 
for their projects, which generally involve ―the infrastructure, such as village 
roads, small bridges, and village water supply systems that require minimum 
technology‖.737 As well as infrastructure projects, the SAOs have to spend in 
order to expand offices, hire more staff, and undertake several new projects. As a 
result, several SAOs face financial problems in responding to the demand for 
services, and so expenditure rises.738  
On the one hand, staff at the local level complain that the revenue 
provided by the government is inadequate. On the other hand, staff at the central 
and provincial levels accept that the problem of limited revenue for SAOs is not a 
new issue. Even though each community has different problems and needs, 
SAOs experienced problems over their limited budgets. The budget for social and 
economic projects is limited.739  
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SAOs get their revenue from different sources. There are grants-in-aid, 
local taxes, and annual income.740 From this, SAOs gain revenue from the 
government and from the taxes collected within their local areas. Even though 
SAOs gain their revenue from different sources, they have difficulty in obtaining 
enough revenue. The different viewpoints of staff are instructive. Respondent 11 
said that SAO staff realised it was very hard to ask for more revenue from the 
government so they had to find ways of earning more income. Yet still, the 
income the SAOs could collect was insufficient because the income-raising 
projects were only limited and the different local conditions influenced what the 
SAO could do.741 Central government had to consider all the national 
programmes and it was not possible for government to fund every project with the 
amount required to accomplish the project,742 making it understandable that the 
revenue distributed to the SAOs were limited.743  
While the staff at the local level pointed out that the problems regarding 
the limited revenue were from both the central government and local conditions, 
the staff at central and provincial level, in contrast, indicated that the revenue 
provided by the government was acceptable.744 Even though the revenue was not 
high, the government, at least, considered that it was sufficient.745  
Respondent 8 noted that staff at central and provincial levels thought that 
it was important to understand that central government expects and encourages 
SAOs to earn their own income. Central government provides the grants-in-aid, 
and may also provide a subsidy for a necessary case, but the main point is SAOs 
have to earn their own income. This is linked to the ultimate objective of the 
decentralisation policy of encouraging and allowing the SAOs to stand by 
themselves. As this happens, then SAO staff can develop and enhance their 
performance and achieve their development policy.  
Those from central government stated that the government always 
supported and assisted SAOs whenever they requested it. In addition, the staff at 
the provincial level from the office of local administration provided suggestions 
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and mentoring to the SAOs as needed. Therefore, it was, according to this 
respondent, inexcusable for SAOs to continue to argue that they did not have 
sufficient revenue when they have not tried to do something about it.746 Since the 
government was willing to assist SAOs, this respondent suggested it came back 
to the SAO staff to raise their performance.   
Analysing SAO problems regarding insufficient revenue from the ‗top-
down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches, it can be seen that SAOs have limited 
capability to develop programmes or activities to raise more income. According to 
the ‗top-down‘ approach, the government at the local level has never been 
trained to exercise their authority. The organisations at the local level adhere to 
the directives from the higher level, but in carrying out the directives from the 
higher level, staff at the local level have plenty of opportunity to demonstrate their 
opinions or even participate in the policy-making process.  
Even though responsibilities and autonomy were transferred to SAOs 
under the decentralisation policy, many aspects of the national administrative 
system did not change. The staff working style remained much the same. The 
long-standing bureaucratic and hierarchical systems remained and there was 
reluctance to move to a better system. In short, government officials continued to 
work as usual, even though under the decentralisation policy the local level 
should have the autonomy to govern itself. The central level never allowed the 
opportunities for local government, especially the SAOs, to practice their new 
role.  
 The administrative rules and regulations issued by central government 
were sophisticated for staff at the local level to understand and to expect SAO 
staff to implement the policy effectively is difficult, and even harder for those staff 
to do this when faced with the sophisticated national administrative system and 
regulations. As several staff complained, the central government always 
concentrated on the ‗top-down‘ approach rather than allowing the local 
government to participate.747 When central government follows the ‗top-down‘ 
approach this closely it is easier for staff working at the central and provincial 
levels who are government officials, but it leaves staff at the local level figuring 
out what they have to do on the policy. SAO staff occasionally face difficulties 
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with the rigid and complex administrative rules and regulations set down by the 
Ministry of the Interior. SAO staff further explain that while administrative rules 
are complex and require many steps for them to follow, the regulations contain 
many legal terms that SAO staff do not understand and so get confused.  Many 
staff at the local level, especially SAO staff, do not have much experience of the 
bureaucratic system compared to staff at higher levels. Nevertheless, the staff 
work with their individual expertise and their willingness without any 
reservations748 in seeking to deliver the government‘s policy implementation 
process to the end.749 This response supports the bottom-up challenge, 
introduced by several scholars, especially Lipsky‘s analysis of the behaviour of 
front line staff in policy delivery and how difficult it is to control them as they 
implement the policy initiated by central government.750 
Respondent 7 reported on the difficulties arising from the national 
administrative system and the government‘s concern with regulations, which left 
staff at the local level having some difficulty in working on the policy 
interpretation.751 Inevitably, from the various backgrounds and experiences, staff 
interpret the policies in different ways in different situations.   
According to Lester and Stewart, where the centre concentrates on the 
‗top-down‘ approach, this does make the policy implementation process 
successful, it does fulfil the needs of the policy makers as the key persons to 
initiate the policy and then work on it until it has been completed.752 Yet, central 
government must realise the importance of their staff at the street level, and 
make them accountable for the policy implementation process. This approach will 
have much greater chance of delivering the policy in the local context, and 
recognise their expert and individual backgrounds and so increase the success of 
the policy implementation process. Once the policy implementation process is in 
place, the outcomes will be determined, to a large extent, by the local conditions 
and by the staff themselves. It is inevitable that not all policy implementations will 
be as successful as hoped for. With neither the ‗top-down‘ nor the ‗bottom-up‘ 
approaches being able to deliver the outcome sought, the Thai government 
should consider a synthesis of the approaches.  
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As mentioned by respondents 24, 25, and 26, SAO staff generally check 
what precedents there are, together with the regulations and guidelines when 
interpreting a policy.753 Yet, respondent 11 argued that even though the SAOs 
check and ensure the policy content matches the requirements in following the 
task, the best check is to contact the staff who are directly in charge of the 
policy.754 SAO staff can then be certain that they understand the policy correctly 
and are working on the same task. Of course, if there are gaps in the information 
or there is no consensus on how to proceed, they can work together so that the 
policies are consistent with others.755   
The questions remain as to whether staff interpret the policies correctly, 
and whether they implement the policies in terms of the regulations, precedence 
and have the mandate. If staff do not follow the path closely then the policy 
implementation process can fail. To ensure greater success, the synthesis 
approach, bringing together both the ‗top-down‘ and the ‗bottom-up‘ approaches 
is essential. All levels of government have to work both ways if the policy 
implementation process is to produce the outcomes sought. The policy-making 
process has to be approached from the top as well as the bottom level. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 When the Thai government promoted its decentralisation programme in 
1997, there were several conditions likely to affect the success of the policy. The 
problems which have arisen have resulted from the traditional, highly centralised 
and bureaucratic national administration system. Not only did this inhibit 
implementation of the decentralisation policy as a whole, but it also prevented the 
development of genuine decentralisation to the local level.  
 Through the national planning process, the Thai government initiated 
decentralisation to empower local government. This was a major effort to 
establish a bottom-up approach. Unfortunately, the decentralisation policy 
outcome takes time to show the desired results.  SAOs are under strict orders 
from central government to function as efficient local organisations, providing 
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public services to the local people, and implementing the decentralisation policy 
in the local areas. To implement what central government determines, local 
government needs to be aware of what central government requires. This means, 
somehow, there is the potential for policy implementation gaps as it takes a long 
process to transmit information. Central government‘s concentration on 
centralisation, finally, gives SAOs less opportunity and experience to carry out 
their role in national administration. With centralisation, local government relies 
on the central government all the time. No matter what the issue is at the local 
level, SAOs have to involve the central government as well.  
As time went by, the government had developed and endeavoured to 
solve the problems inhibiting the decentralisation policy. Subsequently, several 
regulations and royal decrees were created and the national administration is 
being improved. As they gain more experience, SAO staff have more 
understanding regarding decentralisation, compared to the time the 
decentralisation policy was first promoted.  
However, even though central government provides local government 
autonomy, the SAOs lack the capability of carrying out the policy. The degree of 
their understanding is required to be more comprehensive to make their policy 
implementation more effective. Additionally, this also means SAO staff have to 
gain good experience in order to gain more capability to serve and provide the 
public services for their local area. The participation of local community leaders 
and people in the local area is essential because they are the people directly 
affected by the work of the SAO.  
Among the SAOs in Chiang Rai province, staff and village leaders 
suggested that decentralisation in Thailand needed to be reviewed.756 This does 
not mean the whole system is unsatisfactory. Some issues, such as policy, 
regulations, management and processes, needed to be developed for better 
outcomes. The participants thought that the whole political system should be 
reconsidered and more emphasis given to local government. The old fashioned 
political processes and working styles were too slow in practice and action.757 
Because the SAO is the foundation local organisation and close to the local 
people, it is very important for the government to support the SAO so that it can 
work more effectively. The government should be cautious about revenue, staff 
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training, staff mentoring, and other things the SAO may need from central 
government.  
 The next chapter presents an evaluation of decentralisation of Chiang 


























Chiang Rai‘s Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The successful implementation of the decentralisation policy would serve 
as an indicator that government has got the process right. It is not easy to 
implement such a policy and the central government would have to make certain 
that not only the bureaucrats understood what decentralisation meant, but also 
that the Thai people understood what it meant and were well prepared for the 
change. Bureaucrats at the local level would need to be well prepared because 
they are the key people to influence the success or failure of the decentralisation 
policy.  
As the decentralisation policy is implemented the SAOs become 
increasingly autonomous organisations, and as this happens the change in the 
Thai national administrative system begins to take shape. The former system of 
national administration, with its adherence to the bureaucratic processes under 
centralisation, has been replaced by the policy of decentralisation that allows 
local government to be a more significant actor in the national administrative 
process, transforming the national administrative system. Central government 
empowers local government with authority to carry out its policies and 
programmes, and local government needs to be well organised to carry out the 
responsibilities placed on them.  
The decentralisation policy was launched in Thailand in response to the 
unique conditions faced at the time. The environment for these changes, 
discussed later in this chapter, was shaped by Thailand‘s economic, social and 
political policies and practices, with their long histories. Even though important 
changes have been made to the national administrative system, adherence to the 
old system inhibits implementation of the decentralisation policy. It is not that the 
Thai people are unwilling to change, but the time it is taking points more to 
Thailand‘s strong bureaucratic polity, the longstanding practice of centralisation, 
the continued existence of the hierarchical system and the gap which still exists 
between the elite and the ordinary people. Since the government still pays 
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greatest attention to the central level, and since the elites who hold power are not 
tolerant of fundamental change, the lower levels of government and the ordinary 
people do not have the opportunity to participate in politics as promised in the 
policy. The most obvious example mentioned above occurred after the 
decentralisation policy was promoted when only a small number of people knew 
and understood what was involved, while the rest lacked much understanding of 
the core concept of decentralisation, or of its significance to democracy 
Decentralisation in Thailand has gradually developed since the policy was 
launched. Today, many bureaucrats and people now understand and are keen to 
participate more fully in the policy. This is a very good indication for the policy 
because the more people who understand and are ready for it, the easier it is for 
central government to carry out its decentralisation programme. Certainly, the 
government can work more effectively, and at the local level many local factors 
do have an influence on the success of the policy implementation.    
This chapter evaluates the decentralisation policy in Chiang Rai‘s 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisation. The evaluation is based on the 
information provided from the in-depth interviews, focus group interviews, 
questionnaires, private interviews and secondary data. The evaluation will be 
divided into different categories, which are relevant to the problems affecting the 
SAOs‘ policy implementation.   
 
9.2 Background to decentralisation policy implementation 
In implementing the decentralisation policy, SAOs need to ensure the 
implementation process is on the right track and, more importantly, that the policy 
outcomes meet the central government‘s aims and bring benefits to the local 
people. From the initiation of the policy until its accomplishment, the process 
needs to be well organised. Those responsible for implementing the policy have 
to work hard to ensure its success. Obstacles to the policy‘s implementation have 
to be dealt with, or at least prevented from harming the implementation process. 





The government intended that the Tambon Administration Act (TAO) Act 
1994 would run in parallel with the Local Administration Act (2457) in responding 
to the popular demand for decentralisation in the midst of the enduring 
atmosphere of political reform.758 It did this rather than carry out the wholesale 
development of another system. However, the foundation for decentralisation 
was not laid out clearly, was poorly organised, and the bureaucrats and local 
people were not ready to participate in the policy. These factors emerged at the 
beginning of the implementation process.  
Local government at the subdistrict level in Thailand has changed as 
central government devolved some significant responsibilities under the 
decentralisation policy to SAOs. Yet there remain several factors inhibiting the 
success of the decentralisation programme, not least because of the long history 
of Thailand‘s pursuit of nationhood.759 
One respondent at the provincial level noted several issues giving rise to 
clear differences between the decentralisation policy at the local level and the 
national system of administration, and the different hierarchical practices and 
related procedures. This is important since it is the bureaucrats themselves who 
have the most significant impact on the policy‘s implementation. As Anderson 
mentioned, administrative agencies frequently are called on to use their 
discretion in fulfilling the detail of the policy and in making it more specific.760 
Bureaucrats have to seek the best method for implementing a policy, making 
modifications and using their individual experience in order to achieve success.   
Given the importance of the bureaucrats in making the policy a success, 
ensuring that they all work on the right track is necessary. In the 1994 Act, the 
Thai government made a good start with its proposals to decentralise 
administrative power to local people, to revitalize local people‘s participation in 
community development affairs, and in the provisions for decentralisation of the 
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decision making process to people at the Tambon and village levels.761 The 
government showed it was paying attention to the demands for greater local 
participation.762 
After launching the programme in 1997, decentralisation was incorporated 
into the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 to promote the 
people‘s participation and to emphasise that power had been decentralised to the 
local government. The idea of decentralisation was also included in the Ninth 
Plan to promote and encourage local organisations, including SAOs, to play an 
important role in the country‘s government.  
Aside from promoting decentralisation to local level, the Ninth Plan was 
noted as a crucial national development plan through which the government 
endeavoured to promote good governance by restructuring and developing the 
national administrative system. From this, the Ninth Plan became a key point in 
order to achieve the effective national administration system; the government 
agencies could provide better goods and services to Thai people once they were 
well practiced.  
Decentralisation in Thailand, however, has not been the success intended 
by the Thai government. That is to say, while the government attempted to 
promote a foundation of good governance, the plan did not specify how the 
government agencies could carry out the decentralisation. Rather than setting in 
place an effective system of support, the government focused primarily on 
specifying the anticipated objectives and outcomes.763  
The question therefore arises as to what went wrong after the 
decentralisation policy was promoted. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
several problems have been identified:  
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1. The clear differences between the long-established patterns of a 
centralised, bureaucratic and hierarchical system, and the new scheme 
for a decentralised national administration;764 
2. The preferences of those who continue to adhere to the established 
bureaucratic system rather than the new one;765  
3. The gap in knowledge and experience between the policy makers 
and those implementing the policy;766  
4. The reluctance of those at the national level to empower those at the 
local level;767 
5. The continuing habits of centralisation undermining efforts to 
implement decentralisation, especially at the local level.768  
 
Other factors affecting decentralisation include local conditions, such as 
the disagreements between bureaucrats and the limited capacities of staff. These 
also inhibit the SAO implementation of the policy at the local level.   
 
9. 3 Evaluating the decentralisation policy 
In evaluating Thailand‘s decentralisation policy it is necessary to 
understand the bureaucratic system. As noted in chapters 3 and 4, the 
decentralisation policy was initiated at the central government level. The working 
interactions between the three government levels are strongly top-down in 
practice with central government setting out what is required of the lower 
government levels. These interactions can be seen in each government level.  
 
1) National level 
Successful policy implementation requires that all conditions giving rise to 
difficulty be reviewed and solved promptly.  The way in which a policy is designed 
will affect that policy‘s implementation and its outcome. Bureaucrats face many 
conditions and have an array of tools when implementing a policy, and can 
deliver a different outcome from the one expected from the policy. The context of 
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the policy process often involves factors which can influence policy 
implementation and produce a result which is only somewhat successful or even 
a failure. Government should, therefore, pay close attention when designing 
policy and discuss the ideas and intentions behind the policy with all relevant 
people. Developing good policy is much more than the plans for the policy but 
also the policy makers and the breadth of their ideas and visions. A lack of 
knowledge in making a policy will definitely limit what the policy as a whole can 
achieve.  
In Thailand, lower level bureaucrats generally have less opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process. This comes from the long history of 
centralisation in government and reliance on a ‗top-down‘ approach. In his study, 
Nagel outlines the stages in policy formation and implementation that they are 
always related to one another. He also refers to how and why statutes get 
adopted in by legislatures, precedent which is established through the courts, 
and decisions developed and made by government executives and 
administrators. Once agencies from the various branches of government know 
the details of a policy area, and the way in which it is to be implemented, then 
their awareness of how to reform policy procedures effectively will be raised.769 
Bureaucrats who work on putting the policy into practice can carry out their policy 
more easily.  
 
2) Provincial level  
Bureaucrats at the provincial level work under the directions of the central 
government, and in doing this, they are empowered to exercise their authority as 
well. Unlike some bureaucrats at the local level, those at the provincial level have 
to complete and pass the recruitment tests before being employed. This is a 
significant matter and it has had an important impact on the decentralisation 
policy process. The knowledge bureaucrats at the provincial level have of the 
specific areas is very different to those of bureaucrats who work at the local level.   
The interview data reveals that staff at the provincial level had a far more 
extensive knowledge and understanding of decentralisation than those at the 
local level. Furthermore, the knowledge and understanding of the provincial level 
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government bureaucrats was very close to the staff at the central government 
level. Staff at the local level did not have such understanding or knowledge with 
the result that they had more difficulties implementing the policy. Further, the 
provincial and central level bureaucrats were able to work together better, while 
working with local level staff is more difficult. Part of the reason for this is that 
because some staff at the local level were elected to their position and do not 
have to go through the recruitment process that requires the candidates to take 
an examination and interview.770  
With the admission processes so very different, it is very difficult to get the 
two groups of staff to work together in the same routine jobs. Staff at the 
provincial level do not have such problems in their work because they have well-
established tasks and procedures. This makes it difficult for staff at provincial and 
local levels to work together well. Moreover, with the lack of experience among 
the local level staff, mistakes occur in some of their work that need to be 
corrected. Even though those mistakes are not major, they indeed delay the 
working process.    
  
      3) Local level (Subdistrict Administrative Organisation) 
After an uncertain introduction of the decentralisation policy, staff have 
learned much from their own experiences in working with it. They have become 
more confident in working on their duties so that the obligations regarding their 
roles and experiences concerning implementation of the policies have become 
more established.   
Putting the right person, with the necessary experience and knowledge, 
into the right job is important for achieving good outcomes. Staff at the local level 
are expected to develop and deliver the policy and put it into practice. Where 
there are different behaviours representing different degrees of commitment and 
coordination,771 then the policy implementation outcomes are likely to have 
various degrees of success. The readiness of SAO staff for decentralisation has 
been a problem, and this has been due to central government‘s failure to ensure 
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the basic requirements of knowledge and readiness.  Staff needed to have a 
good basic knowledge of decentralisation and knowledge of the new 
administrative system. Other government employees involved with implementing 
the decentralisation policy also needed to know about this.772   
 
9.4 Evaluating decentralisation in Chiang Rai‘s Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisation 
9.4.1 The tendency towards the central administration    
The central government has an important role in the national 
administrative system. Unless the decentralisation policy receives regular 
attention it will be inhibited.773 For example, the policy is inhibited when the 
normal flow of government is interrupted, such as has occurred when the military 
takes over key areas of the national affairs. Even if decentralisation initiatives are 
not dissolved in such circumstances, it is very difficult for the local organisations 
to obtain approval for a proposed new programme, to raise revenue, or obtain 
assistance for projects when the government is not operating normally. Changes 
of government through elections or other means are another condition resulting 
in difficulties for implementation of the decentralisation programme. Change in 
government brings different points of view and policies, and variation to the detail 
of the decentralisation policy. While some aspects of policy may continue to be 
carried out, others are withdrawn as the new government pursues new visions. 
   
2. The provincial level 
The provincial level of government has fewer roles in decentralisation 
compared to that at the central level, but there are several organisations at the 
provincial level which are expected to support and work in cooperation with 
government at the local level. The office of local administration at the provincial 
level can help SAOs in their work with these organisations.  Given the limited 
capabilities available to the SAOs, it can be difficult for staff to support, follow up 
and advise all the organisations they work with at the local level.774 In addition, 
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the limited number of provincial level staff makes it difficult to support SAO staff. 
They have, therefore, tended to play the role of information brokers.   
Another difficulty at the provincial level is the lack of an effective system 
for reporting progress on policy outcomes to the government, and assessing the 
policy implementation by SAOs. The system is loose and vague, meaning there 
are shortcomings in the extent to which government learns of problems with the 
policy. If government does not know when there is a major problem, it is less 
likely real problems will be resolved in a timely manner.    
 
3. The local level 
With the wide range of development experienced across local areas 
(subdistricts), it is clear that the government‘s decentralisation policy faces many 
hurdles. Further, subdistricts are at various levels of development and this 
influences the policy implementation process resulting in different outcomes and 
levels of policy achievement.  
 In initiating a national policy, a government faces the challenge of 
ensuring it is responsive to different areas.  SAO staff do have to deal with the 
different conditions of their local areas and there is a realisation by staff that not 
all goals set by central government will be met. SAO staff do modify aspects of 
the policy to suit their particular situation.  
 Two major problems faced by SAOs were, first, not having a clear 
understanding of their position description and of the underlying principles, 
priorities and scope of their role, which gave rise to difficulties in working with 
other staff from other organisations, as well as working on their own 
responsibilities. Respondents considered a training programme was needed to 
develop SAO staff skills and comprehension of their responsibilities, and second, 
some SAO staff were not well integrated into the local level bureaucracy, were 
not well trained, and did not share the broader organisational goals. This had 
implications for how they carried out their roles. These staff did not have 
adequate knowledge and experience of decentralisation, they did not participate 
fully, and worked only on the direction of the authorised staff.775  
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9.4.2 Different policy interpretations among staff at different government levels
  
 Staff bring a range of interpretations to the policy, which lead to 
shortcomings in the process, as staff at central and provincial government levels 
bring their understanding of the policy which is different to that of the staff work at 
the local level.776 Unlike the central and provincial level staff, the local level staff 
are not well placed to interpret policy for two main reasons.  First, SAO staff have 
had difficulty scoping their work to ensure it is in line with the national policy‘s 
frameworks, as set out by the government. Participants reported that on several 
occasions SAO staff were asked to reconsider their programme proposals and to 
make them more concurrent with the national plan before their plans could be 
approved.777 Second, SAO staff find difficulties with understanding policy 
contents that are sophisticated, for example, that are expressed in legal terms. 
Without understanding what is required they cannot work on their policy in the 
required way.   
 
9.4.3 Difficulties arising among different organisations and staff at the local level 
The inter-relationships among staff and other people working on the 
policy at all levels are significant. Difficulties have arisen between different 
government levels which continue to adhere to the old working patterns. Those 
who underestimate what SAOs can contribute to the decentralisation policy tend 
towards supporting centralised government processes.  
Disagreements among different organisations have frequently occurred 
during the policy implementation process. These disagreements have been 
between the SAO organisations and the higher-level organisations where there 
are different regulations and procedures in force, and where there has been an 
overlap between different organisations and levels of government, making it 
difficult for the SAOs to do their work, particularly when responsibilities are 
shared.   
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 The seniority system, which was originally based on the Thai culture and 
tradition was a cause of conflict.778 Disagreements over seniority among staff can 
be made worse when patronage is evident. Seniority within the SAOs influences 
work processes, particularly where solutions cannot be achieved after careful 
discussion.779 Generally, the seniors are the SAO executives and they decide 
whether a policy or working task should be approved.780 The conflicts generally 
involve the younger staff who find they cannot do anything much about it.781   
 It is a Thai tradition that seniors are very important and that younger staff 
should treat them with respect and be very humble before them. But such 
customs do not necessarily help in carrying our government policy, and staff 
need to bear in mind that it is their roles which are important.782 The respect 
shown to the seniors should be limited and only to a reasonable degree. This 
does not mean the younger staff should be obstinate or rude, but rather that SAO 
staff have to fulfil their roles and distinguish their roles and their work from 
personal issues. Where there is too much concern about seniority, the younger 
staff, especially those who hold higher positions or are expert in a specific area, 
do have difficulties in carrying out their work. Moreover, if this takes too long, the 
working system will be impracticable and time consuming as the younger staff 
spend time listening to the seniors for the sake of tradition. Such behaviour 
concerning seniority does not help the effective running of the system as a 
whole.783   
 
9.4.4 Hierarchy and bureaucracy at the local level 
Central government is necessarily the primary level of government so that 
it can govern the country effectively, but this has negative consequences for 
government at the local level working to implement decentralisation. The 
tendency towards centralisation not only reinforces the Thai bureaucratic system, 
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but also the hierarchy within the system. The lines of authority within the national 
administration are strengthened from time to time and affect the degree to which 
decentralisation occurs. Even though the government launched the 
decentralisation programme, the reality of the national administration means 
there is something missing from the decentralisation policy process. The SAOs, 
which are supposed to be accountable for implementing the decentralisation 
policy, are inhibited by the hierarchy within the bureaucratic system.  Several 
points follow from this.  
First, Thailand has a long tradition and practice of centralisation in 
government. The bureaucracy and hierarchy are very strong and central 
government, which has always played an important role, remains in command of 
the nation‘s affairs. This leaves provincial and local government working under 
the orders of central government with little or no opportunity to prepare 
themselves effectively for decentralisation.  
Second, after the decentralisation programme was promulgated the SAOs 
found they were unable to perform their obligations effectively. The old and 
established bureaucratic system continued to operate over government at the 
local level and limit what the SAO could do. 
Third, staff at higher levels, especially at the central level, are reluctant to 
transfer power to staff at the local level. Those staff at the higher government 
levels attempt to justify their hold on power by asserting that staff at the local 
level are not ready to perform their tasks under the decentralisation policy. 
Consequently, instead of allowing the government at the local level to carry out 
their responsibilities under decentralisation, central government staff continue to 
operate in a way that defeats much of the purpose of decentralisation. The result 
is that the SAOs find themselves in a major dilemma in not knowing what they 
can actually do.  
Several SAO staff responded that hierarchy was always present, 
inhibiting and delaying their work in putting policy into action.784 In addition, some 
SAO respondents reported the continuing problem of overlap between 
organisations, especially at the provincial level. Consequently, they had to put 
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their work on hold and cross check with the relevant organisations before 
continuing their work.  
 
9.4.5 Overlapping responsibilities between provincial and local government 
There was overlap between SAOs and other organisations after the 
launch of the decentralisation policy. Some of the overlap occurred generally, 
and related to the transfer of power to the SAO from the former officials who were 
formerly responsible for responding to the organisations or responsibilities. Other 
overlap arose from the regulations and orders still being applied and subject to 
amendment or other adjustment. Overlap, or a lack of clarity over responsibilities, 
exists, first, between provincial and local governments and, second, between 
local organisations.  
For SAOs, responsibilities are not clearly set out. Regulations are not 
always linked to one another, creating contradictory situations for SAOs, 
particularly in delaying the working processes.  Such overlaps can be solved in 
time, but where neither the SAO nor the organisation the SAO is working with 
cannot continue their work, then there are unnecessary hold ups and tasks are 
not completed on time.    
 Overlap also occurs when the government makes grants to an SAO and 
to a local organisation where both of them are working on issues in the same 
area.785 This leaves staff confused and carries the risk that staff would ignore 
work on the issue concerned and leave it to another organisation. If both of them 
ignored the work then the public services would not be completed.  
 
9.4.6 Limited autonomy 
 Another difficulty for SAOs which frustrates their capacity to implement 
the policy effectively is the degree of autonomy they have. Central government 
must be careful to ensure that SAOs have the autonomy they need for 
implementing the policy without unnecessary problems and delays.  Several 
factors can influence the autonomy SAOs have, and end up by reducing the  
SAOs‘ autonomy.   
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 The autonomy provided by the central government is the main factor 
which enables the SAOs to implement the decentralisation programme and, in 
empowering SAOs, government needs to ensure there is sufficient autonomy 
granted to the SAOs for them to carry out their work. Further, the autonomy 
granted has to match the tasks given to the SAOs so they can work properly. 
 Almost all SAO staff mentioned the issue of autonomy in interviews, and 
reported that the autonomy they were granted was insufficient for them to carry 
out the policy.786 Other respondents, including staff at central and provincial 
levels and also a few SAO staff, considered that the autonomy they had was 
sufficient and suitable for their responsibilities. While respondents did report 
difficulties over the extent of the autonomy transferred to the SAOs, a more 
important problem was that the government transferred more obligations and 
responsibilities than the SAOs could carry out. Respondents among SAO staff 
who mentioned the issue of limited autonomy worked in the larger organisations 
rather than in the smaller ones. The larger SAOs have more responsibilities to 
look after. The issues of autonomy were also mentioned by respondents where 
an SAO could not exercise its autonomy because of an overlap among 
organisations.787  
 While there is an imbalance between the degree of autonomy and the 
extent of the responsibilities, the attitudes of SAO staff can also make their work 
less effective. Even though several SAO staff considered there was insufficient 
autonomy, there was no mention of how SAO staff could implement the policy 
more effectively even where the autonomy was insufficient. The different points 
of view expressed by respondents at different levels reveal the way staff at both 
provincial and district levels, and also the SAOs, understand the role, structure 
and organisation of government, and, in particular, that local government is a sub 
branch of government and can only have limited autonomy. The different points 
of view also reveal the lack of a positive attitude which some SAO staff bring to 
their work. SAO staff expressed much concern about the degree of autonomy but 
did not show enthusiasm to make an effort to do their best with the autonomy 
they had.  Since some SAOs reported they could genuinely work under this 
condition without any problem, then it should be possible for other SAO staff to 
do the same.  
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9.4.7 Traditional forms of local leadership and SAOs 
The traditional forms of local leadership have quite an impact on SAOs, 
and respondents reported there had been several occasions when traditional 
community leaders sought to influence and persuade SAO staff to do what they 
wanted them to do instead of following the government‘s policy.788  Several 
conditions give rise to this problem. First, there are the negative attitudes toward 
each other among community leaders and SAO staff.  Staff are supposed to have 
a good attitude regarding their jobs and their colleagues, but it was obvious that 
several of them do not get along with one another, and this includes the 
community leaders as well as SAO staff.  
Respondents indicated there were disputes between several of the 
community leaders and SAO staff with the result that they avoided interacting 
with each other. Their limited communication, participation and sharing of 
experiences indicated that there were hidden conflicts between them. In 
interviews, community leaders considered that SAOs do not have the capabilities 
and experience to work effectively.789 For their part, SAO staff saw the community 
leaders as meddling too much in the SAO‘s responsibilities.790 Respondents 
reported the negative attitudes of community leaders to SAO staff and that 
community leaders always underestimated SAO staff.791   
Second, the relationships between the community leaders and the SAO 
staff appear to be very cursory and delicate. Respondents revealed that only a 
few SAOs invited community leaders to participate in their work. The other SAOs 
refused to do that, arguing that the job descriptions were nothing to do with the 
community leaders. One respondent reported that conflicts arose when people 
misunderstood their role.792 In the case of the traditional forms of local leadership, 
the community leaders, known as the phuyaibaan and the Kamnan, were on the 
boards of the TAO.793 The disputes among them can originate when the 
community leaders with politico-administrative responsibilities realise their 
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positions as legal entities have been undermined by the SAO becoming the 
effective legal entity, as well as being responsible for the management of the 
Tambon and associated villages.  
In any case, even though both community leaders and SAO staff have 
differences and disputes, they can indeed cooperate regarding their duties. 
Respondents reported that despite their evident differences, they are required to 
work together.794  
Third, besides the problems between community leaders and SAO staff, 
there are other people, who used to have a power within a local area, who are 
well respected by the community members, as well as the politicians, especially 
at national level, who also influence the SAO‘s policy implementation. Even 
though these people do not directly interfere with the SAOs work, their actions 
and comments can influence the ordinary people in the community,795 especially 
when those actions and comments are against the SAOs.  
 It is noticeable that, even though the problems between community 
leaders and the SAO staff are not severe, once tensions accumulate they can 
become bigger problems. In addition, it is the character of senior Thai people to 
always behave as appropriate as people who demand respect and they will 
remain silent when they do not agree with something.796 They remain silent and 
without any means of adjusting their differences and understandings, their 
relationships can worsen. The relationships will be very weak and the problems 
will affect good cooperation and teamwork necessary in working on policy 
implementation.  
 
9.4.8 Limited and unstable revenue 
The main reasons for establishing the SAOs was to provide a range of 
goods and services to the local people, and to assist the central government to 
work more effectively. The outcome of the policy implementation process should 
not only meet the government‘s expectations, but also should provide benefits to 
the local people. In addition to the different factors outlined above that influence 
the way in which SAOs are able to implement the policy, limited and unstable 
revenue is another of the problems faced by SAOs. 
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 SAO staff respondents reported that the issue regarding inadequate and 
unstable revenue varies across the different SAOs, according to their local area. 
SAO respondents indicated it was not always an easy matter for them to spend 
the revenue they received to solve the whole array of problems before them. This 
was not because the revenue was considered to be below what had been set by 
central government in the national plan, but because the number and degrees of 
severity of the problems were considered to be beyond just the revenue 
allocated.797  
Interestingly, some SAO staff respondents also indicated that the revenue 
and grants provided from the government were actually quite a reasonable 
amount. On one hand, the financial resources SAOs derive through local taxes 
and for special programmes, leaves very little for SAOs to use toward the 
significant or big projects they are planning to work on On the other hand, with 
several projects and activities over and above the SAOs‘ routine responsibilities, 
SAOs can request supports from other organisations if they face any difficulty 
with insufficient funds.798  
As mentioned in chapter 7, the policy implementation outcomes can result 
in lower standards after the implementation process is done. Several SAO staff 
respondents mentioned that this problem was related to the limited revenue. 
Most of them only said that the revenue was very tight and insufficient to continue 
implementing the policy.799 However, even though the revenue obtained from the 
government is inadequate, the SAOs are required to create activities to earn 
extra income, which assists the SAOs to gain more revenue. It also helps to fulfil 
the central government‘s aim of developing SAOs that can self govern. The 
government wishes to have SAOs that can actually work and carry out policy 
rapidly and effectively. SAO staff need to understand their situations and carefully 
work on their policy capacity, and to work under the condition of only limited 
revenue. If SAOs only complain and do nothing, waiting for the government to 
support them at all times, then they will never make any change. The SAOs will 
never develop the skills which will enhance their overall capabilities and get them 
to the stage where they can rely on themselves. It is the aim of central 
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government to establish the SAOs so they can lighten the load, and as this 
happens then the government will be able to support and encourage them. 
 
9.4.9 Lack of participation in planning and decision-making processes 
Although promoting the decentralisation policy, Thailand‘s national 
administration continues to be dominated by a ‗top-down‘ perspective, which 
gives the local people less opportunity in political participation.800 Respondents 
noted that the SAOs did not have a public relations programme for working within 
the community.801 Even though SAOs arrange public hearings in order to 
announce proposals and programmes and to listen to the opinions of community 
members on their plans or new projects,802 very few people really know about it.  
As mentioned by the participants, SAO public hearings or activities are 
sometimes not announced in sufficient time that people can prepare themselves 
to participate. In addition, the announcements are also limited to a small area and 
are not spread out as much as they should be.803 There are, therefore, limited 
numbers of people who actually have the opportunities to participate and notice 
what their SAO is doing.   
In addition to the public relations programmes and public hearings, SAOs 
generally report progress on the outcomes of policies in written form, and made 
available in the form of a pamphlet. However, these cannot convey much 
information to the people.  Even though SAOs make an annual report, which 
comes out in the form of documents or booklets, only a few people get that 
information. The people who live in the local area do not actually take much 
notice about such reports. Respondents mentioned that although the SAOs 
report on policy outcomes and yearly activities through documents or booklets,804 
those reports are indeed neglected. The booklets are only distributed to some 
people and organisations,805 with the ordinary people not receiving the 
information.806  People then tend to think that SAOs only work on their own and 
never invite other people to be involved. Furthermore, this can lead people to 
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conclude that SAOs are not transparent, and that they present an opportunity for 
corruption.  
To prevent the consequences of such a lack of public awareness, SAOs 
need to call public meetings where they inform the people about their 
programmes and plans, and report the outcomes of the previous programmes to 
the local people regularly.807 This would bring transparency to the SAOs‘ policy 
implementation, and also communicate to the community the benefits being 
achieved. This would in itself promote more community participation and 
cooperation. 
 
9.4.10 Administrative rules and regulations issued by central government 
As mentioned earlier, Thailand‘s national administration is highly 
bureaucratic, and the public administration system is highly centralised.808 
Hierarchy always plays an important role at all government levels. As long as the 
bureaucratic system plays such a central and important role, there will be 
difficulties, particularly for lower level staff, arising from hierarchy. At the local 
level, SAOs constantly face problems with the hierarchical system at the higher 
levels and the way it inhibits policy implementation, and delays their work.809 With 
the layers of the working process, SAO staff have to follow the process, step by 
step and level by level.  
It is noticeable that respondents at the higher levels did not mention 
anything about hierarchy. They had accepted it and become used to the 
hierarchy of authority as part of the national administration. SAO staff did mention 
hierarchy and the way it frequently influences their work. It is clear that hierarchy 
is significant and is unavoidable, particularly for SAO staff. The hierarchy is 
maintained in an effort to make certain that all government organisations will run 
effectively, but there are also problems, which arise through the reliance on 
hierarchy, particularly where government wants to make changes to the 
administrative processes, or adjust performances and solve problems involving 
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the hierarchy. The national administrative system can perform expeditiously with 
fewer obstacles. 
Another area of difficulty for the SAOs arising from decentralisation is the 
sophisticated way in which regulations, issued by central government, are 
expressed. It can be very difficult for staff at the local level to understand what the 
regulations are saying. As mentioned earlier, staff recruitment processes for the 
SAOs are different from those for staff at higher levels. Developing a common 
understanding of regulations across all staff, from the SAO to the higher levels, is 
very difficult and challenging.   
SAO staff generally have only limited experience for their work and their 
educational backgrounds are not high, which means that SAO staff have difficulty 
in engaging their performance in policy implementation. Several SAO staff who 
reported difficulty regarding the sophisticated regulations struggled when they 
had to interpret policy. SAO respondents mentioned that the problem of 
complicated regulations generally occurs together with the problem of overlap, 
which will be explained further below.  
  
9.4.11 SAO staff capacities to implement policy 
 As noted above, SAO staff capacities to implement policies are limited, 
leaving only a limited number of staff who can work on the policy implementation 
process.810 Several of them acknowledged having difficulty in working in their role 
under decentralisation, because of their lack of knowledge of, and experiences 
in, decentralisation. In addition, there were the requirements of the bureaucratic 
system. But most of all, SAO staff displayed very limited and inadequate 
experience to carry out policy. First, SAO staff lack the capacity in management. 
 For policy implementation to succeed there needs to be sufficient staff, at 
each level of government. Some SAO respondents said there were not enough 
staff, while others had no problem with this issue. Organisations mentioning 
inadequate levels of staffing do not reveal whether it is a matter of inadequate 
staffing levels or whether it is about the limited capabilities of the existing staff to 
carry out the policy.  
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 Second, SAO staff lack the capacity in working in the policy 
implementation process. Several times SAO respondents reported difficulty in 
implementing policy. If SAO staff lack the necessary expertise, understanding 
and skills, then they will be unable to solve the problems. Where there is a lack of 
expertise SAO staff can improve their skills by participating in the training 
programmes offered by the government. While attending training programmes is 
helpful, staff also need to develop and practice their skills and experience in 
working on the policy implementation process.  
 Besides shortcomings in managing the implementation process and 
working towards it, several SAO staff appeared to misunderstand, or to not 
understand, their role and duties. This is particularly important when it comes to 
working with other organisations in carrying out their tasks. SAO staff need to be 
able to cross check with the other organisations whose duties overlap with those 
of the SAO staff.811 Failure to do this makes for difficulties and brings confusion to 
their role and duties, while also delaying the policy implementation process.812 In 
misunderstanding their role and duties, on several occasions SAO staff 
overlapped with staff in other organisations.813  
 Even though the SAOs were established in 1995, several staff members 
are still not focused on the requirements and implications of decentralisation. 
When the SAOs were first established it could be argued that staff were 
inexperienced814 and required more time to improve. Nevertheless, this not longer 
applies. Ten years is sufficient time for staff to develop and resolve the problems 
of the decentralisation policy. Where staff at all levels of government are 
complacent about their work, the decentralisation policy will not be launched and 
implemented effectively.    
 
9.4.12 Unclear policy 
 In evaluating the implementation of decentralisation, it is important to keep 
in mind that the way SAOs work on the policy are different from those staff at 
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higher levels. Nevertheless, SAOs have to work within the national policy 
frameworks and other regulations which they are required to follow consistently.    
Three reasons for policy being unclear are: 1) national government 
policies are not clear to SAO staff; 2) policies are well made but there was a gap 
in communicating the policy between policy makers and policy implementers; and 
3) policies are well made but the SAO staff have difficulty in interpreting and 
following the policies. Several SAO staff respondents mentioned that central 
government policies were unclear for SAO staff. They mentioned there had been 
many times when SAO staff had been confused in interpreting policies. SAO staff 
also reported difficulties in determining the scope of policies, particularly when 
those policies were linked with the regulations, and which also related to other 
organisations. Some of the overlap of regulations may not be real, but just appear 
to overlap.  
 Respondents reported that this problem occurs when SAO staff are 
uncertain or misunderstand the policies, sometimes because the policy contains 
too many details. Where parts of the policy are associated with legal 
interpretations then this also creates a lack of understanding. With limited 
capacities, SAO staff find it is difficult to implement policies.815 Because of this, 
SAO staff have to make sure they do not work against other organisations‘ 
regulations and procedures. In addition, with different regulations, performances, 
and rules the staff come across to policy interpretations which do not coincide 
with one another. SAO staff cannot even scope the policy content to the same 
degree as that expected by central government816 because the SAOs also have 
to adapt the policies to suit their local limited conditions.  
SAO staff respondents mentioned that the regulations and procedures in 
each organisation, for example, the municipalities, SAOs, and other local 
organisations, do vary in various ways. There are several times where 
regulations contrast with others or overlap with one another.817 To solve this 
problem government should put all procedures on the same track, so that all 
government organisations follow the same procedures. This would do much to 
ensure public services can be performed more rapidly and effectively.   
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 The SAOs are the local organisation at the lowest level of the government 
administrative system and play an important role in the government‘s goal of 
decentralisation. In the case of Chiang Rai SAOs, it can be seen that the SAO 
staff face several problems caused by the government at central level, such as 
problems regarding administrative structures, ambiguous regulations issued by 
central government, and limited revenue, resources and autonomy. Problems 
stemming from traditional forms of leadership and the staff capabilities also lead 
to difficulties in implementation. As long as these issues remain unaddressed, it 
is difficult to anticipate that the SAOs can actually accomplish the 
























During the late 20th century, decentralisation played an important role in 
the governance of several countries, especially in Western and Asian states. In 
European countries with histories and backgrounds based on strong national 
governments, decentralisation was more widespread. In these states, vital 
democratic governance led to a people inculcated with the mechanisms through 
which they are able to realise their roles. Thus, when their governments 
promoted decentralisation, the people were able to respond with ease. In 
contrast to their European counterparts, Asian countries exhibited a characteristic 
of decentralisation, which revealed a more utilitarian approach to local self-
government. In several Asian states, differing drivers of decentralisation resulted 
in a range of economic and administrative reforms. In Thailand, decentralisation 
was adopted to foster a mixture of economic, administrative and political reforms.    
Whether governments look to decentralisation as a means of achieving 
democratic political outcomes, fostering economic development or social 
reforms, or as a response to a community‘s wish to have greater control over 
their affairs, decentralisation has been adopted to involve much greater 
participation by officials and people at the local level. In some countries however, 
decentralisation is still controlled by their central government which maintains the 
government‘s authority.  
This thesis has focused on Thailand‘s decentralisation and policy 
implementation through the case study of the Subdistrict Administrative 
Organisation (SAO), which is the foundation unit of Thailand‘s local government 
system.  In developing decentralisation policy, the process and other factors 
which influence decentralisation are discussed below. 
 
10.1.1 Aim 
Thailand‘s first seven National Plans strongly promoted economic 
development, economic stability, economic structural adjustment, and poverty 
eradication in both rural and urban areas, rather than on social development, 
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which caused an imbalance in economic development between the big cities and 
the remote areas. Not only was there a drift of people moving from the rural areas 
to the big cities, especially to Bangkok and surrounding provinces, seeking 
employment, there was also big gap in the income and living standards between 
those people who lived in Bangkok and surrounding provinces, and those who 
lived in the remote areas.  
The main purpose of the decentralisation policy was to balance the 
development of human, social, economic and environmental resources to 
achieve sustainable people-centred development, as well as to promote 
sustainable development at all levels of society. In order to eliminate the gap 
between rural and urban areas, and to ensure people remained living in their 
local areas, attention was given to improving their quality of life through the 
creation of employment opportunities and enhanced local services – education, 
health, and other amenities - through the promotion of decentralisation.   
 
10.1.2 The Process 
The Thai government embarked on a long-term development plan and 
outlined a policy of decentralisation as part of the 1997 Constitution and through 
the work of the Social and Economic Developments Plans, particularly the Ninth 
and Tenth Plans. The prime objectives of this development included: 
1.  Balancing the development of human, social, economic and 
environmental resources to achieve sustainable people-centred 
development, as discussed in chapter 5; 
2. Decentralising administrative power to local people, as discussed in 
chapter 6; and 
3. Revitalising participation by local people in community development 
affairs and to empower people in the decision-making process at the 
Tambon and village levels, as discussed in chapter 6. 
 
In pursuit of decentralisation policy, all government officials and staff, 
especially those at the local level, were encouraged to enhance their capabilities 
and work more effectively, and Thai people were also strongly encouraged to 
participate in decision-making processes and in the monitoring of the government 
officials‘ operations more fully. To be effective, local government staff needed to 
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understand fully and be well practised in the government‘s plans for good 
governance.  
 
10.1.3 Early steps toward decentralisation 
In initiating and promulgating the National Economic and Social 
Development Plans the Thai government consistently failed to recognise the 
prospect that the Plans could not actually be delivered in reality. In theory, while 
the documents discussed the importance of the developing, thriving, economic, 
political and social communities, in practice, however, not every Plan contained 
strategies to achieve the intended outcomes.  
The decentralisation process and the principles of good governance 
contained in the Ninth Plan were launched too soon. As discussed in chapter 7 
and 8, neither the officials nor  the Thai people were ready to respond to the 
concept of a decentralisation policy. In addition, the officials and Thai people had 
not had time to prepare themselves for the new decentralised national 
administrative system. In other words, while in some areas the local staff and 
community were prepared to respond to the call for decentralisation, in others, 
there was a lack of will and understanding of the true essence of decentralisation. 
To simply introduce the concept of decentralisation with the promise of good 
outcomes without considering how best to achieve that end, as governments 
globally have done, consigns the process to failure. 
The government promulgated its decentralisation policy through the Ninth 
National Plan but its national administrative system did not allow decentralisation 
to be practised at the local level. Several factors affecting the decentralisation 
policy were based on cultural and political practices, such as the tendency toward 
centralisation and the hierarchical administrative system, which became an 
obstacle inhibiting the successful implementation of the decentralisation policy. 
First, while the government attempted to launch the decentralisation policy and 
the principle of good governance through the National Plan, these concepts were 
new to the officials, especially those tasked with putting the policy into practice. 
The Plan was not specific as to how officials were to respond. As a result, those 
officials with little understanding of the new scheme of the national administrative 
system, could not implement the policy effectively.  
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Second, the long-standing systemic tradition of a highly centralised 
national administration, where central government played a major role in 
providing resources and implementing policies effectively and rapidly, reinforced 
local government‘s subordinate position. The ‗bottom-up‘ approach has simply 
not been part of the Thai psyche. This impacted on the local level officials‘ ability 
to work independently, as they had worked under the command of the central 
government for so long, as discussed in chapter 7.  
Third, during the implementation of the decentralisation policy, there was 
still a lack of people‘s participation and working practice under good governance. 
The ‗top-down‘ approach continued in the national administrative system, which 
was opposite to the concept of decentralisation. Adherence to the national 
bureaucratic system and centralisation did not change. Accordingly, the mission 
of the Ninth Plan, to strengthen the local administration system, did not work 
effectively, as discussed in chapter 7.   
 
10.1.4 Solution  
The Ninth Plan, with its promulgation of decentralisation and the 
principles of good governance, delivered an average degree of success. The 
Tenth Plan contained a greater emphasis on ensuring the successful 
development of decentralisation policy through the inclusion of a number of 
strategies. Under the Tenth Plan, decentralisation, good governance and the 
sufficiency economy philosophy were extensively promoted.  It also included 
guidelines designed to accelerate the development of laws to support efficient 
and effective implementation of the plan‘s strategies. These included 1) studying 
and researching bodies of knowledge, 2) learning processes to support 
implementation of the strategies of the Tenth Plan, 3) developing systems of 
monitoring and evolution, 4) devising indicators of development outcomes at all 
levels, and 5) developing databases and networks at all levels linking central, 
regional and local administrative bodies. As a result, the government was able to 
follow the progress of the plan more easily.  
The Tenth Plan also recommended four additional guidelines for major 
development strategies in creating good governance and strengthening 
decentralisation, as noted in chapter 5. However, more support and 
encouragement from the government were required to oversee and supervise the 
officials in ensuring that the national administrative system was effective. At the 
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time of writing this thesis, the Tenth Plan is still being implemented, so the 
outcome of the plan cannot yet be evaluated.  
 
10.1.5 Discussion 
Thailand‘s decentralisation program 
Even though provincial and local level governments are part of the 
national administrative structure, and decentralisation is about transferring 
responsibilities from the national government to the local level, local government 
still remains part of, and under the supervision and control of, central 
government. The government still needs to further develop its officials and 
strengthen the national administrative system to sustain its decentralisation 
policy.  
First, there needs to be a good understanding of decentralisation among 
officials at all levels. As discussed in chapter 4, although the government 
promoted decentralisation, central government continued to play an important 
role in conducting the country.  While the adherence to the ‗top-down‘ approach 
was a way of guaranteeing that national policies were effective, staff at higher 
levels were reluctant to see power transferred to local staff, as outlined in chapter 
8. From this, since everything had to be determined at the national level, and 
local government could only represent government in carrying out policies, it 
could not fully exercise authority. Therefore, there was little possibility of 
successfully developing   decentralisation.  
Second, only a few government officials at the local level understood what 
was required under decentralisation and faced difficulties in seeking the best way 
to respond to the policy, leaving central government still playing a vital role in 
local government. In the case of Thailand, with its long tradition of centralisation, 
the first steps of policy implementation must be inclusive of central government 
support and assistance to local government to ensure local government can 
implement the policy effectively. However, the degree of control must be 
lessened to allow local government to gradually become independent.  
Third, to facilitate the local level to perform its responsibilities, clear job 
descriptions are needed at all government levels to define the parameters of the 
governance at each level of the national administration. As discussed in chapter 
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7, an overlap and lack of clarity concerning the respective responsibilities of 
provincial and local government is another matter that limits the success of 
decentralisation. The rules of procedure the local staff are required to follow are, 
sometimes, too complicated, as noted in chapters 7, 8, and 9. Therefore, it is 
essential that the government review the relevant rules of procedure and codes 
of law so that they are in accord with one another, thereby eliminating overlap 
and ambiguity regarding responsibilities.  
Fourth, policy implementation can potentially be a problem if there is a 
lack of mentoring and supervision of staff at the lower levels.  This is a sensitive 
issue as the degree of support and resourcing must be in the right proportion. 
Whether central government provides too much or too little assistance, either 
way the policy can be inhibited. Yet, regardless of providing mentoring and 
supervision, if the government does not provide sufficient revenue, autonomy and 
education of the principles of decentralisation, the successful implementation of 
policy will continue to face difficulties.  
 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisation  
Although SAOs have been established for over a decade, they have had 
difficulties in performing their responsibilities effectively from time to time. The 
problems the SAOs face in general are as follows.  
 As discussed in chapter 6, three different conditions have a 
significant impact on the establishment and operation of SAOs: the territory 
covered, the number of villages in the area, and SAO revenue.  An SAO‘s 
area may include a lot of forest, while other SAOs have a large number of 
villages. As a result, some SAOs have difficulty in generating revenue they 
can earn from special activities to develop their localities and cover 
expenses. 
 As discussed in chapter 8, old centres of power in the locality make it 
difficult for SAO staff to promote decentralisation and good governance as 
set out in the Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan.  
 There has been some controversy about central government‘s 
intentions regarding decentralisation in view of insufficient autonomy being 
granted to SOAs. This argument was mentioned in every SAO where the 
research interviews took place.  
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 There was controversy over the lack of revenue granted by central 
government to support the SAOs. For many of those interviewed this was 
one of the big issues affecting the work of SAOs. As mentioned in chapters 
7 and 8, this argument was raised as part of the argument about the 
capability of SAOs to manage their revenue provided by the government. 
However, as was also discussed, this problem of limited revenue originated 
at the time the SAOs were established. 
 Overlaps in responsibilities occur between the SAOs and some other 
organisations, especially at provincial and local levels. Even though the 
SAO has the authority to fulfil and perform its obligations, sometimes the 
SAO has difficulties in their dealings and work with other organisations and 
has to wait while other organisations consider the matter.   
 Despite the theory of decentralisation, there are controversies about 
what autonomy SAOs should have. As outlined in chapters 7, 8, and 9, staff 
at national and provincial levels consider that the autonomy granted to 
SAOs by central government is sufficient for the SAO to work and achieve 
its responsibilities. However, staff in SAOs and other organisations see the 
autonomy as insufficient. 
 Policies determined by central government are sometimes unclear to 
SAO staff, causing major problems because implementers face difficulties 
in interpreting the policy. In implementing policy, local government 
agencies may do things differently from what the government expects, with 
different degrees of success depending on conditions, environment and 
areas where staff work.  
 Conflicts occur both outside and inside the SAO. The outside conflicts 
arise between SAO staff and ordinary people over the understanding each 
has of decentralisation. The internal conflicts can have a significant 
influence on an SAO‘s policy implementation. Chapters 7 and 8 outlined 
several conflicts within the SAO.  When those in conflict avoid interaction 
with one another, the work of the SAO suffers through the lack of good 
teamwork. This influences an SAO‘s performance of its responsibilities in 
developing the locality. 
 A problem of patronage may exist among SAO staff, especially 
between executive and administrative staff. In addition, as noted in chapter 
6, patronage also occurs between SAO staff and the people who were 
formerly leaders in the local area.  
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 Even though the SAO was established over a decade ago, SAO staff 
do not understand as much as they are expected to know. As discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, local government has experienced little self-governance. 
When the SAO became more autonomous after the 1997 constitution, 
members of the SAO council and commission achieved their positions 
through election, while ex-officio SAO members were discontinued. This 
development presented difficulties for the SAO at times due to the different 
requirements of working under decentralisation. 
 The lack of popular participation in the local area makes difficulties for 
the SAO in working with the local people and gaining support and 
cooperation from the community members. 
 SAO staff need to show their commitment to the organisation and 
show themselves to be part of it and, in that way, convince the community 
that the SAO staff really work for it. From this, as noted in chapter 7, the 
SAO will not only gain advantages by having assistance and support from 
the local people, but also they will have more opportunity to know the real 
problem that their local area requires to be developed.  
 
10.2 The propositions   
In chapter 2, a total of 15 propositions, derived from the discussion of 
policy implementation, were set out. The linkages between the theoretical 
framework and the research findings are outlined below. 
 
1) Policy implementation is best understood by looking at the goals and 
strategies adopted in the statute (Birkland). 
 
Policy implementation must be concerned with the goals and strategies to 
be adopted; however this research finds that paying attention to goals and 
strategies does not guarantee that the policy implementation process will 
succeed. 
In Thailand, decision makers at the top level make the policy but 
implementation of the policy is often difficult. Goals are often ambiguous in the 
complex policy contexts, with the result that local staff face difficulties in putting 
the policy into practice effectively. When front-line staff at the local level are not 
able to respond well to the policy conceived at the top level, they either modify or 
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ignore some points of the policy contexts in order to make the policy suit the local 
conditions. Certainly, the outcomes of the policy implementation vary according 
to how well local level staff can respond to the policy, as noted in chapter 7. 
Understanding the goals and strategies is important in understanding policy 
implementation but, in the end, policy implementation depends on the capabilities 
and capacities of those doing the implementing.   
 
 
2) Policy implementation is best understood from the lowest level of the 
implementation system (Birkland). 
 
As noted in chapter 2, several scholars agree that street-level staff play an 
important role in the policy implementation process. However, this research finds 
that policy implementation is not always best understood from the lowest level of 
the implementation system, particularly where the policy formulated from the top 
level is inappropriate. The government is certainly responsible for determining the 
policy and the SAO staff are responsible for putting the policy into practice, yet 
the policy implementation process may not be carried out fully. Central 
government needs to understand how SAO staff respond to, and implement, the 
policy. At the lowest level the policy can go awry through the limited capabilities 
or lack of experience of the front-line staff.  Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 7, 
several SAO staff mentioned the difficulties in interpreting and understanding the 
policy context. At other times there was an overlap between organisations, or 
SAO staff could not put the policy into practice effectively due to limited funding 
provided by the government. While front-line staff can by their own actions, cause 
policy failure, the policy itself must be appropriate and implementable as well.  
 
 
3) The policy implementation process is best understood by analysing 
and organising policy from its end points (Elmore).  
As noted in chapter 7, even though the policy is developed by central 
government, the policy implementation approach is modified, as SAO staff either 
ignore or adjust some points of the policy context for a better outcome or to suit 
local conditions, and as the SAO staff seek the assistance of other government 
organisations in carrying out their responsibilities.  
Policy makers at central level have little knowledge of whether a policy is 
carried out in the way they proposed or whether it is even appropriate to an 
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SAO‘s local conditions. The policy implementation process covers all stages, 
from the initiation of the policy until the front-line staff have put the policy into 
practice. The policy maker must be concerned about how the policy is 
implemented at the street level, as they are the ones who experience the policy 
the most. With the benefit of the experience of front-line staff and their feedback, 
policy makers are able to initiate more appropriate policy in the future. 
Accordingly, this proposition is supported by this research. 
 
4) The ‗top-down‘ approach is better where there is a dominant 
programme such as where the law is well-structured, where there are 
limited funds, and where there is a situation that someone requires a 
programme structure quickly. Nevertheless, the ‗bottom-up‘ approach 
is better when there is no single dominant programme, or where 
interest is expressed in the dynamics of the policy implementation 
process at the local level (Sabatier).   
This research shows that the ‗top-down‘ approach is better where 
there is a dominant program if the policy implementers are well trained and have 
sufficient experience. The research findings show that the implementers who can 
respond to the decentralisation policy most effectively are those at the central 
and provincial levels, for instance, the ‗top-down‘. However, policy implementers 
at the local level still have difficulties in putting the policy into practice because 
they need to take a more comprehensive approach to achieve a better outcome.  
In the case of Sabatier‘s proposition that the ‗bottom-up‘ approach is 
better when there is no single dominant program, the research findings of this 
study show that only the SAO staff who have sufficient capabilities and skills, and 
sufficient revenue, can respond fully to the policy. SAO staff who do not have the 
capabilities and skills needed still face difficulties in interpreting the policy content 
and have to request assistance from other organisations. Staff at the provincial 
level are the people who offer advice and guidelines to SAO staff, so that they 
can continue to implement the decentralisation policy. 
 
5) Clear messages sent by credible officials and received by receptive 
implementers who have or are given sufficient resources and who 
implement policies supported by affected groups lead to 
implementation success (Goggin). 
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Clear messages from the government organisation at higher levels are 
very significant for SAO staff in implementing the policy correctly. This research 
finds that even though the SAO staff sometimes have their difficulties in 
implementing policies when they are ambiguous and complicated, the staff at the 
Office of Local Administration can assist the SAO staff to continue their work 
through to the end. This is particularly the case when dealing with policy related 
to legal terms. From this, the research study supports Goggin‘s proposition that it 
is very significant that the government must provide policy implementers with 
clear messages and sufficient resources.  
 
6) Even though policy makers aspire to develop appropriate policies, 
there is no guarantee the implementation process will be successful 
because policy drift can shift policy aims and later make the objective 
of the policy go awry (John). 
 
This research supports the proposition there is no guarantee that the 
policy implementation process will be successful. Many factors affect the 
implementation process, including the capabilities of the staff to interpret the 
policy, the local conditions that will affect the policy implementation process, the 
approach of the implementers in delivering the policy, the clarity of the policy, the 
resources allocated to the SAO and the assistance available to SAO staff. 
Even though policy drift does not obviously occur as SAO staff follow the 
working plan, it has been noticeable that SAO staff do adjust their approach to 
make policy fit the local conditions. Accordingly, the policy implementation 
outcome can be different from what the government expects, as noted in chapter 
7. 
 
7) If implementation is defined as putting policy into effect, that is, action 
in conformity with policy, then compromise will be seen as a policy 
failure. But if implementation is regarded as ‗getting something done‘, 
then performance rather than conformity is the central objective, and 
compromise a means of achieving performance, albeit at the expense 
of some of the original intentions (Barrett and Fudge).  
According to Barrett and Fudge, policy implementation failure may be 
understood as the top level actor trying to get the lower actor to conform to their 
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policy expectations. From this, instead of controlling policy execution or 
objectives, policy implementation should be seen as a negotiating process in 
order to avoid implementation failure. It should be acceptable for local level staff 
to modify the policy implementation process as long as the goals are met.  
This statement is supported by the research findings, as noted in chapter 
7, because in practice, the SAO staff hardly respond in accordance with policy, 
but only attempt their best to make it as possible as they can. This happens as 
different organisations have different factors that influence the policy 
implementation process, and they are different from the government‘s intentions. 
However, where local staff do modify the policy implementation process, as long 
as it is within the setting and scope of the policy, it should be acceptable as long 
as the goals are met. 
 
8) Policy implementers may know what to do and have sufficient desire 
and resources to do it, but they may still be hampered in 
implementation by the structures of the organisations in which they 
serve (Edwards). 
 
Policy implementers may know what to do and have sufficient desire and 
resources to do it, but they may still be hampered in implementation by the 
structures of the organisation. Edwards identifies two significant factors inhibiting 
policy implementers as 1) standard operating procedures and 2) fragmentation. 
Standard operating procedures are routines that allow the policy implementers to 
make their everyday decisions.  Even though by using the standard operating 
procedures officials can save time by avoiding making individual judgements 
about specific situations, there is a possibility that the standard operating 
procedures are inappropriate to the policy initiated by the government.  
This research shows that where SAO staff face difficulties in making 
decisions because they are not sure what to do, they check with staff from a 
different SAO or with officials at a higher level to make certain that what they do 
is appropriate, as noted in chapter 7.   
With fragmentation, responsibility for a policy area is dispersed among 
several organisation units with too many government organisations and 
government agencies responding to a particular policy, giving rise to difficulties in 
making decisions in policy implementation. 
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This research finds that the SAO staff face difficulties arising from 
fragmentation, rather than from the standard operating procedures. Normally, 
SAO staff follow the plan that has been already approved by central government 
and, unless there is an emergency, follow the standard operating procedures.   
However, there are many government organisations and officials working 
in Thailand‘s administrative system, as noted in chapter 3. This gives rise to 
difficulties for SAOs in working with other organisations because they always 
face problems according to overlap with other government organisation at higher 
levels. As a result, the SAOs cannot continue their obligations, and have to wait 
for the problem to be solved.     
 
 
9) One of the critical resources in policy implementation is clear and 
concise  information. If policies are innovative and highly technical, the 
implementers  need to have sufficient information, a clear context, direction, and 
structure (Edwards, Sabatier, Paul and Mazmanian). 
 
Because decentralisation is so new to government officials, including 
the SAO staff, government must provide local government agencies with 
assistance to strengthen implementation of the decentralisation policy. This 
research shows that Thailand‘s adherence to centralisation means that staff at 
the local level have few opportunities to exercise their authority. Front-line staff 
continue to rely on the national government for direction. Consequently, staff who 
are expected to put the policy into practice are not able to do so effectively.  
As noted in chapter 7, staff have different understandings of the 
decentralisation policy. Local staff do not have the capabilities and experience, 
and have difficulty with interpreting the policy context particularly where legal 
terms are used, in dealing with issues of overlap with other organisations, and 
where their job descriptions are not clear. They also find themselves having 
directions which are unclear and are not concise, or even when there is not 
sufficient information to follow in making a decision. This always causes 
confusion and uncertainty about the policy or what is to be done. Moreover, to 
solve the problem, local staff have to ask other SAOs to check whether they 
understand the same thing. If what they understand coincides then they continue 
their work. But if not, they will call staff at the provincial level, depending on the 
area of the job. 
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10) Policy implementation must be supported by sufficient funding 
otherwise the task cannot be accomplished (Kelman).   
 
Funding is one of the most important factors in the success of the policy 
implementation process. This research finds that the lack of government funding 
seriously inhibits the policy implementation process. As noted in chapter 7, the 
SAOs have only limited funding, and when other organisations request financial 
support from the SAO this leaves the SAO with little in reserve to carry out their 
responsibilities. This problem appears when there are too many duties 
transferred to the SAOs to accomplish, but there is only limited revenue for 
undertaking all the duties.  
In addition, according to the law, even though the SAO can earn 
additional revenue, it is very difficult for them to earn much because the amount 
of income they can earn depends on the size of the population, the type of 
property the SAO owned, the amount of infrastructure facilities and services, and 
the sources of donation in each local area. Consequently, the SAOs have had to 
request further assistance from higher levels to continue with their projects. 
 
 
11) Implementation orders must be consistent as well as clear if policy 
implementation is to be effective. Transmitting contradictory 
instructions does not make it easy for operational personnel to 
expedite implementation. Nevertheless, implementers are at times 
burdened with inconsistent directives (Edwards).  
 
To implement the policy effectively is difficult, but to put the policy into 
practice while the implementation orders are inconsistent is even more difficult. In 
theory, the government attempts to promote a decentralisation policy and 
empower the SAO to play an important role at the local level. In practice, the 
government has not shown much concern about assisting the SAOs to be able to 
work under its decentralisation policy. There are three reasons for this. First, the 
SAOs do not have the autonomy to work under the government‘s decentralisation 
policy, as noted in chapter 7. Second, working with other organisations gives rise 
to difficulties for the SAOs because the regulations, precedence, and 
responsibilities practiced by those different organisations have not been revised 
and updated and they continue to operate as before. Consequently, SAOs face 
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difficulties arising from the overlap which occurs when there are more than two 
government organisations involved, as discussed in chapter 7. Third, the SAOs 
have limited revenue in order to carry out the policy because of the limited 
revenue from government at the higher level, and the limited income SAOs can 
earn in their local areas, also noted in chapter 7. As a result, SAOs are not able 
to implement the policy effectively. This point is also relevant to Kelman‘s as 
mentioned above. 
  
12) A prime cause of implementation failure arises because the policy 
contents or policy characteristics are ambiguous for government 
agencies to implement. While those who are policy-makers require 
implementers to be competent and to respond to the policies 
correctly, ambiguous policies may lead the frontline workers to 
interpret the policies in different ways (Rawson, Hill and Hupe).  
 
As SAO staff understand and put the policy into practice as the 
government intends, the more likely the policy of decentralisation will be 
implemented effectively. Where the policies are ambiguous then SAO staff will 
apply their individual knowledge and experience to make their policy 
implementation process more effective.  
Generally, SAO representatives have more difficulty interpreting the policy 
than SAO staff who are appointed. They have less experience and knowledge of 
working under the administrative system. When the two groups have to work 
together, some issues invariably cause conflict because they disagree on what 
should be done, as noted in chapter 7.  
This is a significant and serious point for the government because the 
objective of decentralisation policy is to allow SAOs to serve the local people. As 
SAO staff have difficulties in interpreting policy they apply their individual 
interpretation to the policy implementation process, and this can become risky for 









13) Street-level staff bring their individual background and experiences to 
the implementation process: their individual judgements, values, 
opinions, experience, history and background, influence how they 
interpret and apply policy directions (John, Hill & Hupe). 
This research finds that individual background and experiences are very 
significant to the policy implementation. When the SAO staff implement policy, 
they sometimes brought their understanding and experience into their 
implementation of the policy. Even though they realised that they could not 
modify the policy, the SAO staff could only interpret and implement the policy 
differently depending on their individual educational backgrounds, their working 
techniques, and their good relationships with the provincial and local level. With 
the combination of limited staff capabilities and experiences, together with the 
many different factors and conditions faced by SAOs during the policy 
implementation process, they result in different degrees of success in 
implementing the decentralisation policy, as discussed in chapter 7. 
 
14) Many factors can determine the success or failure of policy 
implementation, including regional factors, the local context, cultural 
practices, the mix of ethnicities, assumptions around gender, 
economic forces, changes in social and economic conditions, the 
availability of new technology, and the political circumstances of the 
target group (Jackson, Hill & Hupe, Howlett & Ramesh). 
This research finds that local conditions are a major influence on policy 
implementation. For instance, as noted in chapter 7, the Nong Rad SAO 
sometimes faced difficulty in putting the policy into practice due to the range and 
mixture of ethnicities, which means that they have to deal with the different 
cultural and traditional issues before carrying out their obligations.  
This research also finds that another factor inhibiting SAOs‘ policy 
implementation processes come from cultural factors, especially the influence of 
traditional local leadership. Those community leaders who have good 
relationships with the SAO staff can work together well, as they offer assistance, 
share experiences and provide suggestions. As a result, the SAO‘s policy 
implementation can be delivered effortlessly. Where there is conflict between 
242 
 
traditional community leaders and the SAO staff then relationships between them 
are strained. As noted in chapter 8, this problem normally involves three factors: 
1) The differences in educational backgrounds between the SAO staff and 
the former community leaders; 
2) A reluctance to share power between the executives and the 
administrators which occurs when community leaders have not accepted that 
their roles, responsibilities and power changed after the law change in 1999;  
3) The community leaders still have some power over the local 
community. The people who live in the local area continue to pay respect to those 
community leaders and show little attention to the new concept of 
decentralisation and the SAO because they do not believe that the SAO can 
perform their obligation as well as those former officers did, as discussed in 
chapter 8.  
These conflicts between the community leaders and the SAO staff are not 
obvious, but they affect and inhibit the SAO‘s policy implementation because 
there is a lack of local participation, and the local people are uncertain whether 
the SAO staff have sufficient capability to provide goods and services to the 
community, as noted in chapter 7.   
 
 
15) Coordination and collaboration problems between organisations at 
the vertical level may impede the policy implementation process 
because of gaps or breakdowns between the multi-layers of 
governments (Hill & Hupe). 
According to this research, central and local government staff follow their 
working routines and respective duties, and rely on the exchange of documents 
rather than relying on verbal exchanges. However, conflicts do happen among 
the staff at the SAO level, especially among staff in the same organisation. These 
conflicts can be due to personal issues and attitudes. Conflict among SAO staff 
needs to be addressed because the staff need to work together. When they 
attempt to avoid interacting with one another, then the policy implementation can 
go awry, as noted in chapter 7. 
In addition, the research found that SAO staff do not understand 
decentralisation in the way other staff at higher levels do, and that this can affect 
the government‘s decentralisation policy. This gap between staff at different 
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levels can be very serious, especially if there are poor working links between the 
different levels. Also, when SAO staff are unable to interpret the policy in the way 
the government officials at higher level do, then there are difficulties in putting the 
policy into practice, as noted in chapter 7.  
 
10.3 Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the theory of policy implementation in 
accordance with the ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ approaches as they influence 
policy implementation, whether successfully or unsuccessfully. The thesis also 
contributes to the theory of policy implementation failure in relation to both the 
‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ perspectives.  
This thesis contributes to the theory of policy implementation failure by 
understanding and analysing factors such as cultural practices, local contexts, 
economic forces, the changes in social and economic conditions and their impact 
on the policy implementation process at the local level in a stable system, as 
discussed in chapter 2. However, the literature does not fully address the 
implementation process and policy implementation failure in a complex social 
community. 
From this, the thesis argues that the failure of the policy implementation 
process occurs in the complex social community, which can be explained by the 
dominance of the centralist process, which is a part of the prevalent cultural 
imperative. With the tendency of the ‗top-down‘ approach, problems in policy 
implementation failure arise from three main conditions. First, the influence of the 
long-standing monarchical system over society and its approach to the national 
administrative system through precedence and hierarchy resulted in a stratified 
society with political power of the hand of elites, while the ordinary people had 
few opportunities to participate in politics. Consequently, there was a lack of 
awareness when the government promoted its decentralisation policy, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
Second, the endemic hierarchical system influenced the officials to 
adhere to the traditional way, which made the policy implementation process 
more complicated and slow as there were many layers of authority. This can be 
seen in the case of Thailand which led the government to launch the policy of 
decentralisation in 1997. Third, the consequence of a long-term tradition and 
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practice of centralisation in government can create dependence on a national 
administrative system. At the lower level, the capabilities of officials are limited 
because they have to work under central government with little or no opportunity 
to exercise their own power. In the case of Thailand, when the government 
initiated the policy of decentralisation, there was a varying lack of bureaucratic 
capabilities across all levels and this was reflected in the degree of success.  
 
10.4 Recommendations 
As has been shown above, the Thai government faces a range of 
problems in implementing its decentralisation program and the following section 
suggests alternative strategies under the National Development Plan, and for the 
SAOs.  
 
10.4.1 National Development Plans   
The Thai government has long been seeking to develop the economic 
system through its National Economic and Social Development Plans. The Ninth 
Plan‘s proposals for development through good governance and decentralisation 
have been quite successful as more officials respond positively to the national 
plan, as noted in chapter 5. The government has introduced the concepts of good 
governance, decentralisation, self-governance at the local level, and has 
supported greater participation by the population as promoted in the Ninth Plan.  
The Tenth Plan can be successful only if central government genuinely allows 
local government to practice and play its role. Central government will need to 
provide support and advice to the local government organisations, but should not 
return to the old ways of controlling local government.   
There are several key issues for central government in seeking to assist in 
the implementation of the decentralisation policy. 
a) The law needs clarification, power needs to be delineated clearly, the 
authority and responsibilities of each of the three layers of government 
levels need to be clarified;  
b) Sufficient revenue must be allocated to local government 
organisations for them to carry out their responsibilities, and 
encouragement given to local government organisations to create more 
activities to earn more income; 
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c) The capabilities of local government organisations need to be 
enhanced; 
d) The scope and authority of government at all levels need to be 
outlined clearly, especially the functions transferred from central 
government to local government;   
e) Criteria regarding policy implementation outcomes which the local 
government organisation can use as a guideline need to be set out;  
f) The internal audit system needs to be enhanced to strengthen the 
policy implementation process; 
g) Criteria used in allocating resources among the different government 
levels need to be set out clearly;   
h) A system to strengthen transparency of the local government‘s 
functions and responsibilities and the awarding of merit is needed;  
i) Creating greater consciousness among staff at all government levels 
will mean that they will identify themselves more fully as a part of a 
decentralised and national administrative system;  
j) Public participation in decentralisation needs to be promoted; 
k) The Thai people, especially the youth, need to be encouraged to be 
responsible for themselves and for other people, and to enhance political 




For the decentralisation policy to succeed, government needs to do more 
than set out the policy, as has been done in the past. Government must pay 
close attention to the staff whose job it is to implement the policy to avoid 
mistakes which lead to policy failure.  
As discussed in chapter 2, once a policy is launched there is no guarantee 
that the implementation processes will succeed. In the case of Thailand, it is not 
the outside conditions which inhibit the government‘s policy implementation but 
more the lack of understanding of the core concepts of the decentralisation 
program. Not all staff understand the meaning of the decentralisation policy or of 
the working system under decentralisation.  Nevertheless, the lack of 
understanding about decentralisation at all requires intensive attention, since this 
is where the policy implementation process will succeed or fail. To explain this, 
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while the government decides to devolve power to the local level and allow 
officials at the local level, as well as the local people to participate in 
decentralisation, there are different degrees of readiness of staff at all levels in 
working under decentralisation. This suggests that the decentralisation policy 
was launched too soon, as noted in chapter 7.  
From this, the government must educate officials at all levels, and the 
Thai people need to know and understand decentralisation deeply. Meanwhile, 
the government must train its officials, especially those who are at local level, to 
comprehensively understand the decentralisation policy.    
 
Administrative system 
 Several reforms are indicated for the administrative system. First, the 
regulations, legislation, decrees, rules of procedure, administrative guidelines on 
decentralisation and local government organisation need to be clear, 
understandable and uncomplicated.  Second, the government must allow local 
government to have sufficient autonomy to carry out it own responsibilities and 
should establish a system that is able to provide information, supervision and 
support for local government as and where needed. In addition, the government 
should set out the criteria and scope of the delegated officials regarding their 
responsibilities and authorities over the local government organisations. Third, 
educational programs regarding constitutional mechanisms, offered for the public 
and local politicians, would give people more understanding and familiarity with 
the administrative system. This would require some amendment to the laws on 
local public participation.   
 
Capability of staff  
 Two reforms are suggested for improving the capability of staff. First, 
government should organise annual training programs in different areas for local 
government organisations, especially for SAO executive committees, council 
members, and staff, to enhance their administrative capacities. SAO staff would 
then be encouraged to perform their obligations more effectively and work well 
with staff from the different government levels. Second, because of the limited 
capabilities available in mentoring and giving advice to SAO staff, the 
government should put in place programmes to develop these capabilities.  Such 
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a monitoring programme should develop a mentoring system which is effective, 
maintains a support system, and it is concerned with continuing to supervise the 
local government organisations and provide useful information to the local 
government organisations. From this, SAO staff can perform their responsibilities 
more fully and effectively.   
 
Morale and transparency 
The government should promote and increase the population‘s awareness 
regarding the election of officers to SAOs, and increase the transparency of the 
process. The government should also encourage staff at all government levels to 
be neutral and loyal to their responsibilities. 
 
Good relationships  
In creating and launching its decentralisation program, government should 
encourage the local people to participate in the decentralisation program 
because those people have crucial roles to play in the development of their local 
administration. The government should also encourage and promote good 
relationships among its staff at all levels. This will enable them to collaborate and 
support one another.  
 
10.4.3 Subdistrict Administrative Organisation 
As noted previously in chapter 9, the SAOs face several conditions which 
make difficulties for them. It is not simple for an SAO staff member to determine a 




There are many ways in which SAO staff can develop their understanding 
of their organisation and how to work well with staff from other organisations. 
First, the SAO should allow and give community members more opportunity to 
participate in policy implementation by providing information, proposing activities 
and plans, and providing support. The SAO should allow and encourage 
community members to participate in overseeing, examining and controlling 
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implementation of SAO policy. SAO staff should be encouraged to work 
effectively within the limits of its revenue. 
As well as the criteria set by the government at national level, the SAO 
must set criteria within its organisation to make certain of, and strengthen, their 
performance in policy implementation. The SAO should encourage its staff to 
develop a good network at work.  
The SAO should organise and set an evaluation system within the 
organisation in order to evaluate the policy implementation process and outcome. 
The SAO should also set a system which develops, reforms, and solves the 
problems that occur. The SAO should hold public hearings in planning local 
development policy. This would not only assist the SAO to work and solve the 
right issues, but also create an understanding among the local people. 
 
Capability of staff  
 
The government should organise annual training programs for local 
government organisations, especially special programs for the SAO staff who 
require more skills and capabilities in managing their obligations. The 
government should develop and maintain mentoring and support systems, and 
continue to supervise the local government organisations and provide them with 
useful information. The SAO staff, especially those staff at the higher level should 
have a good and positive vision in order to create activities, exercise 
organisation, and develop their local area.  
The SAO staff need to have a greater understanding of their capabilities 
and to enhance them by attending training programs provided by the 
government, and staff, especially those at the higher level, should allocate staff 
responsibilities according to their backgrounds and expertise. Those who are 
new to the working system should be trained fully to understand what is required 
of them.  
 
Morale and transparency 
 
SAO staff should know their role and responsibilities and work to fulfil 
them fully and to be loyal to the organisation. SAO staff should also understand 
the significance of their responsibilities and their affect on the whole community. 
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They should work to ensure the best possible outcome. SAO staff should have be 
mindful of service and be very friendly in serving their community.  
SAO staff should eradicate corruption, patronage, power and ascendency 
and other forces within their local area that may influence the policy 
implementation in a negative way.  SAO staff should have a high level of 
awareness of themselves as a part of the organisation and the community.  They 
should promote good governance under a transparent system based on merit.   
SAO staff should report to local people on their working process before 
the work begins, while the work is in progress, and after the work is completed. 
From this, people who live in the local area can check and learn what the SAO 
staff do to provide them in terms of goods and services.    
 
Good relationships  
 
SAO staff should have good relationships with staff from other 
organisations at different levels and within its organisation. This will allow them to 
work happily in a good working atmosphere with no conflicts and stress. They 
should promote activities within the organisation, with other organisations at 
provincial and local levels, and within the community to maintain good 
relationships. And, finally, SAO staff should have good public relations with the 
local community and work to promote activities that will result in the community 
developing a trust in the SAO and its staff. 
 
10.5 Recommendations for further study 
The decentralisation policy is very significant for Thailand at this time, as 
discussed in chapter 4. The policy was included in the 1997 constitution that 
presented a new scheme of national administrative system, and in the National 
Economic and Social Development plans as the government endeavoured to 
focus more on decentralisation and local government as a strategy to promote 
the social, political and economic development of Thailand. However, the 
government‘s decentralisation policy has not been completely achieved, due to 
the strong culturally-based traditions of centralisation. Only a small number of 
officials know and understand the significance of decentralisation, and the 
evolving structure and potential role for local government. In addition, this factor 
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also influences the reluctance to transfer power, causing negative attitudes, and 
influencing the way government officials follow the new scheme of national 
administration under decentralisation, as noted in chapter 8. Adherence to the old 
bureaucratic systems still exists, as the national administrative system remains 
focused on centralisation and government officials still continue to work in their 
familiar working style. Further study about the attitudes of government officials to 
the government‘s decentralisation policy under a new scheme of national 
administrative system is recommended.  
With the 1997 Constitution, the Ninth Plan (2002-2006) and the Tenth 
Plan (2007–2011), there has been considerable emphasis on good governance, 
enhancing the national administrative system, decentralisation and fostering 
public participation. Even though the Ninth Plan promoted good governance, as 
noted in chapter 5, it became clear that there were deficiencies in the new 
national administrative system. One area for further study is the degree to which 
staff respond positively to the government‘s policy on governance, and their 
capabilities in interpreting and implementing the policy. Particular emphasis 
would be on the behaviour and attitudes of staff to change at the local level.  
Another area for further study concerns how best to improve staff 
capabilities and understanding. Even though the central government already 
provides training programs all year round, and even though they are offered at a 
basic level for all staff, only a small number of staff participate. A major training 
program is needed for all the staff eligible to attend but it needs to be focused on 
what staff at the local government level genuinely require. In this way, the 































Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in Chiang Rai  






1. Pa Or Donchai 
Chiang Rai 
district 





3. Wiang Chiang Kong 2008  
4. Krueng Chiang Kong 2008  
5.Paa Tan Khuntan 2008  
6. Tyang Hom Khuntan 2008  
7. Pasang Mae Chan 2008  
8.Maiya Paya Meng Rai 2008  
9Takhaopleuk Mae Chan 2009  
10.Mae Khum Mae Chan 2009  
11.Muangyai Wiang Kaen 2009  
12.Laingao Wiang Kaen 2009  
13.Takam Wiang Kaen 2009  
14.Paa Ngew Wiang Papao 2009  
15.Wiang kalong Wiang Papao 2009  
16.Ngew Teuang 2009  
17.Ngao Teuang 2009  





20.Dong Mada Maelao 2009  
21. San Makha Paded 2009  
22.Mengrai Paya MengRai 2009  
23. Mae Suey Mae Suey 2009  
24.Mae Sai Mae Sai 2009  
 
Sources:  Adapted from Department of Local Administration. 15 December 2009, Ministry 




Discussion Guide for Focus Groups 
Decentralisation and Policy Implementation: Thai Development Plans and 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisation (SAO) in Chiang Rai 
 
The focus group discussion will begin with a welcome and comments 
introducing the topic and key theme of the research – i.e., the capacity of SAOs to 
implement the policy of decentralisation.  The discussion will cover the following 
topics: 
Decentralisation  
1. What is your understanding of decentralisation? How has the process of 
decentralisation worked? (its origin, its purpose) 
2. What challenges has your SAO faced in coming up with its own 
programmes and policies of decentralisation?  
3. What alternative plans or programmes has your SAO done in order to 
solve the problems of the decentralisation policy?  
4. What challenges or problems does your SAO face under this 
decentralisation policy? 
5. What is likely to assist the SAO in implementing the decentralisation 
policy? 
6. What are the main issues you think should be examined further? 
7. Who have advised you on the policy in detail? 
8. Who is responsible for implementing decentralisation?  
 
Inter-relationships between organisations 
1. Describe how the policy implementation process has worked in terms of 
cooperation between the SAO and other organisations at provincial levels 
and local levels. 
2. What has worked well in implementing the decentralisation policy? 
3. What has proved to be more difficult in implementing the decentralisation 
policy? (About what? Major? Minor? ) 
4. Has the SAO faced any challenging inter-relationships in cooperation at 
the principle and local levels? 
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5. Does your SAO face any hierarchical conditions in cooperation between 
provincial and local levels? 
6. What problems does the SAO face in cooperation from those two levels? 
7. Do you receive any support from central government or other 
organisations? 
8. What are your SAO solutions or alternatives to solve the problems?  How 
do you deal with that? 
9. What significant issues do you think should be considered? 
 
Different Interpretations 
1. How do you interpret decentralisation policy before the implementation 
process?  
2. What is significant in the decentralisation policy interpretation? 
3. What do you consider are the challenges in interpreting the 
decentralisation policy? 
4. What problems do the SAO staff have in interpreting the decentralisation 
policy and how are the problems solved?  
5. Do you think decentralisation policy determined by central government is 
appropriate? Why do you think it is appropriate? If not, why is it not 
appropriate?  
6. Have you or your SAO modified policy to suit your local area and the 
SAO‘s conditions?  
 
Other conditions  
Internal capacities (SAO) 
1. How did you implement policy in general and in a particular area? 
2. What challenges, difficulties, or problems does the SAO face in 
implementing the decentralisation policy? 
3. What conditions within your SAO make it difficult for staff to implement the 
decentralisation policy? 







1. Would you describe how you participate in policy implementation decision 
making? 
2. What assistance does the central government support your SAO in policy 
implementation? 
3. What policy method does your SAO use to implement policies? 
 
Revenue 
1. Would you describe how you implement policies for revenue provided by 
central government? 
2. In your view, what challenges has your SAO faced in revenue?  
3. What alternatives has your SAO made in order to solve the problems? 



















Discussion Guide for In-depth Interview 
 
Decentralisation and policy implementation: Thai development plans and 




1. What specific changes have occurred since the policy of decentralisation 
was announced in 1997? 
2. How has decentralisation worked? 
3. How has your SAO been able to deal with the additional demands as a 
consequence of the policy of decentralisation?  
4. What is required to ensure the SAO can effectively carry out their new 
responsibilities?  
5. Where are the main problems?  
6. What are the main points to which the SAO should pay more attention? 
 
Inter-relationships between organisations 
1. Describe how the process of policy implementation has worked in terms 
of cooperation between the SAO and other organisations at the provincial 
levels and local levels? 
2. What inter-relationship challenges have the provincial and local levels, 
especially the SAO, faced?  
3. What do you think about the hierarchical condition in between a provincial 
and local government? 
4. What problems do the provincial and a local government face with 
cooperation? 
5. What solutions or alternatives have you made to solve the problems?  







1. Could you describe how different the provincial and local levels (the SAO) 
interpret policies before putting policy into practise?  
2. What is significant in policy implementation interpretation? And how does 
it work? 
3. What are challenges in the SAO policy implementation interpretation? 
4. What problems do the SAO staff have in policy interpretation and how do 
you solve the problems?  
5. Do you think policy determined by central government is appropriate? 
Why do you think it is appropriate? If not, why is it not appropriate?  
6. Have you reported or experienced SAOs in modifying policy 
implementation? 
  
Other conditions  
1. Describe and comment on a policy implementing failure in terms of SAO 
staff capacity, autonomy and revenue.  
2. What impacts on policy implementation at the SAO level? 
3. Do you have any suggestions about the problems? 
4. Do you have any alternatives or solutions to solve the problems?  
 
Staff Capacities 
1. Describe how SAO staff implement policies.   
2. What challenges, difficulties, or problems does your SAO face in policy 
implementation?  
3. What conditions within your SAO staff themselves make it a difficulty to 
implement policy?  




1. Describe how the SAO participates in policy implementation decision 
making? 
2. In which way can central and provincial governments contribute to the 
SAO in policy implementation?  
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3. What challenges do the SAO face in terms of gaining autonomy in policy 
implementation? 
4. What degree of autonomy and support should be provided SAO in order 
to successfully implement policy?  
 
Revenue 
1. What revenue is provided by central government to the SAO? 
2. What challenges has the SAO faced in terms of limited revenue?  
3. What alternatives have the government presented to address the limited 
revenue? 
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